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While political scientists have traditionally examined social influence through social 
network or contextual studies, this dissertation argues for the use of  spatial econometrics as 
an alternative approach. While spatial econometrics is not new to political science, the 
dissertation attempts to broaden its application by exploring spaces based on geography, 
demographic characteristics, and ideology. Social influence can be understood as a form of  
spatial interdependence among individuals in these spaces and can be analyzed as spatial 
autocorrelation. 
In the dissertation, I discuss the dimensions of  the three spaces, what might account 
for mutual influence in these spaces, how to measure distances in these spaces, and how to 
use these distances for estimating social influence in models of  political attitudes using 
ANES data. By taking a broader approach to space, I show that spatial econometrics can 
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Announcing that the “GOP is the new black” and that “Martin Luther King, Jr. was a 
Republican,” three billboards appeared in Austin, Texas in October 2011. Conservative 
group Raging Elephants had put up these billboards to encourage blacks to think about 
voting Republican and to weaken what it saw as an undue loyalty to the Democratic Party. 
According to Raging Elephant’s representatives, blacks have many conservative values that 
align better with the Republican Party, and the Democratic Party is not as good for the black 
community as the black community thinks it is (Cozier, 2011; Wiggins, 2011). 
Rather than present substantive arguments for why blacks should consider voting 
Republican, these billboards made the case for voting Republican by appealing to a sense of  
social propriety in the black community: Martin Luther King, Jr. voted Republican – so should 
you. Hip young black people are voting Republican – so should you. The unstated premise of  
this rhetorical approach is that many black voters currently do not vote Republican because 
it is not socially acceptable. 
The question of  why blacks vote Democratic is, in part, a question of  social 
influence. In political science, the study of  social influence involves understanding the 
relationship between individuals and groups and how individuals influence each other within 
these groups. To find out what role social influence plays in mass politics, researchers have a 
variety of  methods and models at their disposal. These methods and models have led 
researchers to conclude that social influence is important in politics. For example, through 
 
2 
casual conversations, individuals may learn about others’ attitudes toward specific issues and 
may come to adopt those feelings themselves (Mutz, 2002; McClurg, 2006). But the idea that 
social influence is important in politics is hardly confined to scholarly research. For example, 
politicians often identify themselves as members of  various social groups, implicitly 
assuming that members of  a particular group are affected by what other members of  that 
group think. Before the advent of  modern methods and models, Aristotle believed that the 
fundamental unit in politics was not the individual, but the “partnership,” or relationship 
between individuals, such as husband-wife, parent-child, and ruler-subject (Aristotle, 1995 
[350 BC]).  
An important implication of  the idea that social influence is important in politics is 
that individuals tend to be interdependent in their political behavior and attitudes. Ignoring this 
interdependence has important methodological consequences for political science research. 
First, ignoring interdependence in political behavior and attitudes may lead to a 
misspecification of  both individual-level and group-level factors that underlie political 
behavior. According to prominent social influence researcher Robert Huckfeldt (2007a), 
If  various forms of  political behavior are, in turn, contingent on an individual’s 
location within networks of  political communication, the likelihood of  engaging in a 
behavior – holding an opinion, voting for a candidate, putting up a political yard sign 
– is apt to vary across these various contextual units of  aggregation. Thus, aggregate 
analyses that ignore important patterns of  interdependence enhance the risk of  
producing ecological fallacies.1 
Second, ignoring interdependence in political behavior and attitudes may lead to a 
misspecification of  the relationship between individual-level factors and individual-level 
outcomes. In contrast to the ecological fallacy, this atomistic misspecification may lead to 
inaccurate conclusions based on individual-level data; Huckfeldt called this an “individualistic 
                                                 
1 An ecological fallacy refers to the inaccurate conclusions that arise from using aggregate (i.e., “ecological”) 
data to infer individual-level relationships when individual-level data are not available (see King, 1997). 
 
3 
fallacy.” According to Huckfeldt (2007a), both methodological consequences are based on 
“the stated or unstated assumption that individual characteristics and attributes translate 
directly into likelihoods of  opinions and behaviors independently of  the networks and 
contexts within which individuals are embedded.”  
Ecological and individualistic fallacies point to the importance of  basing 
methodological assumptions on realistic and substantively meaningful observations of  
human sociability. Of  course, individualistic or aggregate models of  political behavior and 
attitudes might be defended as mere abstractions that are, by nature, coarse approximations 
of  real, complex human actions. But even mere abstractions should be no coarser than they 
need to be. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
That politics is inherently social is hardly controversial. But the issue of  how to study 
social influence, in light of  the fact that politics is inherently social, is more so. Accordingly, 
the research question at the heart of  this dissertation is, “How should we study social 
influence?” 
Political scientists have conventionally examined social influence through the analysis 
of  variance (ANOVA) framework, social network analysis, contextual analysis,2 and linear 
regression analysis. While these tools are useful and have provided important insights into 
the nature of  social influence in politics and other areas of  study, they have important 
methodological issues (as we will see) and often fall short of  providing meaningful 
information on the social influence process under study. To enhance the study of  social 
                                                 
2 A special case of hierarchical linear modeling 
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influence, this dissertation advocates and uses spatial econometrics as an alternative, more 
meaningful approach. 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF RECIPROCAL CAUSATION 
One of  the most pressing issues in the study of  social influence is the problem of  
reciprocal causation. In political science, the study of  social influence involves understanding 
how, why, and to what extent individuals are influenced by their social environments. The 
problem of  reciprocal causation is an identification problem regarding the direction and size 
of  influence between an individual and his social environment. McClurg (2010a) provides 
the following example of  reciprocal causation in a study of  boss-employee relationships and 
their impact on politics: 
If  the employee donates money to a specific presidential candidate, as does her boss, 
is it because the boss has persuaded her to make that donation in lieu of  facing 
professional setbacks? Such an argument is perfectly sensible and gets raised 
frequently in discussions of  campaign reform. However, it is equally possible that it 
is the employee, anxious to demonstrate her political perspicacity, explains to her 
boss the importance of  making the contribution in order to advance the company’s 
interests. It is also possible that both processes are acting simultaneously to produce 
the behavior of  interest. 
In general, the problem of  reciprocal causation is the problem of  isolating the effect of  a 
social environment on an individual when it is possible that the individual might also have an 
effect on his social environment; that is, the effect flows not only from the environment to 
the individual but also from the individual to the environment. Unfortunately, conventional 
methods for studying social influence, such as contextual analysis, often fails to provide a 
satisfactory answer to the problem. In his critique of  contextual analysis, Blalock (1984) 
wrote, “[T]o the degree that the causal processes [differ], it would also be difficult, if  not 




The problem of  reciprocal causation is an important one because it calls into 
question the internal validity of  social influence studies.3 Despite the volume of  research on 
social influence, researchers have not provided definitive evidence of  a causal relationship 
between interactions in social environments and political behaviors and attitudes. Since the 
direction of  causation is difficult to determine, explanations of  social influence processes are 
often incomplete and unsatisfactory (see Klofstad, 2007 for further discussion). 
Researchers have attempted to address the problem of  reciprocal causation in several 
ways. One approach is to employ systems of  equations involving variables that 
independently predict values of  the dependent variable and characteristics of  the social 
environment under study. According to McClurg (2010a), however, these statistical solutions 
are “frequently intractable and impractical” and “often provide only imprecise and rough 
estimates about casual effects.” Another approach is to use creative research designs to 
address internal validity explicitly, such as field experiments and natural experiments 
(Klofstad, 2007; Nickerson, 2008). Unfortunately, such experiments have well-known 
problems of  their own, such as the problems of  external validity, generalizability, and 
feasibility. The shortcomings of  these and other methods led McClurg (2010a) to express 
pessimism regarding a solution to the problem of  reciprocal causation: 
[W]hile each approach is helpful, none of  them holds out the promise for solving 
these problems “once and for good” in the field of  social communications. This 
again suggests to me that healthy progress in the subfield of  social communications 
depends deeply on the use of  multiple methods and the slow accumulation of  
evidence, rather [than] a single set of  methodological solutions to causal validity 
issues. 
                                                 
3 According to Huckfeldt and Sprague (1991), the problem of reciprocal causation may be important in theory 
but not necessarily in practice. Distinguishing between egos as the centers of social networks and alters as 
members of those social networks, they found that very few alters choose egos as discussion partners among 
nonrelatives, which provided little evidence of actual reciprocity. However, their result is confined to non-




While this dissertation does not solve the problem of  reciprocal causation “once and for 
good,” it does present a methodological approach that directly addresses the issue of  
reciprocal causation and has the potential to aid “healthy progress” in research on social 
influence in politics. 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL DISTANCE 
A fundamental prerequisite for social influence is social interaction, since individuals 
must have the opportunity to interact with one another if  social influence is to take place. 
The likelihood of  social interaction depends, in large part, on social distance. 
Social distance is a general measure of  similarity between individuals in a particular 
social environment. Social distance can be based on geography, demographics, ideology, or 
other characteristics of  a social environment where social influence might take place. The 
idea is that the more similar two individuals are, the less social distance there is between 
them, and the more likely they are to influence each other. For example, there is less social 
distance between individuals who live in the same city, compared with individuals who live in 
separate cities. There is less social distance between individuals who are in the same income 
bracket, compared with individuals who fall into different income brackets. There is less 
social distance between individuals who belong to the same political party and greater social 
distance between individuals who belong to different political parties. Accordingly, 
individuals who live in the same city, who fall in the same income bracket, and/or belong to 
the same political party are more likely to interact and mutually influence each other than 
individuals who are more socially distant. 
Conventional approaches to the study of  social influence tend to take a binary view 
of  social distance, which leads to a binary view of  social influence. For example, a researcher 
might model an individual’s vote choice as a function of  the mean political ideology of  each 
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individual’s city. This means that the ideologies of  fellow city dwellers might have an impact 
on each individual’s vote choice, but the ideologies of  those who live in other cities, even in 
cities that are adjacent or very close to the individual’s city, are assumed to have no impact at 
all. This assumption regarding the nature of  social influence may be overly restrictive, 
especially in cases where cities are relatively small and individuals are very mobile. In such 
cases, there may be potential for a lot of  interaction and hence social influence among 
individuals from neighboring cities. Furthermore, the amount of  interaction and social 
influence might be closely related to the distance between the cities; there might be a lot of  
interaction and influence among individuals in the same city, relatively less interaction and 
influence among individuals in neighboring cities, and no interaction or influence among 
individuals who live in cities that are far apart.4 Conventional approaches, such as contextual 
analysis, do not allow researchers to scale social influence according to distance in this 
manner. By treating social influence as an all-or-nothing phenomenon in all circumstances, 
researchers must necessarily assume that there can be social influence only between 
individuals who live in the same city. More generally, researchers must assume that social 
influence is limited to individuals within discrete categories of  interest. 
One might argue that conventional methods do in fact account for social influence 
(to a limited extent) though the use of  control variables in linear regression models. In 
political science research, researchers may wish to account for social environments, even if  
they are not interested in modeling social influence directly. In such a circumstance, a 
researcher might include several demographic variables as control variables in a linear 
regression model. For example, race, sex, social class, and educational attainment might be 
                                                 
4 The non-binary nature of social influence was suggested in the work of Berelson et al. (1954), who noted that 
the stronger the relationship of individual Catholics with their local church, the stronger the effect of the group 
norm on individual political preferences, compared with the community norm in Elmira. 
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included as independent variables in a model of  individual attitudes toward government 
spending. These independent variables can be interpreted as indicators of  group interests, 
such as women’s interests, Hispanic interests, or business class interests. This interpretation is 
based on the social-psychological thinking that is common in political science research. As 
Achen (1992) noted, “Group identification was said to structure individuals’ thinking, and 
the stronger the identification, the stronger the effect.” Accordingly, group identifiers, such 
as party identification and demographics can serve as controls for group loyalties that might 
impact political behaviors and attitudes. 
Unfortunately, using control variables to account for social influence has important 
limitations. First, indiscriminately using control variables to account for important but 
auxiliary factors may produce misleading coefficient estimates in the presence of  
unrecognized nonlinearity (see Achen, 2002; Achen, 2005). Thus, while the practice of  using 
many control variables may be widespread and convenient, it may be methodologically 
suspect. Second, the assumptions may be unrealistic with regards to social influence. The 
impact of  control variables is assumed to be linear and additive, and each causal effect 
presumably operates independently of  the values of  other variables. This means that the 
researcher would have to treat certain control variables, such as race and class, separately, 
even if  they are related in a social environment. While researchers might overcome this 
problem by interacting all the control variables, such a solution might lead to an 
unacceptable loss of  degrees of  freedom. Even if  the loss of  degrees of  freedom is 
acceptable, a linear regression model with control variables and interacting control variables 
cannot adequately account for social distance because each respondent would be identified 
with a particular combination of  control variables and no others and because there is no 
guarantee that greater levels of  similarity would correspond with greater levels of  social 
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influence. This means, for example, that researchers would be able to assess the effects of  
being working class and Hispanic on an individual’s vote choice, but not the effects of  other 
classes or other races, even if  they are relevant. 
THE CENTRAL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
This dissertation takes the view that reciprocal causation and social distance can be 
addressed methodologically through the use of  spatial econometrics.  
Previous studies have failed to address the problem of  reciprocal causation because 
researchers have often used models and methods that inherently assume that social influence 
flows only in one direction, leaving the problem of  reciprocal causation entirely to the 
discretion of  the researcher. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1991) point out, however, 
“[I]nfluence flows in two directions . . . .” Rather than use models that assume a uni-
directional process of  influence, researchers should instead use models that actually 
incorporate mutual influence and social distance among individuals. In this dissertation, we 
will see that the field of  spatial econometrics offers an attractive set of  models that do 
exactly this. 
Spatial econometrics is a set of  tools for modeling mutual influence among 
interacting individuals (or other units). It allows researchers to find out, all things being 
equal, whether an environment (i.e., a “neighborhood” in spatial econometric jargon) exerts 
any influence on an individual, after accounting for the individual’s role in that environment. 
Doing this involves using a spatial regression model (i.e., a spatial lag model) that represents 
the social influence process as a dynamic diffusion process in which individuals mutually 
influence each other in specific types of  neighborhoods. Furthermore, such a model features 
the size and direction of  social influence as a parameter, which means that it can be 
estimated, rather than relegated to theoretical exposition and speculation. As this dissertation 
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will show, this type of  model is much more representative of  social influence as mutual 
influence and explicitly accounts for the interdependencies among individuals in their social 
environments. 
Indeed, spatial econometrics is especially apt for estimating the effects that others’ 
behavior or attitudes have on the behavior or attitudes of  individuals. While conventional 
methods, such as contextual analysis, can only describe a group’s effect on a member, spatial 
econometrics can show what effect the member has on the group. Take, for example, the 
decision of  baseball player Albert Pujols to sign with the Los Angeles Angels of  Anaheim. 
Contextual analysis can describe how joining the Angels changes Mr. Pujols, but it cannot 
describe how changes in Mr. Pujols might affect the Angels. Suppose we are interested in the 
average amount of  time baseball players spend practicing base running, and suppose that 
there is a culture of  base running among the Angels so that each team member practices 
more base running, compared with being a member of  a different team. If  Mr. Pujols loses 
weight because of  this running, causing him to practice even more base running, what effect 
would his extra practice have on the amount of  time that his team members spend base 
running? Would Mr. Pujols’ weight loss indirectly affect the average amount of  base running 
practice among the Angels? As this dissertation shows, spatial econometrics can answer 
these kinds of  questions. 
Furthermore, spatial econometrics allows researchers to account for social distance 
when modeling social influence. Spatial regression models feature what is called a spatial 
weights matrix, which is a square matrix that represents the relationships between the 
respondents in a sample. These relationships can be as simple as common membership in a 
group (such as a church), which can be represented in a binary manner; or the relationships 
can be more nuanced, such as language similarity (which can be represented on a continuous 
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scale). As we will see, the spatial weights matrix is a powerful and flexible way of  
representing social environments of  interest.  
BRIDGING SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND SPATIAL ECONOMETRICS 
While spatial econometrics originated in the study of  geography, this dissertation 
seeks to broaden its use to the study of  social influence in politics. This effort is in line with 
the increasing interest in and use of  spatial econometric tools in political science over the 
past decade. Researchers have used spatial econometric models to study such diverse 
phenomena as the diffusion of  policies and innovations (Werck et al., 2006; Woods, 2006; 
Couglin et al., 2007; Volden et al., 2008), the role of  interdependencies in international 
relations (Gleditsch and Ward, 2000; Gleditsch, 2002; Ward and Gleditsch, 2002; Gleditsch, 
2007) and political economy (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Simmons et al., 2006; Beck et al., 
2006), neighborhood effects on national identity (Lin et al., 2006), and neighborhood effects 
on campaign contributions (Cho, 2003). 
Expanding the use of  spatial econometrics is not a straightforward task. Spatial 
econometrics is a set of  tools that originated in the study of  geography; its concepts, models, 
and methods require explanation as to how they can be applied to the study of  social 
influence in politics. This dissertation provides this explanation in several ways.  
First, it explains how social influence can be understood as a form of  spatial 
dependence and can be analyzed as spatial autocorrelation. A primary concern in spatial 
econometrics, spatial dependence is the relationship between observations and the locations 
of  those observations.5 Anselin (1988) defines spatial dependence as follows: “In general 
                                                 
5 Spatial dependence can be compared with serial correlation in time-series analysis. In the former case, 
observations are lagged over a given subset of other observations, whereas in the latter, observations are lagged 




terms, spatial dependence can be considered to be the existence of  a functional relationship 
between what happens at one point in space and what happens elsewhere.” He points out 
that where human beings are located and how far apart they are from each other are 
important elements in structuring human behavior. This dissertation is an attempt to bring 
this insight to the study of  social influence and address the problem of  reciprocal causation. 
Second, this dissertation shows how spatial econometrics can allow researchers to 
work with more flexible definitions of  social context. It can deal explicitly with 
interdependencies among groups that are not necessarily geographically-based. A primary 
contribution of  this dissertation lies in re-conceptualizing social context as space and social 
influence as functions of  distance in this space. This space need not be geographically-
defined; it need not be limited to census tracts or state boundaries. Taking Beck et al.’s (2006) 
suggestion that “space is more than geography,” this dissertation explores this idea by 
translating different types of  social contexts and social influence into spatial terms. 
Specifically, this dissertation conceptualizes three different types of  spaces – i.e., 
geographical, demographic, and ideological – and looks at whether and to what extent 
individuals mutually influence each other’s political attitudes in these spaces. 
Third, this dissertation provides in-depth discussions of  spatial econometric models 
and conventional models of  social influence. These discussions address how and why spatial 
econometrics can provide information on the phenomenon of  social influence that other 
methods cannot. The purpose of  these discussions is to demonstrate the theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                 
Upon closer examination, it often follows that standard econometric results from time series analysis 
do not carry over in a straightforward way to spatial dependence in cross-sectional samples. This is 
primarily a result of the multi-directional nature of dependence in space, which, as opposed to a clear 
one-directional situation in time, precludes the application of many simplifying results and necessitates 
the use of a different methodological framework. 
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advantages of  spatial econometrics and why social influence researchers should include it in 
their methodological toolbox. 
Finally, this dissertation provides three illustrative examples of  how econometric 
models can be used to understand the role of  social influence in politics. In three empirical 
chapters, this dissertation assesses whether and to what extent individuals who are 
geographically, demographically, and ideologically similar mutually influence each other’s 
attitudes toward political issues such as government spending and access to abortion. The 
models used in these assessments incorporate social contexts that are not limited to 
geography; represent social influence as a dynamic process of  mutual influence among 
interdependent individuals; and allow for the estimation of  a social environment’s influence 
on individuals, after accounting for reciprocal causation and individual-level factors. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
In this introduction, I have discussed the major themes, research question, and 
scholarly contribution of  this dissertation. 
In chapter 2, I discuss the key concepts, theories, and propositions pertaining to the 
role of  social influence in mass politics and the spatial econometric framework. I argue that 
a social context can be reconceptualized as a space for social interaction, that individuals 
who might be subjected to social influence occupy particular points in such a space, that the 
extent of  social influence is related to the “distances” between such individuals situated in 
the space, and that similarly-situated individuals comprise a kind of  spatial “neighborhood,” 
or group, in which each individual influences and is influenced by his spatial neighbors’ 
political behaviors and attitudes. Then, I explain why social influence must be understood as 
mutual influence and argue that models of  social influence must account for the endogeneity 
in the dependent variable of  interest. Next, I introduce spatial econometrics and show how 
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the concepts, theories, and propositions of  social influence come together in spatial 
regression models of  social influence. Finally, I introduce existing models of  social 
influence, compare them to spatial regression models, and show how the latter models better 
represent the social influence mechanism. 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth comparison of  spatial regression and linear 
regression models to address directly the issues of  social influence and social distance. In 
this chapter, I examine ANOVA, simple linear regression, and multiple linear regression 
models; discuss their relationship to spatial regression models; and show how spatial 
regression models are more substantively meaningful and statistically informative for the 
study of  social influence than linear regression models. 
Chapter 4 describes the research design of  the dissertation. In this chapter, I identify 
and discuss the unit of  analysis, the data source, measurement issues, estimation methods, 
and testable hypotheses employed in this dissertation’s empirical analyses of  the role of  
social influence on individual attitudes toward political issues. Furthermore, I also discuss 
Galton’s Problem, which has to do with the enormous difficulty of  separating the effects of  
mutual influence from common shocks, and how this dissertation deals with this issue. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are empirical applications of  spatial econometrics to the 
question of  whether and to what extent social influence impacts the political attitudes of  
individuals. In these three chapters, I provide more detailed accounts of  how social influence 
on political attitudes might take place in geographical space, Blau space, and latent 
ideological space. I put into practice the idea that the dimensions of  these spaces can be 
understood not as control variables, as they have often have been used, but as structures 
underlying the clustering of  political attitudes. Implementing the research design discussed in 
chapter 4, I construct spatial weights matrices based on geographical, Blau, and ideological 
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distances and use these matrices in spatial regression models of  social influence to find out 
whether and to what extent individuals who are similarly situated in geographical, Blau, and 
ideological space mutually influence each other’s political attitudes. 
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation. It highlights the main issues and findings of  
this dissertation, and discusses their implications for the study of  social influence in politics. 
Finally, it identifies avenues for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORIES 





As individuals make up their minds about political issues or decide whether to act politically, 
it is plausible that they take into account the views of  family members, friends, colleagues, 
and neighbors. These family members, friends, colleagues, and neighbors are part of  each 
individual’s social context. But depending on the researcher’s subject of  study, an individual’s 
relevant social context may be narrower or broader than these. An individual might account 
only for the views of  his family when deciding whether to vote for a property tax hike; or he 
might account for the (perceived) views of  several countries in deciding whether to support 
or oppose his country’s decision to go to war. Thus, in the study of  social influence, it is 
important to specify the relevant social context that circumscribes the subject of  study. This 
important specification bridges substantive and methodological concerns; it encourages 
more precise theories of  social influence, constrains the set of  possible social influence 
mechanisms under consideration, and helps determine which models and what data to use 
for the empirical study of  social influence. 
Accordingly, this chapter begins with a discussion of  different definitions of  social 
context and their consequences for understanding social influence. I argue that the 
increasing number of  competing definitions has led to greater confusion regarding the 
mechanisms of  social influence. To remedy this problem, I suggest a re-conceptualization of  
a social context as an abstract, multidimensional space. This idea of  social context as space is 
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general yet useful; it can subsume existing notions of  social context while providing a clearer 
framework for positing mechanisms for social influence. Next, I give three examples of  
social contexts and discuss how thinking of  them as spaces helps to show how they might 
shape political attitudes.  
Along the way, I also clarify the major concepts supporting the idea of  social context 
as space, such as social space, social distance, and neighborhood. Using these concepts, I 
argue that social influence should be understood as mutual influence among individuals who 
occupy particular points in a space, that the extent of  social influence is related to the 
“distances” between such individuals situated in the space, and that similarly-situated 
individuals comprise a kind of  spatial “neighborhood,” or group, in which each individual 
influences and is influenced by his spatial neighbors’ political behaviors and attitudes. Next, I 
show how this framework can be used with spatial econometric tools for empirical analyses 
of  whether political attitudes are subject to social influence. To do this, I provide a brief  
introduction to spatial econometrics and show how the concepts, theories, and propositions 
of  social influence come together in spatial regression models of  social influence. Finally, I 
introduce existing models of  social influence, compare them to spatial regression models, 
and show how the latter models better represent the social influence mechanism. 
THE EMERGENCE OF “SOCIAL CONTEXT” 
“Social context”6 refers to the characteristics of  social aggregations such as 
neighborhoods, discussion groups, peers, small groups, and social networks. The relevance 
of  social context to political behavior and attitudes has long been established in social 
science. For example, political discussions in social networks affect how individuals view and 
                                                 
6 Also called “social environment” or “social structure.” 
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participate in elections (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991, 1995; Kenny 1992, 1994). Lake and 
Huckfeldt (1998) found that more frequent political discussion in individuals’ social 
networks correlates with higher levels of  political participation. Social aggregations also 
affect individuals’ attitudes toward specific issues (Binder et al., 2009), cause individuals to 
hold more extreme attitudes (Sunstein, 2000), decrease ambivalence about political decisions 
(McClurg, 2007), change initial opinions about politics (Luskin et al., 2002), and increase 
political participation (McClurg, 2007). 
The study of  social contexts and their consequences emerged from the work of  
prominent sociologists such as Durkheim, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and Blau. Observing the rise 
of  mass surveys in social science research in the 1950s, Columbia sociologists such as 
Berelson and Lazarsfeld worried about the possible marginalization of  social interactions 
and complexities (that in-depth studies of  group dynamics could better explain), and about 
the problems with inferring individual behavior from aggregate data (the “ecological 
fallacy”). Their solution to both problems was the analysis of  “contextual effects,” which 
were also known as “structural effects” or “compositional effects.” The analysis of  
contextual effects involves obtaining measures on individuals, aggregating the measures 
based on group membership to obtain group attributes, and then determining the effect of  a 
group attribute on some individual-level outcome variable when the corresponding 
individual characteristic is held constant. The effects of  the group-level independent 
variables are the “contextual effects” that presumably arose from social interaction within a 
social context. Blau (1957) explains: 
The general principle is that if  ego’s X affects not only ego’s Y but also alter’s Y, a 
[contextual effect] will be observed, which means that the distribution of  X in a 
group is related to Y even though the individual’s X is held constant. Such a finding 
indicates that the network of  relations in the group with respect to X influences Y. 
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This general approach uncovered a number of  interesting social phenomena. For example, 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) found that the higher the proportion of  
Republicans in a group of  friends, the higher the proportion of  non-Republicans in that 
group who vote Republican. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) found that political interest is 
higher in social contexts with higher levels of  political consensus, regardless of  political 
preference. Davis, Spaeth, and Huson (1961) later formalized the general approach outlined 
by Blau and others by developing techniques for identifying contextual effects and a 
typology of  different kinds of  contextual effects.  
In the 1980s, Robert Huckfeldt and his colleagues took the sociologists’ analysis of  
contextual effects and adapted it to the study of  political psychology and public opinion by 
collecting egocentric network data and using contextual analysis. Egocentric data collection7 
was a way of  incorporating social context data into random sample surveys. Contextual 
analysis provided the statistical methods and models for parsing individual-level and group-
level effects within a regression framework. In order to apply both of  these tools, however, 
Huckfeldt and his colleagues found that they needed a major redefinition of  social context, 
which had been too conceptually narrow for their needs. 
Prior to these research efforts, “social context” was not a major conceptual issue 
because it was understood simply to refer to the observable characteristics of  clearly-defined 
groups. Early sociological studies of  contextual effects involved clearly-defined groups such 
as assembly line workers, counties, the military, religious sects, and countries, which were 
chosen prior to the actual research effort. This approach carried over to early studies of  
contextual effects in political science as well, when researchers focused on clearly-defined 
                                                 
7 In egocentric data collection, researchers collect data on individuals and their associates in a multi-step 
process. First, they conduct the initial interviews with randomly-selected individuals from a population of 
interest. Next, the researchers ask those individuals to name other individuals with whom they have 
discussions. Finally, the researchers carry out a second set of interviews with the named discussants. 
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groups based on election districts (Tingsten, 1963), towns (Segal and Meyer, 1974), mining 
and resort areas (Butler and Stokes, 1974), and counties (Miller, 1956; Putnam 1966).8  
But over the course of  their research, Huckfeldt and his colleagues found that they 
needed a broader, more generally applicable definition of  social context in order to take 
advantage of  their new data and methods. Accordingly, Huckfeldt took the idea of  a 
“neighborhood,” which conventionally refers to a cohesive geographical community, and 
reworked it into a more abstract concept that included, but was not limited to, the 
conventional understanding. This broader definition can be found throughout much of  
Huckfeldt’s research (see Huckfeldt, 1979; Huckfeldt, 1983a; Huckfeldt, 1983b; Huckfeldt, 
1986). A typical definition of  “neighborhood” is as follows:  
The neighborhood, as it is conceived here, refers to the shared geographical locale of  
a residential grouping, and the neighborhood social context refers to the population 
composition of  the people who live in the neighborhood. 
This neighborhood definition subsumes the cohesive community but does not 
depend upon it. The definition is designed to capture the inescapable social relations 
of  any geographically based social collectivity. Thus, the neighborhood is of  interest 
as a structural factor in the lives of  its residents, rather than as a well-articulated 
social organization. (Huckfeldt, 1986) 
The “well-articulated social organization” refers to clearly-defined groups such as churches, 
assembly plants, and other subjects of  early sociological studies of  contextual effects. By 
expanding the idea of  a “neighborhood” from these kinds of  groups to “any geographically 
based social collectivity,” Huckfeldt allowed the idea of  social context to be more general. 
For example, under the narrower, sociological definition, an assembly line worker’s social 
context is restricted to the relationships with his fellow workers and supervisors; under 
                                                 
8 Some of these early studies indicated a need for a broader view of social context. Putnam (1966) and others 
used counties as the contextual units but not in the same spirit as the early sociological studies. Instead, they 




Huckfeldt’s broader definition of  “neighborhood,” that same assembly line worker’s social 
context can include the residents of  his hometown – even the ones he has never actually met 
or interacted with. This broader conception of  social context provided theoretical 
justification for using broad indicators of  a person’s social environment, such as the average 
income level in a county or percentage of  blue collar workers in a town. 
Huckfeldt’s generalization of  the concept of  neighborhood and, by extension, of  
social context, allowed for the wider application of  contextual analysis to the study of  mass 
politics. This generalization brought increasing attention to the question of  how social 
influence actually works. 
THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 
Interactions among individuals in well-defined organizations (like assembly plants) 
are apparent, while interactions among individuals in broadly-defined social environments 
(like Huckfeldt’s neighborhoods) are much less explicit. Accordingly, the broadening of  
“social context” must be accompanied by a different understanding of  what social 
interactions in particular social contexts look like. Huckfeldt’s definition of  neighborhood 
assumes that mere geographical proximity leads to “inescapable social relations.” These 
relations do not depend on some cohesive sense of  community or friendship among 
members, or on whether those members choose to engage in those relations (hence 
“inescapable”), because the neighborhood imposes associational constraints and 
opportunities on each individual: “[T]he social content of  social networks is not solely a 
function of  either the social context or individual choice; it is the complex product of  individual 
preference operating within the boundaries of  a social context.” (Huckfeldt, 1986) Whereas Blau 
argued that a “structural effect” is the effect due to social interaction within a well-defined 
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group, Huckfeldt modified this idea so that a “contextual effect” is the effect to due to the 
constraints on social interaction within a loosely-defined group. 
But Huckfeldt’s idea of  social contexts as social constraints raised serious questions 
about the nature of  the social interactions themselves. How does the presence of  political 
lawn signs and bumper stickers in a neighborhood actually affect how individuals think 
about politics? How do casual or accidental encounters with near-strangers actually facilitate 
social influence? 
Perhaps in recognition of  this problem, researchers began distinguishing between 
interpersonal and impersonal contexts. Huckfeldt and his colleagues’ theory that social 
contexts constrain social interactions did not explain how those social interactions actually 
worked. Based on their theory of  social context as associational constraint, social influence is 
only an indirect effect of  one’s environment. But what about the direct forms of  social 
influence that actually take place within those contextually-constrained social relationships? 
To understand social influence within associations, some researchers turned to social 
network studies to understand how social influence works, given that actual interaction can 
be assumed. McClurg (2010a) provides the following definition of  a “social network”: 
The key definitional element of  a social network is the presence of  identifiable 
relationships between people where conversations create opportunities for the 
transfer of  politically relevant information, such as pertinent political facts, general 
perspective on politics, political norms and mores, and so on. 
Social networks are interpersonal contexts that involve intimate social interactions between 
individuals, such as those among family and friends. Interpersonal contexts are the concern 
of  social network studies, which examine the relationship between individuals’ political 
behavior and the attributes of  their personal network of  friends, families, and colleagues.  
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Impersonal contexts involve casual, day-to-day encounters between individuals who are 
less intimately related to each other. Impersonal contexts are the concern of  aggregate 
studies, which examine the relationship between individuals’ political behavior and the 
attributes of  the general social context (e.g., election districts, ZIP code area) in which those 
individuals are located. The importance of  impersonal contexts gained recognition with the 
work of  Mutz (1992), who brought attention to the mass media’s role in facilitating 
“impersonal influence.” 
The power of  these collective representations flows from the sheer numbers they 
claim to represent rather than from their specific identities. It is in this sense that 
impersonal influence may be viewed as a fundamentally different social influence 
process with fundamentally different mechanisms of  influence from conformity or 
group identification. 
The split between aggregate studies and social network studies necessarily raised the 
question of  what social interaction and social influence really mean in these two areas. In 
aggregate studies, explanations of  social interaction and social influence tend to follow 
Huckfeldt’s view that social contexts constrain associational opportunities. But in social 
network studies, explanations of  social interaction and social influence tend to follow Blau’s 
view that social contexts consist of  actual social interactions that shape behavior. How can 
we reconcile these two views to understand the overall relationship between social context 
and social interaction? In the following section, I suggest a possible reconciliation. 
SOCIAL SPACES AND NEIGHBORHOODS: AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK 
[A] contextual explanation for political behavior emphasizes the interdependence of  
political choices made by individuals who share a common social space.  
       - Robert Huckfeldt, 1983 
A first step toward reconciling Blau and Huckfeldt is to climb up the ladder of  
generality. Both Blau and Huckfeldt would agree that social context is a kind of  structure 
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containing diverse and numerous human behaviors. While they would disagree on the 
specific form of  the structure itself, they would agree that such a structure could be 
characterized by certain characteristics, such as race, political ideology, or income level. To 
maintain Blau and Huckfeldt’s commonalities, we can think of  social context as an abstract 
“social space” in which individuals inhabit and potentially or actually interact. Individuals 
“inhabit” points in the social space in the sense that they have certain roles that belong to 
the structure. In the case of  Blau, for example, the assembly plant is not just a physical place; 
it also represents an abstract space where individuals have roles as assembly workers, 
foremen, or supervisors. One could describe an assembly plant as a two-dimensional social 
space where one dimension is the formal ability to exercise control over others and the other 
dimension is the informal propensity to demand work or assistance from others. An 
assembly worker’s position would be low on the first dimension but middling on the second, 
while a foreman would be middling on the first, but high on the second and a supervisor 
would be high on both dimensions. In the case of  Huckfeldt, the census tract is not just an 
arbitrarily-defined geographical area for census-taking; it can also be viewed as a two-
dimensional space where individuals move around in their day-to-day lives and potentially 
encounter each other.  
By thinking of  social contexts as social spaces, one can go beyond the 
geographically-defined social collectivities that Huckfeldt and his colleagues studied. 
Geography may have played a huge role in constraining social relations back in the 1970s 
and 1980s, but there are reasons to suspect that this role has diminished. Technological 
advances have allowed for instantaneous communication, which allow social relations to 
traverse geographical boundaries and to flourish despite the absence of  physical, day-to-day, 
face-to-face interaction. In fact, the Millennial generation, which has grown up with these 
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technological advances, regard tweeting, texting, and blogging as everyday parts of  their 
social lives (Taylor and Keeter, 2010). Political scientists have noted the lessening of  
geographical constraints. “Geographical contexts, such as neighborhoods, are increasingly 
less important as spaces for social interaction,” observed McClurg (2006). Second, 
individuals are less tied down to their jobs and families than they used to be (Taylor and 
Keeter, 2010). To the extent that jobs and families determine geographical location, this 
trend suggests that individuals may not be as strongly attached to the geographical location 
of  where they live as strongly as they used to be. 
Defining the social context is important because it determines what the group-level 
variables are. If  the social context of  interest is the neighborhood, then group-level variables 
might include the percentage of  Republicans or the average level of  interest in political 
campaigns. But if  geography is only part of  an individual’s social context, then acquiring 
group-level variables in this way may be too restrictive. In contrast, a social space can be 
broadly defined by any number of  characteristics, such as occupation, age group, and culture, 
and can comprise any number of  dimensions. 
Since all individuals can be viewed as inhabitants of  a social space, individuals who 
share the same or similar positions in the space can be considered “spatial neighbors.” For 
example, all assemblers in the assembly plant can be considered neighbors, since they have 
similar positions on the two dimensions of  social space defined by the assembly plant. 
Inhabitants of  the same census tract can be considered neighbors since they are 
geographically proximate. These spatial neighbors comprise a “spatial neighborhood,” and 
the set of  all spatial neighborhoods comprise the social space. This definition of  
neighborhood is much broader than the usual meaning of  the term, which refers to an actual 
place where people live. It is also broader than the sense used by geographers, for whom a 
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“neighborhood” is simply a geographically-proximate area without cultural meaning. But this 
definition is flexible enough to include both usages, as different as they are. 
In a social space, individuals potentially or actually interact according to some rule.9 
This rule determines to what extent individuals interact with each other. In the assembly 
plant example, the rule might be that the more similar jobs are in terms of  status, the more 
interaction there would be. There would be a lot of  interaction among the assemblers but 
less interaction between assemblers and foremen, and even less interaction between 
assemblers and supervisors. Another rule might be that reporting requirements determine 
the frequency of  interaction. Under this rule, there would be a lot of  interaction between 
assemblers and foremen and between foremen and supervisors but not a lot of  interaction 
among assemblers or among foremen or among supervisors. In the census tract example, the 
rule might be that individuals who live in the same census tract have a greater chance of  
meeting each other than individuals who do not live in the same census tract. Another rule 
might be that individuals who live in the same census tract as well as adjacent census tracts 
have the same chance of  meeting each other but individuals who do not live in the same or 
adjacent census tract have no chance of  meeting. Rules of  interaction can be as specific as 
the assembly plant example or as broad as the census tract example. 
For the most part, identifying these rules depends on the amount of  specificity 
desired or attainable by the researcher. However, these rules must be based on substantive 
mechanisms that represent actual processes of  interaction and influence and link back to the 
observed contextual effect. According to Erbring and Young, “[C]ontextual effects must be 
conceptualized as a consequence of  processes of  interaction among individuals in a social 
                                                 
9 Similarly, Douglass North (1991) defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” However, my use of 
the term “rule” in this dissertation is much more general and is not limited to institutions. 
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network.” They suggested two broad classes of  interactions: Actual face-to-face contact 
between pairs of  individuals or symbolic categorical relations shared among all individuals in 
a given group. Face-to-face interaction involves processes of  contagion, diffusion, persuasion, 
assimilation, conformity, consensus, and contrast, while symbolic interaction involves processes 
of  comparison, competition, emulation, identification, facilitation, and inhibition. According 
to Erbring and Young, researchers must reference either type of  social interaction, lest “the 
notion of  contextual effects tends to become theoretically vacuous.” 
THREE TYPES OF SOCIAL SPACES AND DISTANCES 
In the study of  political attitudes, demographics, ideology, and geography are 
important sources of  social influence on how individuals think about political issues. First, 
demographics are important indicators of  group loyalties, which help structure individuals’ 
thinking about politics. For this reason, demographic variables such as race and sex are often 
included in linear regression models of  political behaviors and attitudes (Achen, 1992). 
Second, ideology serves as constraint on how individuals think about politics, not 
only in the individual sense, but also in a social sense. While researchers tend to focus on 
ideology as an individual-level characteristic that may or may not impact individual political 
behavior or attitudes (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Kinder, 1998; Ansolabehere, 
2008), there is research suggesting that there are social aspects to ideology as well. According 
to Elkins and Simmons (2005),  
[I]mitating similar individuals is one of  the simplest and most effective cognitive 
heuristics in the calculations of  utilities. Actors negotiating a complex set of  political 
choices regard the actions of  actors with perceived common interests as a useful 
guide to their own behavior. 
These “useful guides” can be identified through visible characteristics such as geographical 
and cultural proximity. In a study of  policy diffusion, Sugiyama (2008) identified ideological 
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proximity as another useful guide, since policy makers are more likely to emulate the policies 
of  ideologically-similar municipalities, even in the absence of  partisan directives. 
Third, geography has been shown to be an important factor in how individuals think 
and act in politics because the communities in which individuals live and work are often 
circumscribed by geographical boundaries and individuals are susceptible to community 
standards and norms (Campbell, 1960; Rodden, 2010). 
In this section, I reframe demographics, ideology, and geographical location as Blau 
space, ideological space, and geographical space, and identify rules for interaction in each 
space. These spaces are based on variables that social scientists often use as control or 
explanatory variables. But here, these control variables are reconceptualized as dimensions 
of  social spaces for social influence. 
Blau space and Blau distance 
Coined by sociologist Miller McPherson, Blau space is “the k-dimensional system 
generated by regarding the sociodemographic variables as dimensions, rather than as 
variables.” (McPherson, 2004) In Blau space, each individual has a position described by k 
coordinates, and distances in the coordinate system define the relationships among the 
points. Given a three-dimensional Blau space defined by income, race, and sex, for example, 
a middle-class black woman and a poor white man are two distinct points in the space. The 
distance between these two points is relatively large; in contrast, the distance between a 
middle-class black woman and a middle-class black man is relatively small. Thus, 
demographic characteristics can be understood not as variables but as a structure underlying 
the clustering of  political attitudes. This structural understanding of  social characteristics is 
McPherson’s homage to Blau, for whom the space is named. 
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Homophily is the organizing principle in Blau space. The intuition underlying the 
principle of  homophily is that like attracts like; it is the sociologists’ refinement of  the 
popular notion that “birds of  a feather flock together.” Formally, according to McPherson et 
al. (2001), “Homophily is the principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a 
higher rate than among dissimilar people.” This implies that friends, family, and other 
personal networks tend to be relatively homogenous when it comes to many characteristics.  
Social scientists have found that the characteristics that matter the most are 
demographics: race/ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupation, and gender (McPherson, 
et al., 2001). Homogeneity in terms of  these characteristics consistently shows up in survey 
respondents’ descriptions of  those with whom they discuss politics or other important 
matters. Using network data from the 1985 General Social Survey, Marsden (1988) found 
that respondents’ discussion networks tended to share similar demographic attributes. This, 
he argues, is evidence that similarity generally breeds stronger ties among individuals than 
does dissimilarity. In a subsequent study, McPherson et al. (2006) compared network data 
from the 1985 General Social Survey with network data from the 2004 General Social Survey 
and found that the heterogeneity of  confidantes in terms of  age, education, race, and sex has 
remained relatively stable between 1985 and 2004. Furthermore, McPherson et al. (2001) 
noted that the mean heterogeneity of  discussion networks is significantly less than the mean 
heterogeneity of  the overall population, which reaffirms the idea that discussion networks 
are homophilous. 
In political science, researchers often include demographic characteristics as control 
variables in their models of  political behavior. But this practice does not capture the most 
theoretically interesting aspect of  these characteristics – that race/ethnicity, age, religion, 
education, occupation, and gender provide contexts in which individuals think and talk about 
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politics. Following Blau and McPherson, demographic characteristics can be viewed as 
dimensions of  a social structure that defines social positions relative to one another. This 
departs from the conventional view that demographic characteristics are simply indicators of  
group interests or personal attributes, while accounting for the contextual analytical view that 
demography can have contextual effects. 
In Blau space, great Blau distances indicate very low probabilities of  contact. 
According to McPherson, “[t]his multidimensional Blau space at once organizes the social 
interactions among individuals, and structures the opportunities for the formation of  social 
entities that are associated with individuals in that space.” This organizing principle is the 
general rule for how individuals interact in the Blau space. The principle of  homophily 
suggests that the more similar individuals are, the more likely they are to interact. In other 
words, the frequency of  contact is inversely proportional to the Blau distance between any 
two individuals. When two individuals come into contact frequently, they are more likely to 
encounter or talk with each other. By encountering or talking with each other, they are more 
likely to transmit political attitudes than those who never or infrequently meet or talk. 
Ideological space and distance 
Ideological space (or “policy space” or “political choice space”) is a latent, politically-
defined space. Following the work of  Melvin Hinich and his colleagues, ideological space is 
“a commonly-held simplification of  the complex network of  government policies and 
political issues.” All voters are located on points on a k-dimensional ideological space. Based 
on previous research, there are k = 2 ideological dimensions where the first dimension is the 
well-known left-right ideological scale and the second dimension is a less explicit issue that 
changes from time to time, such as foreign policy or social issues.  
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According to the spatial theory of  electoral politics, there is a relationship between 
the points in the ideological space and issues that become salient during election campaigns. 
In this ideological space, there are two groups of  self-interested actors: voters and 
politicians. Voters are interested in the outcome of  any given election, and they want to vote 
for the politician who is closest to their position in the space. This motivation is rooted in 
utility; the farther away a politician is from a voter’s point in the space, the lower the utility 
associated with voting for that politician. Politicians are interested in winning the election 
and want to offer a “package” of  policy statements, candidate characteristics, past record, 
and so on that would appeal to the greatest number of  voters. Each politician’s package 
defines his position in the ideological space. During a campaign, politicians and voters 
“interact” in this space, as politicians attempt to influence voters to vote for them and voters 
attempt to vote for politicians closest to their ideal issue positions. 
The idea of  ideological space from the spatial theory of  voting can be very useful to 
the study of  social influence. For the purposes of  placing survey respondents on a common 
ideological space, the exact nature of  the dimensions is not essential. What does matter is 
the spatial distance between voters in the space, which can be acquired simply by calculating 
the Euclidean distance between any two voters in the ideological space. In the spatial theory 
of  voting, the distances between voters and candidates are of  primary concern; in studying 
social influence, we are more concerned with the distances between voters because we are 
interested in understanding how the relationships among voters affect them as voters. In the 
spatial theory of  voting, the distance between a given voter and a given politician impacts the 
voter’s utility in voting for that candidate; in the context of  social influence, the distance 
between two voters impacts the extent to which those voters will influence each other’s 
political attitudes. Why might this be? 
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It is well-known that voters are not as informed as political scientists would like them 
to be (Converse, 1964). As in the spatial theory of  voting, we assume here that voters are 
interested in election outcomes, which implies a certain level of  political knowledge. But 
acquiring political knowledge is costly in terms of  time and effort, and most people are not 
sufficiently interested in politics to sustain those costs. To overcome the information costs, 
individuals turn to sources that they trust to provide information that is already filtered and 
processed (Downs, 1957). Research has shown voters tend to seek out political experts (real 
or perceived) when they want political information and that these political experts tend to 
share the same ideological outlook. This suggests that voters are more affected by those who 
are closest to them in an ideological space and less influenced by those who are ideologically 
farther away. Thus, we can expect that any given Republican is more likely to be influenced 
by other Republicans than by Democrats, and that any given Democrat is more likely to be 
influenced by other Democrats than by Republicans. Furthermore, we can expect 
Republicans to visit websites and watch television programs that lean to the right, and we 
can expect Democrats to visit websites and watch television programs that lean to the left. 
Geographical space and distance 
In geographical studies, space refers to actual physical areas. But even geographical 
space need not be limited to geography. While paradoxical, this idea is borne out by how 
geography actually plays out in politics and social life. 
While Huckfeldt used the census tract to approximate the set of  unavoidable social 
interactions of  everyday life, the census tract itself  is meaningless. It is an artificial 
geographical boundary drawn for occasional census-taking purposes. Individuals inhabit this 
space in the sense that they are physically on it. But is this the only sense? For example, a 
“neighborhood” in the conventional sense has both geographical and social boundaries; it is 
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defined physically by its buildings, parks, and sidewalks, but it is defined more meaningfully 
by its inhabitants, their relationships with one another, and their relationships with the 
physical space. While Huckfeldt stripped the definition of  neighborhood so that it does not 
necessarily include a cohesive sense of  community, he nonetheless included the day-to-day 
interactions among individuals who reside in the same geographical location. But these 
interactions are not necessarily constrained by physical proximity. Community norms and 
values also guide those interactions because geographical areas are where people grow up 
and live and necessarily acquire a sense of  who they are in the context of  fellow residents. 
There need not be a cohesive sense of  community, but it is unrealistic to assume that 
individuals have absolutely no connection to where they live. First, individuals choose to 
move or stay in a geographical area for reasons that are social, such as job opportunities and 
school quality. When it comes to political science, these social qualities are the primary 
distinctions among geographical areas, rather than their size, elevation, and other physical 
characteristics. Second, geographical areas can include media markets, historical landmarks, 
and judicial circuits. These areas are nominally geographical but primarily functional. For 
these reasons, geographical spaces should be viewed as types of  social spaces in political 
science research. 
An election district is a type of  geographical space. Individuals potentially interact 
with other individuals in the same election district, and individuals who live in adjacent 
election districts might also interact. But beyond that type of  interaction, individuals may 
also have some idea of  the norms and values and social realities of  their election district and 
neighboring districts. Furthermore, when politicians and political groups reach out to voters, 
they tend to mobilize around geographical areas like election districts. For example, an 
environmental protection group might focus its organization, mobilization, and fundraising 
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efforts in the areas surrounding a polluted lake but not much beyond it. In this situation, we 
expect more interaction among individuals in the areas surrounding the polluted lake 
because of  this political effort, and less interaction between individuals in areas surrounding 
the lake and individuals in areas not surrounding the lake. In this way, geography has social 
meaning; geographical proximity becomes a kind of  social proximity, and the geographical 
linkages become social linkages. In political science research, geographical relationships are 
often of  this social nature, which is why it makes sense to subsume geographical space under 
the broader category of  social space. 
In contrast to Blau and ideological distances, geographical distance is a 
straightforward measure. Furthermore, with the increasing availability of  geo-coded data, 
measuring geographical distance is more and more feasible for many types of  spatial units. 
Other spaces 
Political scientists are generally interested in connections or ties among actors that 
are defined by some political or social phenomena. We can call the set of  connections or ties 
defined by a particular political or social phenomenon a “social space” with dimensions 
corresponding to elements of  that phenomenon. Subsets of  this space are “spatial 
neighborhoods,” which consist of  points that are in some sense “close,” such as degree of  
similarity or common membership. By viewing a set of  politically or socially-based 
connections as a social space, we can represent these connections in a spatial weights matrix 
for spatial econometric analysis 
While this chapter focused on Blau, ideological, and geographical spaces, the idea of  
social space is not limited to these three types. Previous studies have shown that social 
spaces can be based on language similarity (Dow et al., 1984), trade or group membership (Simmons 
and Elkins, 2004), occupation and township (Lin et al., 2006), trade volume (Beck et al., 2006), and 
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dyadic membership (Beck et al., 2006). Social spaces can also be based on historically shared ties or 
common acquaintance (Beck et al., 2006). Furthermore, previous studies of  social influence have 
focused on aggregate contexts and social networks that can also be considered social spaces. 
Aggregate contexts can be viewed as geographical spaces, since they tend to be census tracts, 
counties, states, and other geographically-bounded areas. Social networks can also be 
interpreted in the context of  social space. We can call the set of  all social networks a social 
space where spatial neighbors are those who mutual recognize each other as friends or 
discussants, which means that each neighborhood is a social network. The choice of  which 
social space to study is a research consideration along the same lines as the unit of  
observation and choice of  dependent variable. 
ATTITUDES ARE CONTAGIOUS: A THEORY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
This section features a theoretical argument for how individuals in a social space 
might influence each other’s political attitudes. First, I explain the concept of  social influence 
and why social space is a useful tool for understanding social influence. Next, I explain the 
mechanisms of  social influence. Finally, I identify testable hypotheses for gauging social 
influence in Blau, ideological, and geographical spaces. 
Political attitudes are attitudes about political things, such as government spending 
and environmental protection. Following Crano and Prislin (2006), attitudes are “evaluative 
judgments” that integrate and summarize cognitive and affective reactions to an object. 
While most people, most of  the time, do not think very much or very hard about politics, 
they do pick up bits and pieces of  information and feelings about politics, and it is 
reasonable to suppose that they do so because politics is sometimes a topic of  conversation 
with their families, friends, and colleagues. Previous research studies have shown that 
individuals do indeed rely on others for understanding politics. Individuals use their social 
 
36 
networks as a shortcut for gathering political information (Huckfeldt, 2001; Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 1995). Luskin et al. (2002) showed that the policy preferences of  individuals can 
change quite a bit as a result of  exposure to deliberation within small groups. Binder et al. 
(2009) found that having discussions with others affects individuals’ attitudes toward stem 
cell research. Cho (2003) uncovered evidence of  a diffusion effect in Asian-American 
campaign contribution networks. These and other studies show that social influence takes on 
a variety of  forms, including network effects, small group effects, neighborhood effects, peer 
effects, and imitation. 
Social influence as mutual influence 
Social influence has been conventionally conceived as a one-directional effect of  
networks, small groups, neighborhoods, and other social groups on individuals. This view is 
based on the assumption that the effects of  these groups are exogenous, or that individuals 
are influenced by these groups but do not, in turn, influence the groups to which they 
belong. Erbring and Young’s (1979) work on the formal specification and substantive 
mechanisms of  contextual effects shows that the assumption that social influence (as the 
effect of  groups on individuals) is exogenous is both incorrect and unfortunate, for it 
underlies the inability of  researchers to translate contextual effects into contextual 
explanations. To support the development of  better contextual explanations, Erbring and 
Young argued that a contextual effect (i.e., social influence) must be conceptualized as “a 
consequence of  processes of  interaction among individuals in a social network” – that is, 
social influence is mutual influence. Because this idea is important to this dissertation’s 
treatment of  social influence, I discuss Erbring and Young’s argument in some detail here. 
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In their article, Erbring and Young first looked at the substantive mechanisms 
implied in conventional contextual models, and then looked at the structural specifications 
implied in conventional substantive interpretations of  contextual effects. 
In the first case, they found that the substantive mechanism implied in a typical 
contextual model is a kind of  “social telepathy.” In a typical contextual model, the 
individual-level dependent variable is the outcome of  a combination of  individual-level and 
group-level effects. The “contextual effect” is the effect of  some group-level explanatory 
variable, which is usually represented by a group mean of  a characteristic of  interest. This 
effect can be interpreted as a direct effect of  the group on the individual. In their example, 
Erbring and Young used individual academic achievement as the dependent variable yij, 
intellectual ability as the individual-level explanatory variable xij, and mean intellectual ability 
(of  the ith individual’s class j) as the group-level explanatory variable x∙ : 
 = a + bx + bx∙ + e  
According to Erbring and Young, 
[The equation above] implies the direct flow of  effects from (each) student (i')’s 
ability to student (i)’s performance [where ≠ ′ ], and similarly from student (i)’s 
ability to (each) student (i')’s performance without, in either case, letting this impact on 
performance be mediated by the student’s own ability. 
Noting that there may be “perverse situations” (e.g., universal cheating) in which one 
student’s intellectual ability directly affects another student’s academic performance, Erbring 
and Young maintained that such a direct effect is generally implausible because there is no 
direct link between the two. Indeed, the presumed relationship between a group-level 
characteristic (such as intellectual ability) and individual-level outcome (such as academic 
performance) amounts to a kind of  “social telepathy” that is unworthy of  social science. 
“Yet ‘action at a distance’ is a well-known principle of  magic, not of  science which, on the 
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contrary, is premised on the denial of  that possibility and the search for intervening links,” 
they wrote. 
In the second case, Erbiring and Young found that two conventional substantive 
mechanisms that produce group effects – namely, common fate and group norms – actually 
implied structural specifications that did not correspond with the conventional contextual 
model. According to the common fate explanation, students in the same class share a 
“common fate” due to having the same teacher, sharing the same resources, or some other 
attribute of  common class membership. But if  this explanation is true, then it would make 
more sense to use one of  these attributes as an explanatory variable rather than using mean 
intellectual ability as a proxy for it. 
According to the group norms explanation, a group-level explanatory variable 
represents a kind of  group “climate” that affects individual-level outcomes. According to 
Erbring and Young, however, this substantive explanation actually implies a structural 
specification without any group-level explanatory variables at all. Using individual academic 
achievement as the dependent variable yij and educational aspiration as the individual-level 
explanatory variable xij, Erbring and Young pointed out that, under the group norms 
explanation, the educational aspirations of  one’s peers affects one’s own educational 
aspirations, but does not directly affect one’s educational outcome. This mechanism has the 
following structural specification: 
 = a + bx + e  where  ≠ ,  ≠ ′ 
The problem with this structural specification is that the “contextual effect” due to the 
mutual influence on the explanatory variables cannot be estimated. Erbring and Young note: 
Unlike the intervening mechanisms considered previously, the present case – 
feedback among the “exogenous” variables – involves a genuine contextual process: 
interaction among individuals within a particular social structure. However, the 
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effects of  that process remain entirely hidden from view: the impact of  social 
context on individual outcomes is confined to variables which are “exogenous” with 
respect to the outcome variable of  interest . . . . 
To remedy the problem of  representing meaningful mechanisms of  social influence, 
Erbring and Young proposed a class of  “endogenous feedback models” that represent 
processes of  mutual influence in a social context. These models represent social contagion 
processes, which are based on “reciprocal influence.” In contrast to the conventional 
assumptions of  the contextual model, an endogenous feedback model is based on the idea 
of  “reciprocal influence”: 
Individual behavior is assumed to be both passively responsive to the contextual cues 
provided by the behavior of  significant others, and at the same time actively 
impinging upon the behavior of  others sharing the same social environment. 
A key characteristic of  an endogenous feedback model is that the outcomes of  interest are 
interdependent. In other words, individuals mutually influence each other through their 
dependent variables, resulting in interdependent individual outcomes within a social space. 
But before we look more closely at such an endogenous feedback model, it is necessary to 
discuss in further detail the mechanisms of  mutual influence. 
Mechanisms of mutual influence 
There are several explanations for how social influence (as mutual influence) works; 
these explanations are generally based on the idea that social interaction, however defined, 
has consequences for individual behaviors and attitudes. According to the social conformity 
explanation, for example, individuals generally do not want to come into conflict with others 
because of  social or psychological costs. That means individuals will tend to agree – or at 
not least not disagree – with the views of  others. According to the group identity (or 
reference group) explanation, individuals have certain social loyalties, and these loyalties 
color their perception of  political information and issues. According to the impersonal 
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influence theory, individuals develop their perceptions of  what others think from 
information they get from the media and use this perception to form or change their 
political attitudes and behaviors (see Mutz, 1992). According to the information cascade 
theory, whether an individual decides to act (or not act) depends on whether the number or 
proportion of  other individuals acting (or not acting) exceeds a certain threshold 
(Granovetter, 1978). This suggests, for example, that an individual might adopt a pro-
environmental attitude if  enough other individuals do so as well. Despite their different 
focuses, all of  these explanations of  social influence suggest that when individuals form or 
change their attitudes toward politics, they take into account other individuals’ attitudes as 
well. All these various theories suggest that one’s susceptibility to social influence is strategic. 
According to Franzese and Hays (2007a) and Brueckner (2003), strategic 
interdependence arises whenever some unit(s)’s actions affect the marginal utilities of  the 
alternative actions for some other unit(s). Their general theoretical model of  strategic 
interdependence can be easily adapted to social influence. 
Suppose there are two individuals (which we denote as individual i and individual j), 
and suppose they derive indirect utilities (which we denote as Ui and Uj) from their 
respective political attitudes. Because of  externalities resulting from social interaction, 











What this means is that when an individual i takes on a political attitude ai, his choice 
depends on the political attitude aj of  individual j and vice versa. The strategic 
interdependence between individuals i and j can be expressed with two best-response 
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functions such that individual i’s optimal political attitude  is a function of  individual j’s 
chosen political attitude aj and vice versa: 
 ≡ ,  ≡   
 ≡ !(, ) ≡  () 
The slopes of  the functions provide information on the relationships between 
individuals i and j. If  the slopes of  these best-response functions for individual i is positive, 
then the political attitude of  individual j causes individual i to move in the same direction. In 
this case, Franzese and Hays (2007a) would refer to their attitudes as “strategic 
complements.” On the other hand, if  the slope for individual i is negative, then the political 
attitudes of  i and j move in the opposite direction. In this case, the attitudes would be 
“strategic substitutes.” 
When it comes to social influence in politics, we should generally expect political 
attitudes among mutually influential individuals to be “strategic complements.” Psychological 
studies of  attitude formation and change suggest that individuals tend to conform to rather 
than contradict other individuals in their social environment. 
Social influence can lead individuals to form new attitudes or change existing ones. 
Mechanisms underlying attitude formation can be categorized by the degree of  conscious 
awareness (Crano and Prislin, 2006). An example of  a “below-conscious” mechanism is 
mere exposure. According to the theory of  mere exposure, the frequency of  exposure to 
something tends to increase an individual’s affect toward that thing. In the context of  
political attitudes, the idea of  mere exposure suggests that, by simply being around other 
people, individuals are thereby exposed to their attitudes and gradually come to adopt those 
same attitudes themselves. This also suggests that others’ attitudes are influential not only 
because of  their credibility or content, but because of  the nature of  sociability itself. People 
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want to be liked by other people, and accordingly, they are inclined to conform in opinion 
and action. This inclination may be conscious or unconscious. In their study of  automaticity, 
Bargh and Chartrand (1999) argue that individual attitudes and behaviors do not originate 
from within the individual but are largely caused by the automatic, unconscious processing 
of  environmental factors. This automaticity means that the internal weighing of  pros and 
cons is not necessarily the primary cause of  an individual’s position on political issues. In 
fact, these evaluations may be more automatic than commonly realized (Bargh and 
Chartrand, 1999). Accordingly, many political attitudes may not be conscious judgments but 
automatic evaluations. Since most people do not think about politics most of  the time, the 
concepts of  mere exposure and automaticity are consistent with empirical findings that 
many political attitudes are lightly held and poorly thought out. 
Social groups can bring about attitude change by enhancing an individual’s receptivity 
to arguments and by limiting the pool of  arguments. According to Druckman and Lupia’s 
(2000) review of  preference formation, persuasion can be divided into three components: 
recipient effects, message effects, and source effects. Recipient effects pertain to the 
characteristics (such as political sophistication) of  individuals that affect how receptive they 
are to persuasive attempts. Message effects refer to the characteristics of  persuasive appeals, 
such as their content and tone. Finally, source effects refer to the characteristics of  the 
source of  persuasive appeals, such as a speaker’s trustworthiness, popularity, insider status, 
accuracy and objectivity, and ideology. Social influence can be seen as a type of  source effect. 
Because persuasion depends, in part, on the personal attributes of  those attempting to 
persuade (Lupia 2002), would-be persuaders need to be (or appear to be) trustworthy and 
knowledgeable before the actual argument is even heard at all. 
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The literature regarding attitude formation and change points to the importance of  
individual characteristics in transmitting and assimilating attitudes. By combining this idea 
with Erbring and Young’s idea that social influence must be mutual influence and with our 
adaptation of  Franzese and Hay’s general theory of  strategic interdependence, we come to a 
working theory of  social influence: Social influence is a process that leads to the formation 
of  or change in an individual attitude (or behavior) within a social space. It takes place when 
a group of  individuals in a social space mutually influence each other’s attitudes (or 
behaviors) such that each individual finds it advantageous to adjust their attitudes (or 
behaviors) in the direction of  other individuals in the group. This theory underlies processes 
such as social contagion, facilitation, competition, conformity, diffusion, emulation, learning, 
and coercion. 
MODELING SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
Based on our working theory, a formal specification of  social influence must have 
certain features that are currently missing from conventional specifications (e.g., contextual 
models). Mutual influence among individuals must refer to mutual influence among the 
individuals’ outcomes of  interest, which, according to Erbring and Young (1979), is called 
“endogenous feedback.” This means that the dependent variable outcomes are 
interdependent, while allowing for a number of  exogenous independent variables. Erbring 
and Young (1979) provide an example of  such an “endogenous feedback model”: 




(* , + -. + - + /  
where	 = 1,… , 6;  = 1,… , 
In this endogenous feedback model, the dependent variable yij is an outcome associated with 
individual i, who is associated with group j. yij is a function of  an individual’s personal 
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characteristic xij as well as the outcomes of  the other individuals in group j. The parameter α 
is the “feedback coefficient” that represents the effect of  mutual interaction among the 
individuals in a group, while the parameter β1 represents the effect of  the individual-level 
characteristic xij. The term '()(( represents the “extent of  interaction between any two 
students; it is equal to 0 if  they do not interact and if   = and	 = . The error term uij is 
assumed to be independently and normally distributed. 
According to Erbring and Young, the endogenous feedback model has two 
important features: 
First, it includes terms in yi’j in the equation for yij, where (i’) represents the relevant 
peers with whom (i) interacts; this has important implications for the error term, uij . 
. . . Second, the model incorporates explicit assumptions for each (i) about who the 
relevant peers (i’) are; thus the social structure through which the particular effects 
are mediated becomes an integral part of  the specification of  the model, as 
suggested by the wii’ terms (and their associated coefficient, α). 
In other words, the endogenous feedback model features the dependent variable on both 
sides of  the equal sign and the social structure that provides the opportunity for social 
influence. It turns out that Erbring and Young’s endogenous feedback model is actually a 
version of  the spatial lag model, which is a widely-used model in the field of  spatial 
econometrics. 
INTRODUCING SPATIAL ECONOMETRICS 
Rooted in geography, early work in spatial econometrics was limited to the statistical 
analysis of  regional and urban modeling using geographical data. It was not until the mid-
2000s that interest in spatial econometrics went beyond the bounds of  regional science. In 
2006 alone, Anselin (2006) established spatial econometrics in the methodological toolbox 
of  applied econometrics; Lin et al. (2006) expanded the idea of  spatial dependence to mutual 
influence within townships and occupations in a study of  national identity in Taiwan; and 
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Beck et al. (2006) argued that spatial econometric models should not be limited to geography 
and can accommodate political economy notions of  distance. Two years later, Ward and 
Gleditsch (2008) released Spatial Regression Models, an introduction to spatial econometrics 
written for social scientists. Understanding social influence within the spatial econometric 
framework, as this dissertation does, is a logical step forward in advancing the use of  spatial 
econometrics in political science. 
Spatial econometrics is a set of  tools for working with data with spatial effects, which 
include spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity. Spatial dependence is “the existence of  a 
functional relationship between what happens at one point in space and what happens 
elsewhere” (Anselin, 1988). Spatial heterogeneity refers to a situation in which there is spatial 
dependence but the relationship between values and locations is unstable – that is, 
“functional forms and parameters vary with location and are not homogenous throughout 
the data set” (Anselin, 1988). This dissertation is concerned with the first type of  spatial 
effect – i.e., spatial dependence - and how it can be expanded to include the concept of  
social influence. 
The Concept of Spatial Dependence 
Also called “spatial interdependence,” spatial dependence is a fundamental concept 
in spatial econometrics. According to Anselin (1988), spatial dependence is based on the idea 
that relative distance has an effect on observed quantities of  interest. This effect tends to 
arise from two main sources: measurement error and spatial interaction. Measurement error 
can give rise to spatial dependence when data are organized in space or in space and time. 
Anselin (1988) elaborates: 
In a more general sense, any situation where data are structured subject to a measure 
of  location or distance, in any space, may be considered. For example, measures 
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derived for clusters of  industrial activities characterized by a sectoral profile (i.e., a 
point in multi-dimensional profile space), or information on nations or [interest] 
groups identified by their positions in policy space would satisfy this requirement. 
The second and more substantively interesting source of  spatial dependence is 
spatial interaction. Spatial interaction follows from “the importance of  space as an element 
in structuring explanations of  human behavior” (Anselin, 1988). Because human beings live 
in space and time, their relative location and distance matter in a variety of  ways (e.g., 
diffusion processes.) and as a result, what is observed as one point in a space is, in part, 
determined by what happens elsewhere in the space. Formally, this can be expressed as 
follows: 
( ) Siyyfy ni ∈= ,,1 K   
where S is the set containing all spatial units of  observation and f is the function relating 
each observation of  y for one spatial unit to the values of  y for the other spatial units. As 
Anselin (1988) points out, the function f is unidentified, but by imposing a form for the 
spatial process it represents, one may estimate and test empirically some characteristics of  
the spatial dependence at hand. Specifying the form of  spatial dependence, incorporating the 
form into a formal model specification, and using the model for data analysis are the primary 
tasks of  spatial econometrics. 
The Spatial Weights Matrix 
The first step of  specifying the form of  spatial dependence involves specifying the 
form of  the spatial weights matrix (also called a “connectivity matrix”), which is denoted by 
W. W is an n by n spatial weights matrix that represents the connectivities among spatial 
units, such as countries, cities, and individuals. A “connectivity” is a researcher-defined 
relationship between two spatial units; for example, two countries can be considered 
connected if  they share a common border, if  they are trading partners, or if  they share a 
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common language. This connectivity is assumed to be known to the researcher, which means 
that the specific spatial weights matrix to be used in a spatial econometric analysis is not 
estimated. While this is a strong assumption, Beck et al. (2006) point out that “[I]t is no 
stronger than the typical implicit assumption that all connectivities are zero, that is, all 
observations are spatially independent.” 
The connectivity between individuals i and j is denoted by the element wij*. The 
simplest type of  connectivity is binary membership, where  
otherwise0*








For example, if  individual 1 and individual 2 are members of  the same civic 
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Note that the diagonal elements of  (2.1) are all equal to 0, which is conventional in spatial 
econometrics. When individuals i and j belong to the same group (i.e., wij* is a nonzero 
number), they are said to be “neighbors” and, by convention, no individual is a neighbor to 
himself. Each group of  individuals is called a “neighborhood.”  
Other popular types of  spatial weights matrices are those based on inverse distance, 
inverse distance squared, distance band, and k-nearest neighbor. In spatial matrices based on 
inverse distance or inverse distance squared, the elements are functions of  the distance (e.g., 
miles) between individuals i and j. In a distance band matrix, wij* is non-zero if  the distance 
between individuals i and j meets some threshold, such as 500 or greater miles. If  the 
distance between individuals i and j does meet the threshold, then wij* can be assigned a value 
of  1 or some function of  the distance. In a k-nearest neighbor spatial weights matrix, the 
element wij* is non-zero if  individual j is one of  the k nearest neighbors to individual i, where 
k is a positive integer and “nearest” is based on some type of  distance. 
Conventionally, the spatial weights matrix is row-standardized. Each element wij* is 
divided by its corresponding row sum so that the elements of  each row sum to one. 
Throughout this dissertation, W* will denote an unstandardized spatial weights matrix, while 
W will denote a row-standardized spatial weights matrix. 
The spatial weights matrix is essential to spatial analyses. After specifying spatial 
weights matrix, one can then measure and assess the existence of  spatial dependence using 
spatial autocorrelation and spatial regression analysis. 
SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
Spatial regression models allow researchers to assess whether there is still spatial 
dependence in a variable of  interest (detected in tests of  spatial autocorrelation) after 
controlling for relevant variables. For example, a researcher might use a spatial regression 
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model to see whether there is spatial dependence in vote choice across counties while 
controlling for party affiliation and social-economic status. 
While there are many types of  spatial regression models, the spatial lag model is 
most consistent with the idea that social influence is a diffusion process. Therefore, it is the 
workhorse model of  this dissertation. Other commonly-used models include the first-order 
spatial autoregressive model, spatial-x model, spatial error model, and spatial simultaneous 
autoregressive model, which will also be briefly discussed below. 
The Spatial Lag Model 
Also called the “mixed regressive autoregressive model” or “spatial autoregressive 
model,” the spatial lag model is the primary model used in this dissertation. The spatial lag 






In this model, y is the n by 1 vector of  observations of  the dependent variable. β is a k by 1 
vector of  parameters associated with independent variables X, which is an n by k matrix. 
The error term ε satisfies the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions, and I is a n by n identity 
matrix. Note that this is essentially the same model as Erbring and Young’s endogenous 
feedback model if  we assume that W is based on binary membership.  
The spatial lag model is characterized by the spatial lag term Wy. The spatial lag Wy 
is an n by 1 vector where each element is the lagged values of  the dependent variable. 
Depending on how W is defined, the spatial lag can be interpreted as the unweighted mean, 
weighted mean, or sum of  the y values of  respondent i’s neighbors. The spatial 
autoregressive parameter ρ measures the effect of  the spatial lag. If  0=ρ , then there is no 
spatial dependence, and the spatial lag model reduces to the classical linear regression model. 
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On the other hand, if  the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is statistically different from 
zero, there would be evidence of  a neighborhood effect on political attitudes. 
The First-Order Spatial Autoregressive Model 
While the first-order spatial autoregressive (FAR) model is seldom used in applied 
work, it is useful for exploring theoretical ideas and concepts (see LeSage, 1998). The FAR 






In the FAR model, the variable vector y is expressed in deviations from the means. 
Wy is the spatial lag of  y. The spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is the effect of  Wy on y – 
that is, the extent to which variations in y are explained by neighboring y values. The error 
term ε satisfies the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions, and I is a n by n identity matrix. 
The Spatial-X Model 
In the spatial-x model the dependent variable y is regressed on two types of  
explanatory variables: the spatially-weighted explanatory variables WZ and the conventional 
explanatory variables X.  








where y is an n by 1 dependent variable vector, Z is spatially-relevant explanatory variable 
vector, WZ is the n by 1 spatial-x term, and X is the n by k independent variable matrix. The 
spatial parameter γ is the effect of  the spatial-x term WZ, while β is a k by 1 vector of  
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parameters associated with independent variables X. As usual, the error term ε is assumed to 
satisfy the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions, and I is a n by n identity matrix. 
Note that in contrast to the spatial lag model and FAR model, the spatial term in the 
spatial-x model is exogenous. This means that the effect of  a social content is unidirectional; 
the individual is influenced by the social context but does not influence the social context.  
The Spatial Error Model 













This model can account for the possibility that a given social context constitutes a 
spatially correlated omitted variable, causing the errors of  a model to be spatially correlated. 
β is a k by 1 vector of  parameters associated with independent variables X, which is an n by 
k matrix. The error term ε has been decomposed into two parts: the spatial component λWε 
and the component µ, which satisfies the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions. I is a n by n 
identity matrix, and the errors µ are distributed normally with a constant variance. The term 
λWε accounts for the average error associated with each social context. The spatial error 
parameter λ indicates the extent to which the errors are correlated for nearby observations. 
If  there is no spatial correlation between observations i and j ( )ji ≠ , then λ will equal 0, 
and the model will reduce to the classical linear regression model.  
The Spatial Simultaneous Autoregressive Model 

















This model combines the spatial lag model with the spatial error model. The 
advantage of  the spatial simultaneous autoregressive model is that it allows for the 
simultaneous estimation of  the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ and the spatial error 
parameter λ, which allows for the evaluation of  two different contexts (when 21 WW ≠ ) 
with only one model. 
COMPETING MODELS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
To study social influence, researchers require data on groups and on individuals. The 
analysis of  data collected at different levels falls under the broad category of  multilevel 
analysis. The most popular types of  multilevel analysis for studying social influence are the 
analysis of  variance (ANOVA), contextual analysis, and social network analysis. 
Analysis of Variance 
ANOVA is a method for finding out whether different groups have different 
characteristics, values, behaviors, or some other quality of  interest. For example, we can use 
ANOVA to find out whether Protestants, Catholics, and Unitarians have different levels of  
political participation and whether those differences are statistically significant and 
meaningful. To do this, we can use the following fixed one-way ANOVA model (assuming 
that we have data on all three groups): 
ijjijy εαµ ++=  
Each yij represents an observation of  an individual’s level of  political participation. The term 
µ represents the overall mean level of  political participation, αj represents the mean level of  
political participation for the jth group, and εij represents the individual-level random error. 
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According to the ANOVA framework, if  different groups have different means (under the 
conventional assumption that the variance is constant), the between-group variance should 
be greater than the within-group variance and we use the F-test to see if  the data meets this 
expectation. If  it turns out that the group differences are statistically significant, we can then 
conclude that being a Protestant or a Catholic or a Unitarian has an effect (denoted by αj) on 
an individual’s level of  political participation and that this is some evidence of  a group-level 
effect, or social influence. 
ANOVA, or dummy variable regression, can be viewed as a special case of  spatial 
regression. This will be shown in a later chapter, which features a detailed discussion of  the 
differences and similarities between linear regression and spatial regression. For now, suffice 
it to say that the ANOVA approach is limited to finding out whether different groups are 
merely different; it says nothing about why those groups are different. This is why researchers 
often turn to contextual analysis to study social influence. 
Contextual Analysis 
Contextual analysis is a popular method for finding out whether particular 
characteristics of  a social, political, economic, or some other type of  context affects how 
individuals think or behave. By using the ANOVA framework, for example, researchers can 
find out whether Protestants, Catholics, and Unitarians have different levels of  political 
participation, whereas a contextual analysis can tell researchers whether an individual has a 
higher level of  political participation due to some specific characteristic of  Protestants, 
Catholics, or Unitarians. For example, a Protestant might have greater political participation 
when there is a large percentage of  Protestants living in the same county, or a Catholic might 
have greater political participation when the average level of  political knowledge among 
fellow Catholics is higher. Researchers can use a contextual model to find out if  the effect of  
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a higher percentage of  Protestant county-dwellers or the effect of  average Catholic political 
knowledge is a statistically significant factor in an individual’s level of  political participation. 
A contextual model for such a study might look something like this: 
ijjijij xxy εααα +++= 210  (2.5) 
Each yij represents an observation of  an individual’s level of  political participation. In 
the model, α0 is the overall intercept, α1 is the effect of  the individual-level independent 
variable of  political knowledge xij, α2 is the effect of  the religious group-level independent 
variable of  political knowledge jx , and εij represents the individual-level random error. If  
the group-level effect α2 is statistically significant, we can conclude that the level of  political 
knowledge of  an individual’s religious group has an effect on the individual’s level of  
political participation and that this is evidence of  a group-level influence, or social influence. 
In contrast to the ANOVA findings, we can argue that political participation is subject to 
social influence because of  the need for political knowledge, which religious groups might 
provide. In this manner, contextual analysis can help determine why groups matter. 
Contextual models are special cases of  the two-level hierarchical linear model, which 
Lin et al. (2006) have shown to be a special case of  the spatial lag model. The proceeding 
discussion follows Lin et al.’s (2006) demonstration and uses it to show how spatial lag 
models can provide all the information that a contextual model can and more, thereby 
showing that spatial lag models are more than adequate for studying social influence. 
Consider m groups, and each group comprises nk members (k = 1, 2, … , m). Let yk 
be the nk observations for the kth group, Xk be the corresponding nk by k matrix of  
independent variables, β be a k by 1 vector of  coefficients, and εk be the nk by 1 vector of  
independent, normally-distributed disturbances. Let ρ denote the spatial autoregressive 
parameter. Using the identity yDDDWy =+++≈ mmbbb ...2211 , the spatial lag model 
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εXβWyy ++= ρ  where 1<ρ  
is asymptotically equivalent to 
 εXβyy ++≈ ρ . 

























































































































This is a two-level hierarchical linear model with fixed effects from neighborhood-level 
variables and a random intercept. If  we assume a constant intercept ( )0=ε , it becomes a 








Note that the more familiar form of  the contextual model is 
 
εXαXααy 0 +++= 21  
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The purpose of  estimating a contextual model is to parse and compare individual 
and group-level effects – in other words, estimating the vectors α1 and α2. At first glance, the 
contextual model appears more desirable for these purposes than the spatial lag model. First, 
there are no a priori restrictions on parameter vectors α1 and α2. Second, there are minimal 
assumptions involved, since an individual observation is simply a linear combination of  
individual-level and group-level variables, and the error term follows the usual classical 
assumptions. Finally, there is no need to impose a structure on the relationships among 
individuals using the spatial weights matrix. Unfortunately, these “desirable” characteristics 
have led to a host of  problems for the study of  social influence. 
First, empirical evidence suggests that there is a relationship between parameter 
vectors α1 and α2. Individual-level and group-level independent variables are usually collinear 
(see Blalock, 1984; Iverson, 1991). This collinearity problem implies the usual set of  issues 
for significance testing. In the spatial lag model, the coefficient vector for X  is clearly 




 represents the 
relationship between the effects of  the individual-level and group-level independent 
variables. Note that there are no contextual effects when ρ = 0, the individual-level effects 
are the same as the contextual effects when ρ = 0.5, and the contextual effects become 
infinitely large as ρ approaches 1. Furthermore, the parameter ρ represents the size of  the 
group influence itself  and can be subjected to significance testing. In contrast, the absence 
of  ρ in the contextual model makes it difficult to compare the size of  individual-level versus 
group-level effects, since the effects are estimated at different levels of  measurement (using 
classical methods). 
Second, the minimal assumptions required for estimating a contextual model come at 
a great cost: There is no explicit representation of  the process of  group influence. 
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Consequently, researchers debate what the processes of  group influence might be, rather 
than subject these theories to empirical evaluation. The minimalism of  the contextual model 
prohibits them from doing otherwise. In the spatial lag model, the presence of  the y variable 
on both sides of  the equal sign represents an endogenous process of  group influence. An 
individual observation is influenced by other individual observations and influences other 
individual observations in turn. Furthermore, for individual i, a change in an individual-level 
independent variable affects yi and, because of  the endogeneity, also affects individual i’s 
neighbors’ y values as well. This process of  mutual influence is why Lin et al. (2006) 
described the spatial lag model as “a dynamic spatial contagion process in equilibrium.”  
Finally, contextual models do not require researchers to specify group structures. 
While researchers often present theories of  how individuals fit into groups, contextual 
models do not allow these social relationships to be represented. Consequently, empirical 
results derived from contextual models are too general to support or reject specific theories 
of  group influence. In contrast, using a spatial lag model means having the capability to 
assess different group structures by specifying an appropriate spatial weights matrix, 
estimating the model, and testing the significance of  the parameter ρ. An often-cited 
weakness of  spatial regression models is that different spatial weights matrices produce 
different results; in the case of  social influence, however, this can be a source of  strength 
because it allows researchers to compare the results of  different assumptions regarding 
social structures. 
Social Network Analysis 
In network analyses in political science, researchers often rely on social network data. 
This type of  data is gathered using specially-designed surveys that are conducted to assess 
whether and to what extent discussing politics with social network members affects an 
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individual’s political attitudes and behaviors. Social network data includes information 
gathered on survey respondents as well as information gathered on individuals that survey 
respondents have identified as people with whom they discuss politics and/or important 
matters (often called “network members” or “discussants”).  
To assess whether and to what extent social network members affect an individual’s 
political attitudes and behaviors, researchers use some form of  the following model: 
εXβαZy ++=  (2.6) 
where y is an N by 1 dependent variable vector, Z  is an N by l matrix of  network measures, 
and X is the N by k independent variable matrix. For clearer and simpler exposition, we 
assume that 1=l , which means that there is only one network measure. The scalar α is the 
parameter associated with the network measure, while β is a k by 1 vector of  parameters 
associated with individual-level independent variables X. As usual, the error term ε is 
assumed to satisfy the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions. Note that N is the number of  
survey respondents and that Z is based on data acquired from the ith respondent’s p network 
members (where 2≥p  and p is assumed to be the same for all N respondents). 
For assessing network effects, the parameter of  interest is α, which is the effect of  Z 
on y. The network measure represented by Z is the measure of  some characteristic of  a 
respondent’s social network, such as the mean level of  political expertise, percentage of  
Republicans (or Democrats), or frequency of  discussion. Such a characteristic is assumed to 
be exogenous to the survey respondents, and if  it has a statistically significant effect, this is 
taken to be evidence of  network influence on an individual attitude or behavior of  interest.  
An illustrative example of  the social networks approach in political science is 
McClurg’s (2006) study of  social influence on political participation. McClurg examined 
three aspects of  social networks: the level of  political disagreement, the supply of  political 
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expertise, and the frequency of  discussions about politics. Measures of  these variables were 
obtained for each survey respondent’s social network. To gauge the magnitude of  these 
effects on individual political participation, McClurg included these network variables in his 
negative binomial regression model and found that they were statistically significant 
variables. His findings showed that higher levels of  network agreement, more frequent 
discussions with network members, and higher levels of  political knowledge in the network 
led to higher counts of  political activities for individuals.  
It turns out that network models such as (2.6) are special cases of  spatial-x models, 
which we will see in the following discussion. 
Suppose there is social network data on N survey respondents who each have p 
discussants. Assuming that no respondent shares a discussant, this means that there are 
npNN =+ *  total individuals in the survey. Suppose we are interested in a dependent 
variable y as a function of  a network characteristic Z and k individual-level variables X. Then 
the dependent variable y can be modeled using the following spatial-x model: 
vXβWZy ++= γ*  
where y* is an n by 1 dependent variable vector, X is the n by k independent variable matrix, 
β is a k by 1 vector of  parameters associated with independent variables X, and the error 
term v is assumed to satisfy the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions.  
Like other spatial regression models, the spatial weights matrix W is an integral part 
of  the spatial-x model. The n by n matrix W is the row-standardized version of  W*, which is 
defined as follows: 
0* =ijw  if  individuals i and j are not in the same social network or ji =  
1* =ijw  if  individuals i and j are in the same social network 
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Thus, W* represents the social network structure of  all n respondents. Since no 
individual can belong to more than one social network, W* can be represented as a block-
diagonal matrix with N disjoint neighborhoods. Following convention, we row-standardize 
W* by dividing each element by the row sum – i.e., p – to obtain W. 
Post-multiplying W by Z yields the spatial-x term WZ. Because W is row-
standardized, each ith element of  the spatial-x term WZ represents the mean of  Z for the 
ith individual’s network members, excluding the value of  Z of  the ith individual. The 
parameter γ is the effect of  WZ on y; if  γ is positive and statistically significant, then an 
individual-level attitude or behavior is subject to network influence because of  a network 
characteristic represented by Z. 
Using the identity ZWZ = , we can rewrite the spatial-x model as follows: 
vXβZy ++= γ*
 (2.7) 
It is clear that (2.7) is a network model very similar to (2.6), since y* is a function of  Z , a 
vector of  the means of  a network characteristic Z, and of  some individual-level variables X.  
It is important to note that there are several important differences between models 
(2.6) and (2.7). First, the sample sizes are different but related. Whereas (2.6) is based on N 
observations, (2.7) is based on npNN =+ *  observations. In other words, (2.6) is based 
on a subset of  (2.7). Second, (2.6) contains observations of  y and X only for the survey 
respondents, not for the discussants. In contrast, (2.7) contains observations of  y and X for 
both survey respondents and discussants. Third, while the parameters γ and α are both 
network effects, γ is the network effect on all n individuals, while α is the network effect only 
for the N survey respondents. 
In fact, model (2.6) can be viewed as a truncated version of  model (2.7). The 
observations in (2.6) are selected based on whether the individuals are survey respondents 
 
61 
and omitted when they are discussants. Equating (2.6) and (2.7) must therefore depend on 
some assumptions regarding their relationship. 
Since the observations in (2.6) are selected on whether the individuals are survey 














where 0=is  means that an individual i is a discussant and 1=is  means that an individual i 
is a survey respondent. The binary variable 
is  is the realization of  an unobserved variable 
*is , which is a function of  some unknown independent variables x0 and is assumed to have 
a normally distributed, independent error term u with a mean of  zero and constant variance. 














Thus, the equation for y is equivalent to the network model (2.6) and the equation for y* is 
equivalent to the spatial-x model (2.7). The errors u and ε are assumed to have correlation ρ, 
which means that the joint distribution of  u and ε is bivariate normal. According to Breen 
(1996), this correlation is intrinsic to the model and should be considered inherently 
immeasurable: “[W]e assume 0≠ρ  in the theoretical model that we posit for the population 
and not simply for the sample in which we may have omitted the measurement of  a variable 
common to x and s.” 
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Because the network model (2.6) is selected based on (2.8), estimates of  the 
parameters α and β may be biased and inconsistent. This is because the expected value of  y 
































is the inverse Mill’s ratio. In contrast, the expected value of  the unconditional, untruncated 
y* is 
( ) iii zyE βxα i+=*  
The difference between the two expected values means that OLS estimates for the network 
model (2.6) and spatial-x model (2.7) will generally be different. The two sets of  estimates 
will be the same in two circumstances: One, if  ρ is equal to 0, then the two expected values 
will be the same, which corresponds to the situation in which selection and outcome are 













any x variable or z  is zero, then the OLS estimate of  the parameter associated with the x 
variable or z  for the network model will be the same as the OLS estimate for the spatial-x 
model. 
Thus, the network model can be considered a special case of  the spatial-x model. As 
a truncated version of  the spatial-x model, the network model does not include network 
observations for the dependent variable and limits network information to independent 
variables. However, the spatial-x model has two main advantages over the network model. 
First, the spatial-x model makes use of  all the available information (for survey respondents 
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as well as discussants) while preserving the network structure via the spatial-x term. Second, 
the network model may result in biased and inconsistent estimates due to correlations 
associated with the selection process. If  the correlations are zero, then both the network 
model and spatial-x model will be appropriate, all else being equal. But if  one or more of  the 
correlations are non-zero, then the spatial-x model will be more appropriate. Thus, the 
spatial-x model is the safer choice. 
By understanding the contextual model and network model as special cases of  the 
spatial lag model and spatial-x model, we can see that spatial regression models can do what 
conventional models of  social influence can do and more. While we can estimate the effects 
of  groups on individual-level outcomes with either the contextual model or the spatial lag 
model, only the latter model explicitly places the individual in a social context (via spatial 
weights matrix), incorporates the reciprocal causation between individuals and groups, and 
represents the social influence process as a dynamic process of  mutual influence among 
individuals in a social context. While the effects of  social networks on individual-level 
outcomes can be estimated with either the social network model or the spatial-x model, only 
the latter makes use of  all the available data and does not require assumptions regarding the 
selection process. Thus, the spatial lag model and the spatial-x model are capable of  doing 
what the contextual model and network model can do, but more. 
In particular, the spatial lag model can overcome the problem of  reciprocal causation 
associated with the study of  social influence. The spatial lag model explicitly incorporates 
the reciprocal causation through the spatial lag term; thus, the spatial lag model represents an 
individual’s observed dependent variable as, in part, the outcome of  other individuals’ 
observed dependent variables. Because the spatial lag models explicitly incorporate 
reciprocal causation in this manner, all the covariates become, in a sense, group covariates. 
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Since the dependent variable y is found on both sides of  the equation, any effect from an 
individual-level covariate will indirectly influence the group as well. Accordingly, the “total 
effect” of  a covariate in spatial lag model consists of  direct and indirect effects. For example, 
suppose an individual is highly interested in politics and that this independent variable is 
statistically significant. The effect of  his political interest will affect his value y for his attitude 
toward a political issue, such as government spending, but because y is endogenous, his 
political interest will also (indirectly) affect the observed y for his neighbors as well. In fact, 
the spatial lag model implies a dynamic data generation process with a feedback loop (Lin et 
al., 2006). There is no such process represented in the contextual model, social network 
model, or spatial-x model, which all assume that the dependent variable is the outcome of  
linear and additive independent variables. This difference is a fundamental advantage of  the 
spatial lag model for the study of  social influence. Indeed, the spatial lag model explicitly 
represents the most plausible process of  social influence as mutual influence. 
 
In this chapter, I discussed the theories and models of  social influence. I argued that 
social contexts can be reconceptualized as social spaces that provide opportunities for social 
interaction and presented three examples: Blau space, ideological space, and geographical 
space. Following Erbring and Young (1979), I argued that social influence must be 
understood as mutual influence, which means that each individual influences and is 
influenced by others in his spatial neighborhood in a social space. I then provided a more 
formal definition of  social influence. Next, I introduced spatial econometrics and showed 
how spatial regression models can bring together the ideas of  social context as social space 
and social influence as mutual influence. Finally, I examined existing models of  social 
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influence and showed that they can be considered as special cases of  spatial regression 
models. 
This chapter showed why and how spatial econometrics is well-suited to the study of  
social influence in politics. It did this by addressing the major shortcomings of  conventional 
models and methods and by providing an alternative framework that overcomes many of  
those shortcomings. 
But what if  the researcher wishes simply to capture the role of  social influence in a 
more modest manner? In political science research, researchers may wish to account for 
social environments, even if  they are not interested primarily in modeling social influence 
directly. In such a circumstance, what does spatial econometrics have to offer over 
conventional linear regression models? This is the subject of  the next chapter, which is an 












Researchers already have a variety of  statistical options for dealing with social influence, such 
as using dummy variables or socio-demographic variables in linear regression models. Why 
use spatial econometrics instead of  these better-known methods? This chapter addresses this 
question by analyzing the differences and similarities between spatial regression models and 
linear regression models. 
First, I look at the dummy variable regression model and show how dummy variable 
regression is at best a special case of  spatial regression and discuss the substantive 
advantages of  using the spatial regression model for understanding social influence. Next, I 
turn to a simple regression model with one continuous independent variable and, by 
analyzing the structure of  its hat matrix, show how using this type of  model is not a 
substitute for spatial regression. Third, I extend the discussion of  the simple regression 
model to the general case of  multiple regression and show how it compares with spatial 
regression. Fourth, I show that by discretizing the continuous independent variables, linear 
regression models can be considered as spatial regression models but only in a very narrow 
and problematic sense. Finally, I conclude that spatial regression models represent specific 
processes of  mutual influence and contain meaningful parameters for a better understanding 
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of  social influence. Consequently, spatial regression models should be preferred over linear 
regression models for studying social influence. 
LINEAR REGRESSION 
Since political scientists often study social influence variables using the regression 
framework, we begin with the classical linear regression model, which is given by 
εXβy +=  
where y is an n by 1 vector of  dependent variable values, X is an n by k matrix of  
independent variables, β is a k by 1 vector of  coefficients, and ε is an n by 1 vector of  error 
terms that adhere to the Gaussian-Markov assumptions. The OLS fitted values are given by 
Xby =ˆ  
where b is a k by 1 vector of  estimated coefficients given by the well-known formula 
( ) yX'XX'b 1−=  
Because of  the Gaussian-Markov assumptions regarding the error term, b is a best linear 
unbiased estimator of  β. 
By combining the equations for the fitted values ŷ and coefficient estimates b, we 
can see that the fitted values indicated by ŷ are weighted averages of  the observed data 
points indicated by y: 
( ) yX'XX'Xy 1−=ˆ  
The weights are given by the n by n matrix ( ) X'XX'XH 1−= , which is known as the hat 
matrix. The hat matrix H is a symmetric and idempotent projection matrix that maps y into 
ŷ . 
 We can interpret each element hij of  H as the amount of  influence that each jy  
exerts on 












Conventionally, the hat matrix has been used for regression diagnostics. Because its form is 
comparable to the form of  a spatial weights matrix, I will use the hat matrix to show how 
different linear regressions relate to spatial regression, beginning with the case of  dummy 
variable regression. 
DUMMY VARIABLE REGRESSION MODELS VERSUS SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
Suppose we have a substantive independent variable such as religion. The possible 
values for this variable indicate mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and discrete categories; a 
respondent may be Protestant or Catholic but not both. Membership in each mutually 
exclusive category can be represented as dummy variables in a regression model. This model 
is a dummy variable regression model (through the origin) that is equivalent to a one-way 
analysis of  variance (ANOVA) model; it is a type of  model that is commonly used for 
studying group effects. This section will show that the dummy variable regression model is at 
best a special case of  the first-order spatial autoregressive (FAR) model, and because of  this, 
we will see that the FAR model has advantages for the study of  social influence. 
To represent formally the mutually exclusive groups, consider k groups, where each 
group comprises nm members (m = 1, 2, … , k). Let y be a vector of  observations of  the 
dependent variable, X is a k by k matrix of  indicator vectors, βm is a vector of  associated 
coefficients, and εm is a vector of  disturbances for the mth group. The dummy variable 
regression model (through the origin) is given by 




































i is an nm by 1 vector of  ones indicating membership in the mth group and mn0  is a 





































Note that each subscript indicates the dimension of  each vector. The total sample size is 
knnnn +++= K21  





























































































For an X matrix of  dummy variables, the hat matrix H turns out to be a block-diagonal 
matrix, which is a square diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are square matrices and 
the off-diagonal elements are zero matrices. To see this, we take advantage of  the fact that 




































































































































































where ⊕ is the conventional notation for the matrix direct sum. We can see that the n by n 





. This is a matrix whose elements are all equal to 1/ nm . It is easy to see that the 










































































































y is a vector in which the elements are the mean of  the elements of  
mn
y , i.e., 
the element 
mn
y is the mean value of  y for the nm members of  the mth group. This means 
that iŷ is the mean of  the y values of  group m associated with individual i. 
Now that we have uncovered the structure of  hat matrix H for dummy variable 
regression models, we will next see that H bears a strong resemblance to a specific type of  
(standardized) spatial weights matrix W. In fact, the structures of  H and W turn out to be 
very similar for disjoint neighborhoods (i.e., mutually exclusive groups); using this similarity, the 
following discussion will show that when nm becomes very large, 
WyHyXb ≈=  
We will then use this asymptotic equivalence to show that the dummy variable regression 
model is a special case of  the FAR model. 
Under the spatial regression framework, group membership is represented in a 
spatial weights matrix W. Spatial weights matrices are based on the researcher’s definition of  
what a neighborhood (i.e., group) is; for example, neighborhoods can be based on religion, in 
the sense that two individuals are “neighbors” if  they belong to the same religion. When 
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neighborhoods are “disjoint,” two individuals are neighbors if  they reside in the same 
neighborhood but not if  they reside in different neighborhoods. Disjoint neighborhoods in 
the spatial regression framework are analogous to the mutually exclusive categories used in 
the dummy variable regression model (through the origin). 
A spatial weights matrix representing disjoint neighborhoods is an n by n matrix W*, 
where each element w*ij = 1 when individuals i and j are neighbors and w*ij = 0 when i = j or 
when individuals i and j are not neighbors. Furthermore, each diagonal element w*ii is equal 
to 0, under the reasoning that individuals are not their own neighbors. Conventionally, the 
spatial weights matrix is row-standardized so that the elements of  each row sum to 1. In this 
chapter, W will denote the row-standardized version of  W*. Note that post-multiplying W 
by the dependent variable vector y yields the spatial lag Wy, where each element of  Wy 
represents the average y value of  observation i’s neighbors. 
We have seen that in a dummy variable regression model (through the origin), the hat 






Similarly, in spatial regression model with disjoint neighborhoods, a spatial weights matrix W 
representing the k disjoint neighborhoods is also a block diagonal matrix. As Lin et al (2006) 
observed, 
A characteristic of  such disjoint neighborhoods is that the spatial weights matrix, W, 
can always be arranged in a “block-diagonal” fashion. That is, there will be blocks of  
square matrices with non-zero off-diagonal elements along the principal diagonal line 
of  W, with each block representing a neighborhood while all other elements are zero 
outside these blocks. 
In the following discussion, we will establish that the diagonal blocks of  the block 
diagonal matrix W are asymptotically equivalent to the diagonal blocks of  H. 
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Suppose there are k neighborhoods and each neighborhood contains nm individuals 
(m = 1, 2, … , k). This is the same situation as the one discussed in the case of  dummy 
variable regression, but here we use the spatial econometric term “neighborhood” instead of  
group. 
 Let W* be an unstandardized spatial weights matrix such that w*ij = 1 when 
individuals i and j are neighbors and w*ij = 0 when i = j or when individuals i and j are not 



































where each block 
mmm nnn
I'ii −  is a nm by nm matrix representing the mth neighborhood, minus 
individual i (since individual i is not his own neighbor). To row-standardize W*, we divide 
each row by the number of  neighbors (nm - 1), which is a scalar. Letting W represent the 

































































































































































































































































































































































































The asymptotical equivalence of  Wy and Hy means that the spatial lag of  y and the OLS 
fitted values of  a dummy variable regression model are also asymptotically equivalent: 
WyHyy ≈=ˆ  
This is a special case of  the FAR model Wyy ρ̂ˆ =  when the spatial autoregressive parameter 
1ˆ =ρ . Thus, the dummy variable regression model (through the origin) is a special case of  a 
spatial regression model, when the neighborhoods (or groups) are exclusive, exhaustive, and 
discrete.10 
However, the difference between the FAR model and the dummy variable regression 
model is not a trivial one. First, by restricting the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ to 1, the 
dummy variable regression model forces the assumption that individual observations are 
essentially the same as their group averages. Under the dummy variable framework, the 
effect of  the group average is always equal to 1; under the FAR framework, the effect of  the 
group average can take on other values. For the purposes of  studying social influence, the 
latter is clearly more relevant, since estimating the effect of  the group average is estimating 
the effect of  the group on the individual. 
Second, the dummy variables account only for influence in one direction, while the 
FAR model can measure mutual influence. The presence of  the y variable on both sides of  
the FAR model represents an endogenous process in which observations influence and are 
influenced by neighboring observations. In the study of  social influence, the idea that 
individuals influence and are influenced by other individuals in their groups implies endogeneity. 
While the FAR model directly models this endogeneity among neighboring observations, it is 
absent in the dummy variable regression model. In the dummy variable regression model, 
the dependent variable (such as a political attitude) is simply a linear combination of  group-
                                                 
10 Lin et al. (2006) reached the same conclusion using a slightly different method. 
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membership indicators. It implies that groups affect individuals but, paradoxically, 
individuals do not affect the groups to which they belong. 
SIMPLE LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS VERSUS SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
In addition to dummy variable regression models, researchers can assess social 
influence by using a linear regression model with continuous independent variables that 
indicate social characteristics. While this type of  model is not usually found in studies that 
are explicitly about social influence, researchers in other areas of  study often find it useful to 
include in their models independent variables such as income or education – variables that 
can be interpreted as individual or social characteristics. For example, household income may 
be considered an individual-level indicator of  material resources or an indicator of  socio-
economic status. When independent variables are interpreted as social characteristics, the 
models that employ them necessarily make an implicit claim about social influence (e.g., 
group interests). These implicit claims of  social influence fall short of  what can be 
accomplished in spatial regression models. 
In this section, I show that a simple linear regression model with one continuous 
variable is not a special case of  a spatial regression model. In contrast to the dummy variable 
regression model (through the origin), the simple linear regression model does not have a hat 
matrix H that is comparable to a spatial weights matrix W; because of  this, the estimates 
from a linear regression model are not equivalent to the estimates from a corresponding 
spatial regression model, which are more relevant for studying social influence.  
The classical linear regression model is once again given by 
εXβy +=  
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where y is an n by 1 vector of  dependent variable values, β is a k+1 by 1 vector of  
coefficients, and ε is an n by 1 vector of  error terms that adhere to the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions. Let X be the following n by 2 matrix representing one continuous independent 




























The OLS fitted values are given by 
Hyy =ˆ  
where H is equal to ( ) X'XX'X 1− . It has already been shown that for disjoint 
neighborhoods, the hat matrix H and spatial weights matrix W are asymptotically equivalent. 
But in our simple linear regression model, H is based on a continuous variable (rather than a 
set of  dummy variables). We will see that H is not equivalent to a spatial weights matrix W 
that is based on that continuous variable. 
Under the spatial regression framework, a spatial weights matrix W that is based on a 
continuous variable can be considered an inverse distance matrix. In an inverse distance 
matrix W*, the elements wij are functions of  the inverse distance between two observations i 
and j. Each element wij is larger when observations i and j are closer together and wij is 
smaller when observations i and j are far apart. This structure of  W* has substantive 
consequences for the meaning of  the spatial lag W*y. The ith element of  W*y is given by 
∑
≠ij
jij yw   
when each yj is given more weight when wij is large and less weight when wij is small. Since wij 
is large when the distance between observations i and j is small, and wij is small when the 
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distance between observations i and j is large, this means that the spatial lag W*y is the 
weighted sum of  observation i’s neighbors’ y values, where neighbors that are farther away 
count for less and neighbors that are closer by count for more. 
To assess whether H is a type of  inverse distance matrix, we need to determine 
whether each hij is like wij (for ji ≠ ) in the sense that they are both based on the distance 
between observations i and j. If  so, then we can classify H as a type of  inverse distance 
matrix. But as we will see, we cannot. 
Determining whether each hij is based on the distance between observations i and j is 
not a straightforward task because each hij (for ji ≠ ) is defined relative to a reference point: 
it is the leverage of  yj on iŷ . That means we need to employ additional points for 
comparison. Accordingly, let ijij xxd −=  represent the “distance” between observations j 
and i, and let ikik xxd −=  represent the distance between observations k and i. We will 
compare observations j and k and see if  their leverages on
iŷ  correspond with ijd and ikd . 
If  H is a type of  distance-based matrix, then a difference between ijd and ikd  should 
correspond to a difference between hij and hik. Specifically, if  hij is a spatial weight, it should 
be small when the distance between observations j and i, is large, and it should be large when 
the distance between observations j and i is small. Accordingly, if  ikij dd > , we should expect 
ikij hh < , and if  ikij dd < , we should expect ikij hh > . 
The X matrix for a simple linear regression model implies that the n by n hat matrix 
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Note that when either xi or xj are equal to the global mean x , hij is equal to n
-1. The off-
diagonal element hij is commonly interpreted as the amount of  influence exerted on iŷ  by yj. 
Each diagonal element of  H is given by the following: 





































































It is known that 10 ≤≤ iih , since H is a symmetric idempotent matrix (see Hoaglin and 
Welsch, 1978). Note once again that when xi is equal to the global mean x , hii is equal to n
-1. 
The diagonal element hii is the amount of  influence exerted on iŷ  by yi. 






























































Whether ∆ is positive or negative depends on kj xx −  as well as xx i − . Using this fact, we 
can see that ikij dd >  does not consistently correspond with ikij hh < , and ikij dd <  does not 
correspond with ikij hh > . 
For example, suppose kji xxxx >>> . This means that ikij hh >  and that 
ikij dd < . Accordingly, the conditions for H to be a spatial weights matrix are satisfied. 
But suppose kji xxxx <<< . This would mean that ikij hh <  and that ikij dd < . 
In order for H to be a spatial weights matrix, however, we require that ikij dd > . Thus, the 
conditions for H to be a spatial weights matrix are no longer satisfied. This counterexample 
is sufficient grounds to conclude that in the case of  simple linear regression, the hat matrix 
is not a type of  spatial weights matrix.  
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS VERSUS SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
It has been shown that for disjoint neighborhoods, the dummy variable regression 
model (through the origin) is a special case of  the FAR model (with 1=ρ ). It has also been 
shown that this equivalence does not extend to a simple regression model with one 
continuous independent variable and first-order spatial autoregressive model with a distance 
spatial weights matrix based on the same continuous variable. This section generalizes the 
results for the simple regression model; we will see that the equivalence also does not hold 
for a multivariate regression model with k continuous variables. 
 
82 
The classical linear regression model is given by 
εXβy +=  
where y is an n by 1 vector of  dependent variable values, β is a k +1 by 1 vector of  
coefficients, and ε is an n by 1 vector of  error terms that adhere to the Gaussian-Markov 
assumptions. Let X be the following n by k+1 matrix representing k continuous independent 
































The OLS fitted values are given by 
Hyy =ˆ  
where H is equal to 
( ) X'XX'X 1− .  
To demonstrate why a multivariate regression with k continuous variables is not 
equivalent to a spatial regression model with corresponding spatial weights matrix, we turn 
to a numerical example, since the form of  the hat matrix H is too complicated. We have the 









Table 3.1. 10 observations 
 RESPONDENTS X1 X2 
 1 0.0 1.0 
 2 0.1 0.9 
 3 0.2 0.8 
 4 0.3 0.7 
 5 0.4 0.6 
 6 0.5 0.5 
 7 0.6 0.4 
 8 0.0 1.0 
 9 0.8 0.2 
 10 0.9 0.1 
 
To examine the distance (or similarity) between the respondents, we can plot these 











The corresponding hat matrix H is given by 
 
Table 3.2. Hat Matrix Based on Two Continuous Independent Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 0.26 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.26 -0.07 -0.12 
 2 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.22 -0.03 -0.06 
 3 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.00 
 4 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.05 
 5 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 
 6 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.17 
 7 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.22 
 8 0.26 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.26 -0.07 -0.12 
 9 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.20 -0.07 0.29 0.34 
 10 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.22 -0.12 0.34 0.40 
   
 
Using the same reasoning we used to examine the simple linear regression model, we 
can use the elements of  H in Table 3.2 to assess whether the difference between dij and dik 
corresponds to the difference between hij and hik. If  H is indeed a kind of  distance-based 
matrix, then a greater difference between dij and dik should correspond to the smaller 
difference between hij and hik.  
Consider respondent 4 as a baseline and respondents 5 and 6 for comparison. From 
Figure 3.1, we can see that 4645 dd < , and from Table 3.2, we can see that 4645 hh > . Since a 
greater distance corresponds with a lesser hat value, this example is consistent with the idea 
that H is a spatial weights matrix. 
Now let us look at respondent 4 as a baseline and respondents 2 and 5 for 
comparison. From Figure 2.1, we can see that 4542 dd > . But from Table 3.2, we can see that
4542 hh > , which means that we have an example of  a greater distance corresponding with a 
greater hat value rather than a smaller hat value. 
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Based on this numerical example, we can see that a greater (lesser) difference 
between dij and dik does not reliably correspond with a lesser (greater) difference between hij 
and hik. Thus, we can conclude that H is not a type of  distance-based spatial weights matrix.  
As in the case of  the simple linear regression model, the multivariate linear 
regression model is not equivalent to the spatial regression model. A multivariate regression 
model does not reflect the relationship between influence and distance the way that a spatial 
regression model can; and it is the ability to capture this relationship that makes the latter 
model better for studying social influence. 
DISCRETIZED LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS VERSUS SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
From the previous sections, we see that the hat matrices for the simple regression 
model and multivariate regression model do not behave like distance-based spatial weights 
matrices in spatial regression models. Because of  this, we can conclude that linear regression 
models are generally not special cases of  spatial regression models. However, this conclusion 
is only a general one because linear regression models can actually be expressed as spatial 
regression models. By discretizing the continuous independent variables, we can transform 
any linear regression model into a dummy variable regression model (through the origin), 
which is a special case of  the FAR model. 
The classical linear regression model is given by 
εXβy +=  
where y is an n by 1 vector of  dependent variable values, β is a vector of  coefficients, and ε 
is an n by 1 vector of  error terms that adhere to the Gaussian-Markov assumptions. Let X be 































Each of  the k continuous variables can be discretized into p intervals, where p is an integer 
and 2≥p .11 In other words, we represent the mth continuous variable x as a set of  p dummy 
variables: 
{ }mpmmm dddx ,,, 21 K≡  
For example, if  x1 were age in years, d11 might be children (ages 12 and under), d12 might be 
teenagers (ages 13 through 17), d13 might be young adults ages (18 through 34), d14 might be 
mature adults ages (35 through 65), and d15 might be the elderly (ages 65 and over). For a 
respondent who is 45 years old, we would say that 114 =d  and the remaining dummy 
variables would all be set to 0.  
For a simple linear regression model with one continuous variable (k = 1), 
discretizing the continuous independent variable simply means transforming the simple 
linear regression model into a dummy variable regression (through the origin) with p 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive dummy variables. Since no respondent can score a “1” for 
more than one dummy variable, we can think of  each dummy variable as a disjoint 
neighborhood. As we saw in a previous section, disjoint neighborhoods can be represented 
in a spatial weights matrix (with zeroes on the diagonal), which means that a dummy variable 
regression (through the origin) is a special case of  a FAR model (when 1=ρ ). In other 
words, by discretizing the continuous variable, a simple linear regression model can be 
considered a special case of  a spatial regression model. 
                                                 
11 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that p is the same for all k variables. 
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For a multivariate linear regression with k > 1 continuous variables, we can discretize 
all the continuous independent variables into p intervals and define each neighborhood as a 
unique combination of  the kp discretized variables. Accordingly, the number of  dummy 
variables for the discretized multivariate linear regression model is pk, since there are p 
possible intervals for each of  the k variables. By allowing each respondent to belong to only 
one of  the pk neighborhoods, the neighborhoods are necessarily disjoint and can be 
expressed as a spatial weights matrix. The asymptotical equivalence between a dummy 
variable regression (through the origin) based on the pk neighborhoods and the FAR model 
(when 1=ρ ) follows from this. In this way, a multivariate linear regression model can be 
considered a special case of  a spatial regression model. 
While any linear regression model can be expressed as a spatial regression model, it 
would generally be unwise to do so because of  how quickly the number of  dummy variables 
can accumulate during the discretization process. To see how this happens, recall that each 
continuous independent variable can be discretized into 2≥p intervals. In the simplest case, 
each continuous independent variable is dichotomized, which means that 2=p . As k (the 
number of  independent variables) increases, the number of  dummy variables required for 
the discretized linear regression increases exponentially. For example, by increasing the 
number of  independent variables from 4 to 5, the number of  dummy variables jumps from 
16 to 32 and by increasing the number of  independent variables from 5 to 6, the number of  
dummy variables jumps from 32 to 64. 
The increase in the number of  dummy variables (and subsequent loss of  degrees of  
freedom) is more rapid when we also allow p to increase (see Figure 3.2). For example, 
consider 3=k  independent variables and let us discretize those variables into 4=p  
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intervals. Despite the modesty of  those numbers, we end up with a daunting 64 dummy 
variables. 
 
Figure 3.2. Number of Disjoint Neighborhoods (Dummy Variables) for 
Different Intervals (p) and Continuous Variables (k) 
 
 
While the discretized linear regression model is a special case of  a spatial regression 
model, it is a problematic one. The fact that any linear regression model can be converted 
into a spatial regression model via discretization does not mean that it should be done in 
actual data analyses. First, the rapid increase in the number of  dummy variables at the higher 
values of  p and k makes such a conversion impractical. Second, the discretization process 
results in a significant loss of  information. The discretized linear regression model implies 
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completely separate means for each group, even if  some groups are more similar than 
others. This is because the discretized linear regression model is essentially an ANOVA 
model, and ANOVA models make no assumptions regarding the statistical relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables. Consequently, in a linear regression 
model, respondents with similar independent variable values will have similar estimated 
dependent variable values and there will be a linear relationship between the independent 
and dependent variable. In contrast, in a discretized linear regression model or ANOVA 
model, respondents with similar independent variables values are forced to have completely 
different means; there is no recognition of  similarity among the groups and there is no 
relationship among the means. Thus, the discretized linear regression model is a rather crude 
version of  the linear regression model.  
The usefulness of  the discretized linear regression model lies not in its application, 
but in its connection to the spatial regression model. It is a theoretical device that allows us 
to compare and contrast the application of  the general linear regression model and the 
spatial regression model to social influence analyses. 
When it comes to linear regression models, a regression coefficient is the effect of  a 
unit increase in one independent variable, all else being equal. In political science research, 
however, we are often not interested in isolating the effect of  a single independent variable 
but in understanding the effect of  a combination of  related variables. For example, consider 
the attitude toward government spending as the dependent and consider age, income, and 
education as the (roughly) continuous independent variables. While the effects of  unit 
increases in age, income, or education may be interesting and statistically significant in their 
own right, it is often more meaningful to consider combinations of  these characteristics: 
What is the effect of  being poor, young, and college-educated on one’s attitude toward 
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government spending? What is the effect of  being affluent, middle-aged, and high-school-
educated? Estimating these kinds of  combined effects is important. 
To estimate combinations of  effects on the dependent variable, researchers can 
simply add up different combinations of  estimated effects from a linear regression model. 
By conceptualizing a discretized linear regression model (i.e., a dummy variable regression 
(through the origin) with pk dummy variables), we can see that the combined effects are 
equivalent to the group means, such as the average political attitude of  all poor, young, and 
college-educated individuals and the average political attitude of  all affluent, middle-aged 
high-school-educated individuals.  
But as we saw in an earlier section comparing general dummy variable regression and 
spatial regression, group means can be considered as social influence only in a very narrow 
sense. If  we think of  social influence as the effect of  belonging to a group, using a group 
mean requires the assumption that individuals who belong to a group fully assimilate the 
group mean. As a special case of  the FAR model, the discretized linear regression model 
illustrates this assumption by restricting the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ to 1. The 
constraint 1=ρ  means that the social influence completely determines an individual’s 
observed y value such that 
mi yy =ˆ  
This means that the group effect is equal to the group mean. By using the FAR model, we 
acknowledge ρ as a parameter that can be estimated, allowing the group effect to be 
proportional to the group mean: 
mi yy ⋅= ρˆ  
Because the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is the effect of  the group mean, it can 




Recognizing the relevance of  groups and social characteristics, political scientists 
usually include them as control variables in their regression models. Political methodologists 
have often criticized this “garbage can” approach for lacking any real explanatory power. In 
this spirit, Achen (2005) writes: 
Countries, wars, racial categories, religious preferences, education levels, and other 
variables that change people’s coefficients are “controlled” with dummy variables 
that are completely inadequate to modeling their effects. The result is a long list of  
independent variables, a jumbled bag of  nearly unrelated observations, and often a 
hopelessly bad specification with meaningless (but statistically significant with several 
asterisks!) results. 
If  demographic, ideological, and geographical variables are important for understanding 
political attitudes and if  Achen and his partisans are correct, then having them as control 
variables in a linear regression model would not help us say very much about the role of  
social influence in political attitude formation. Doing so would not capture the most 
theoretically interesting aspect of  these characteristics – that race/ethnicity, age, religion, 
education, occupation, and gender provide contexts in which individuals think and talk about 
politics.  
In this chapter, I showed that spatial regression models offer meaningful advantages 
over linear regression models. First, by demonstrating how the dummy variable regression 
model is a special case of  the first-order spatial autoregressive (FAR) model, I showed that 
the latter model offer advantages over the former. The FAR model contains a substantively 
useful parameter (ρ) that quantifies the amount of  social influence exerted by social groups. 
The FAR model also directly incorporates a dynamic, endogenous process of  influence that 
dummy variable regression and linear regression models lack.  
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Next, I showed that simple and multiple linear regression models are generally not 
special cases of  spatial regression models by demonstrating that their hat matrices do not 
behave like the distance-based spatial weights matrices used in spatial regression models. 
These results explain why including a collection of  geographic, demographic, and ideological 
control variables in a linear regression will not produce the same results as including those 
same variables in a spatial weights matrix in a spatial regression model. 
Finally, I discussed how simple and multiple linear regression models can be forced 
into special cases of  spatial regression models by discretizing the continuous independent 
variables. Since this procedure produced a dummy variable regression model that quickly lost 
degrees of  freedom even at modest numbers of  independent variables, the discretized linear 
regression was theoretically useful for showing how linear regression models and spatial 
regression models can be used to address the same questions of  group influence. But as in 
the case of  the dummy variable regression model, the discretized linear regression model 
falls short of  the spatial regression model’s ability to model individuals with respect to their 
groups. 
Because spatial regressions are much more meaningful than dummy variable 
regression models and linear regression models, spatial econometrics can serve as an 









Up to this point, this dissertation has been mainly theoretical. I have looked at the 
methodological problem of  reciprocal causation, proposed an alternative framework based 
on spatial econometric concepts, reframed the idea of  social context as social space, 
emphasized the idea of  social influence as mutual influence, introduced spatial econometric 
models of  social influence, and compared and contrasted spatial regression models with 
more conventional regression models. The utility of  these theoretical considerations remains 
to be illustrated in actual empirical applications of  such a spatial econometric approach to 
understanding social influence, which are the subjects of  chapters 5, 6 and 7. This chapter 
describes the research design of  these applications. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
This dissertation focuses on how researchers can better analyze and understand 
social influence in politics by using a spatial econometric framework. Motivated by the 
problems of  reciprocal causation and social distance, this dissertation is concerned with the 
following major question and related corollary questions: 
 
1. Main Question: What is the best way to study social influence on political 
attitudes? 
2. Secondary Questions: 
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a. How can social contexts be reconceptualized as spaces for spatial 
econometric analysis? What are the dimensions of  these spaces, and 
how should they be used in spatial regression models? 
b. Compared to the dominant models of  social influence, what 
advantages and disadvantages does a spatial econometric approach 
offer? 
c. To what extent are demographic, ideological, and geographical 
contexts important for understanding social influence? 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The unit of  analysis is the individual, and the phenomena under study are individual-
level political attitudes toward various political issues. 
DATA SOURCE 
This dissertation relies on the 2004 American National Election Studies dataset for 
analysis. This is an unusual (and unprecedented) choice because studies of  social influence 
typically rely on social network data or a combination of  datasets (such as individual-level 
survey data and census data) in order to obtain the individual-level and group-level data 
necessary for a contextual analysis or a social network analysis. In contrast, the spatial 
econometric analyses in this dissertation are based on individual-level data from a well-
known mass survey. But how can a study of  social influence be based on a public opinion 
survey that consists of  randomly selected individuals who have probably never met, never 
interacted, and therefore never actually influenced each other? 
The justification for using a public opinion survey lies in structural equivalence, a 
concept found in network analysis. Structural equivalence is the idea that actors who have 
identical (or sufficiently similar) relations to all other actors in a social system can be 
considered equivalent (see Lorrain and White, 1971; Sailer, 1978; Burt, 1987). Burt (1987) 
provides the following definition: 
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Structurally equivalent people occupy the same position in social structure and so are 
proximate to the extent that they have the same pattern of  relations with occupants 
of  other positions. More specifically, two people are structurally equivalent to the 
extent that they have identical relations with all other individuals in the study 
population. 
Or, as Sailer (1978) puts it, “Two people in the same role are substitutable.” Because this 
dissertation looks at social influence in the context of  geography, demography, and ideology, 
the use of  mass survey data in this dissertation is based on the idea that individuals with the 
same geographical, demographic, or ideological characteristics are structurally equivalent. 
This means that individuals with the same geographical, demographic, or ideological 
characteristics have the same patterns of  relationships, so that randomly chosen individuals, 
so long as they have the same characteristics, can be studied to see whether they influence 
and are influenced by other individuals with similar characteristics.12 
For example, suppose two individuals reside in the same congressional district. 
Suppose they know each other and interact on some level with one another, which may 
result in the mutual influence of  each other’s political attitudes. In an ideal world of  perfect 
and complete data, both individuals would be included as data points and the amount of  
social influence can be estimated based on such data. But actual datasets such as the 2004 
might include only one or neither individuals. By leveraging the idea of  structural 
equivalence, however, we can assume that even if  the randomly selected individuals in the 
2004 ANES are virtually strangers, we can still assess whether the randomly selected 
                                                 
12 The concept of structural equivalence is often contrasted with contagion processes of social influence. For 
example, Burt (1987) considered the adoption of medical innovation among medical professionals as the result 
of structural equivalence and as the result of social contagion. The latter process means that common adoption 
is the result of social influence among interacting agents, while the former means that common adoption is the 
result of similar circumstances. Thus, the juxtaposition between structural equivalence and contagion is really 
just a version of Galton’s Problem. While use of structural equivalence as a justification for using mass survey 
data in this dissertation is somewhat unorthodox, I believe that it is in line with the implications of the concept.  
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individuals influence and influenced by other randomly selected individuals so long as they 
share their geographical, demographic, ideological characteristics. 
Another advantage of  using the ANES is that it is a well-known, often-used dataset. 
Its weaknesses and strengths are known. Therefore, it is well-suited for this dissertation’s 
alternative approach to social influence. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The dependent variables are individual-level attitudes toward specific political issues, 
which are familiar to political scientists. These dependent variables are attitudes toward the 
following political issues: 
 
1. Whether medical expenses should be covered by government insurance or by 
private insurance 
2. Whether the environment should be protected even if  it eliminates jobs or 
reduces the standard of  living 
3. Whether the federal government should let everybody get ahead on their 
own or ensure that every person has a job and a good standard of  living 
4. Whether the government should provide fewer services to reduce spending 
or more services even if  it means more spending 
5. Whether the federal government should make every effort to improve the 
social and economic position of  blacks 
6. Whether women should have an equal role with men in business, industry, 
and government or remain in the home 
7. Whether defense spending should be increased or decreased 
8. Whether abortions should be more or less restricted 
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For each of  these issues, the survey respondents in the ANES have been asked to 
place themselves on a seven-point scale. Descriptions and summary statistics for these eight 
dependent variables can be found in the appendix. 
The independent variables used in this dissertation’s models also come from the 
2004 ANES. They include various socio-economic and demographic variables as well as 
variables associated with political behavior and attitudes, such as party identification and 
political knowledge. Subsequent chapters will provide more details on the specific 
independent variables used in different models. 
The main measurement issues in this dissertation have to do with specifying the 
connectivities among the survey respondents in spatial weights matrices. These specifications 
have significant consequences for estimating spatial regression models and will be dealt with 
in the following empirical chapters. 
SPATIAL WEIGHTS MATRICES 
This subsection discusses methods for locating respondents in three different types 
of  spaces, for calculating distances between respondents in these spaces, and for using these 
distances to construct spatial weights matrices. 
Blau Space 
To estimate social distance, it is necessary to define the dimensions of  the Blau 
space. Based on an informal review of  political journal articles, I identify race, education, 
and sex as the most commonly used demographic variables and are therefore well-suited to 
serve as dimensions of  a Blau space. To calculate the distance between individuals i and j in 
















Higher values of  Gower’s Sij indicate greater dissimilarity (or greater social distance), while 
lower values indicate lesser dissimilarity (or lesser social distance). Using this measure, the 






=  for i ≠ j 
0=ijw  for i = j 
This means that the spatial lag Wy can be seen as the weighted average of  the respondents’ 
Blau neighbors. 
Ideological Space 
Using Poole’s scaling technique, individuals can be placed in a basic ideological space 
by using their candidate evaluation scores from public opinion surveys. Poole’s technique is 
based on a singular value decomposition of  a numeric matrix with missing data (see Poole, 
1998).  
By placing each individual on a single basic ideological space, one may compute 
distances between individuals in the space and assess the ideological similarity between them. 
The smaller the ideological distance between two respondents, the more similar they are. I 
expect that respondents are more influenced by those who are more ideologically similar to 







 for i ≠ j 
0=ijw  for i = j 
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where dij is the Euclidean distance between respondents i and j in the basic ideological space. 
This means that the spatial lag Wy can be seen as the weighted average of  the respondents’ 
ideological neighbors. 
Geographical Space 
In this dissertation, I use the congressional district to represent geographical space. 
Two respondents are geographical neighbors if  they reside in the same congressional district. 
This means that the elements of  the spatial weights matrix W are: 
1=ijw   if  respondents i and j are neighbors 
0=ijw  for i = j and if  respondents i and j are not neighbors 
The spatial lag for the respondents can be seen as the unweighted average of  their fellow 
congressional district dwellers. 
INDICATORS OF SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION 
Spatial autocorrelation is the measure of  the strength and direction of  spatial 
dependence. Positive spatial autocorrelation indicates that higher values (of  the variable of  
interest) correlate with higher neighboring values and that lower values correlate with lower 
neighboring values. Negative spatial autocorrelation indicates that higher values correlate 
with lower neighboring values and that lower values correlate with higher neighboring values. 
If  there is no spatial autocorrelation, there is no association between values and locations. 
The most widely-used indicator of  spatial autocorrelation is Moran’s I. By using the 
(global) Moran’s I test, one can test the null hypothesis of  spatial randomness against the 


















where wij is spatially-defined weight between spatial units i and j (e.g., individuals, cities, states) 
and yi is an observation of  the variable of  interest (e.g., policy, vote, institution). Moran’s I is 
essentially a ratio of  the weighted covariance over the variance of  the observations, where wij 
are the weights. If  the distance between units i and j is large, then wij will be very small and 
the cross-product of  units i and j’s deviations from the mean will be small. On the other 
hand, if  wij is very large, then the cross-product of  units i and j’s deviations from the mean 
will be large. Moran’s I ranges from approximately -1 (which indicates negative 
autocorrelation) to 1 (which indicates positive autocorrelation). If  Moran’s I is equal to zero, 
then there is no autocorrelation, implying a random dispersion of  values in a space.13 In a 
Moran’s I test, the null hypothesis is that there is no systematic relationship between values 
and location, or spatial randomness. The alternative hypothesis is that there is spatial 
autocorrelation. Positive and significant spatial autocorrelation indicates that there is spatial 
clustering of  the variable of  interest. 
Moran’s I is the most popular indicator of  spatial autocorrelation because it is easily 
applicable and performs well in a variety of  situations. For these reasons, it will be used in 
this dissertation to test for spatial autocorrelation in political attitudes.  
But Moran’s I is by no means the only indicator of  spatial autocorrelation. There are 
two broad classes of  indicators: global and local. Global indicators of  spatial autocorrelation 
                                                 
13 The Moran’s I test can be conducted under the assumption of normality or by using random permutation. 
This study uses the latter because it is data-driven and does not make parametric assumptions. The results 




measure the degree of  spatial autocorrelation for the entire dataset. These measures are 
based on the assumption that the same spatial process occurs over the entire space – i.e., no 
spatial heterogeneity. Global measures include Moran’s I, Gamma, Geary’s C, and the Getis-
Ord G statistics. Local indicators of  spatial autocorrelation measure the degree of  spatial 
autocorrelation for each observation unit. These measures are based on the assumption of  
spatial heterogeneity – i.e., the assumption is that different spatial processes may occur over 
the same space. Local indicators of  spatial autocorrelation include local Moran’s I, local 
Gamma, local Geary’s C, and others. Both global and local indicators of  spatial 
autocorrelation are closely related; in general, the sum of  a local measure of  spatial 
autocorrelation is proportional to the corresponding global measure (see Anselin, 1995). 
MODEL 
The spatial lag model is the primary model used in this dissertation. The spatial lag 






where y is the n by 1 vector of  observations of  the dependent variable. β is a k by 1 vector 
of  parameters associated with independent variables X, which is an n by k matrix. The error 
term ε satisfies the usual Gauss Marcov assumptions, and I is a n by n identity matrix. 
The spatial autoregressive parameter ρ measures the effect of  the spatial lag Wy. If  
0=ρ , then there is no spatial dependence, and the spatial lag model reduces to the classical 
linear regression model. On the other hand, if  the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is 
statistically different from zero, there would be evidence of  social influence on political 




In general, spatial regression models cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The exception to this is the spatial-x model, which can be estimated using OLS so 
long as the Gauss-Marcov assumptions hold. For the spatial lag model and FAR model, 
however, OLS estimation generates biased and inconsistent estimates (Dow, 1982; Anselin, 
1988; Le Sage 1998);14 the presence of  y on both sides of  the equation gives rise to 
simultaneity bias. To overcome these problems, maximum likelihood estimation should be 
used for estimating the parameters of  the spatial lag model and the FAR model. Since the 
FAR model can be considered a special case of  the spatial lag model (with no covariates), the 
discussion focuses on estimating spatial lag models. 
To estimate the spatial lag model using maximum likelihood, Anselin (1988) provides 
the following procedure: 
 
1. Use OLS to estimate OLSOLS εXβy +=  
2. Use OLS to estimate 
LL εXβWy +=  
3. Compute the two sets of  residuals OLSOLS βXye
ˆ−=  and LL βXWye
ˆ−=  
4. Given the two sets of  residuals from step 3, find ρ that maximizes the 
following concentrated likelihood function 








5. Using ρ̂ from step 4, compute the estimates β̂ and 2ˆεσ  using 
                                                 
14 Anselin (1988) showed that the OLS estimate of the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is inconsistent, since 
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Using maximum likelihood to estimate the spatial lag model has many advantages. 
First, maximum likelihood estimates are asymptotically efficient and consistent, so long as 
certain regularity conditions are met. This means that the spatial autoregressive parameter 
must be constrained such that 1<ρ  (Anselin, 1988). Second, maximum likelihood 
estimation is substantively appropriate. According to Lin et al. (2006), maximum likelihood 
estimation allows for the endogeneity of  y, and in doing so, provides an “equilibrium 
solution” to the dynamic influence process represented in the spatial lag and FAR models. If  
1≥ρ , the process can be non-stationary or explosive, which would imply the lack of  an 
equilibrium. 
Another popular method for estimating spatial regression model is two-stage least 
squares. While maximum likelihood estimation is more asymptotically efficient, two-stage 
least squares can be less computationally intensive. In a two-stage least squares procedure 
(see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), one can use X, WX, W2X, and other transformations of  X 
using W as instruments in a first-stage regression of  Wyy =*  to obtain an estimate for the 
spatial lag term, and then use OLS on the spatial regression model with the estimated spatial 
lag *ŷ .  
The decision to use maximum likelihood or two-stage least squares depends on 
several factors. Lin et al. (2006) found maximum likelihood adequate for estimating spatial 
lag models with only one spatial lag but turned to two-stage least squares estimation for 
models with two or more spatial lag terms. Cho (2003) recommended two-stage least squares 
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for large datasets and for data exhibiting a high degree of  non-normality. Since each of  the 
models used throughout this dissertation feature only one spatial lag and the dataset of  
interest features only 1200 observations with low levels of  non-normality (in the dependent 
variables), this dissertation will rely on maximum likelihood estimation. 
GALTON’S PROBLEM 
If  a test for spatial autocorrelation turns out to be statistically significant, the 
researcher cannot conclude that there is spatial dependence (and therefore social influence) 
and stop there. Examinations of  indicators of  spatial autocorrelation are exploratory in 
nature; they do not account for other factors that may give the appearance of  spatial 
dependence. Neighboring values may be similar because neighboring individuals mutually 
influence each other, or they may be similar because of  some coincidence or common 
predisposition. For example, one might find statistically significant positive spatial 
autocorrelation in vote choice across counties, which is evidence that adjacent counties tend 
to vote in similar ways. This relationship between geographical location and vote choice can 
be explained in different ways. One, there may actually be social influence among 
neighboring counties, due to the interactions among individuals who live close together in 
those counties. This would be true spatial dependence. Two, it may be that adjacent counties 
have faced common external shocks, such as a common media market or environmental 
issue, that have led them to vote independently in a similar direction. Three, it may be that 
Republicans tend to live with other Republicans while Democrats tend to live with other 
Democrats, which means that the similarity in vote choice in neighboring counties is really 
the result of  party affiliations.  
Distinguishing between true spatial dependence and the effects of  common shocks 
is known in spatial econometrics as Galton’s Problem. This methodological issue is named 
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for Sir Francis Galton, who pointed out in 1889 that inferences based on assumptions of  
independence can be misleading if  there is actually diffusion among observations of  
observations. The subject of  his criticism is an 1889 anthropological study of  marriage and 
descent across cultures. Edward Tylor, who carried out the study, found that certain types of  
institutions of  marriage and descent were associated with each other and concluded that 
these associations implied a general evolutionary sequence involving institutional shifts from 
maternal lines to paternal lines. In response, Galton pointed out that similarity among 
cultures could come from borrowing, common descent, or evolutionary development. 
Without controlling for these interdependencies, he argued, one cannot make valid 
inferences across cultures. While it arose out of  cross-cultural anthropological research, 
Galton’s problem became a general but serious methodological issue in social science 
research. 
In spatial econometrics, Galton’s Problem is the problem of  distinguishing between 
mutual influence and coincidence, between common attributes and interaction, between 
independent and interdependent processes. By understanding mutual influence as a process, 
we are saying that individuals become more alike through some process of  interaction. This 
is distinct from saying that individuals are more alike in some ways because they are more 
alike in other ways. Dow et al.’s (1982) explanation is useful here: 
When interacting units tend to become either more alike – through diffusion, 
contagion, imitation, assimilation, cooptation, convergent competition or a host of  
other process – or more dissimilar – through repulsion, divergent competition, 
differentiation, etc. – as a result of  interaction, we have a particular kind of  
contextual effect resulting from the network of  relations between sample unit rather 
than from their attributes. 
Franzese and Hays characterized Galton’s Problem as the “great difficulty” of  
distinguishing common shocks from interdependence. Common shocks result in “correlated 
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response to correlated unit-level, contextual, or context-conditional factors,” while 
interdependence refers to “contexts in which the outcomes of  interest (i.e., dependent 
variables) in some units of  analysis (e.g., countries) directly affect outcomes in others. 
However, spatial patterns might appear without any direct effect from outcomes in some 
units to those in others, perhaps via spatial correlation in domestic or exogenous-external 
conditions affecting units. 
In the case of  political attitudes, Galton’s Problem leads us to the following question: 
Do some individuals have similar attitudes because they mutually influence each other, or do 
they have similar attitudes because they were exposed to the same stimulus or were 
predisposed to have those attitudes in the first place? Answering this question means 
figuring out whether similarities in political attitudes are due to a process (i.e., mutual 
influence) or an attribute (i.e., common shock). This can be accomplished to a large degree 
by using carefully-considered control variables in spatial regression models. Accordingly, 
each spatial regression model in the following three chapters will feature control variables 
appropriate to influence in the social space under examination. 
HYPOTHESES 
The null hypothesis is that there is no neighborhood effect on political attitudes in 
Blau, ideological, and geographical spaces. The alternative hypothesis is that there is a 
positive neighborhood effect, meaning the spatial parameters associated with each type of  
spatial regression model are all greater than 0 and less than 1. 
For example, if  the estimated spatial autoregressive parameter 0ˆ ≠ρ , then there 




This chapter outlined the next three chapters’ empirical research design, including 
the research question, variables, measurement, models, and hypotheses. The next three 
chapters apply this design to the study of  social influence on political attitudes in 
geographical, Blau, and ideological spaces. 
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In the previous chapters, we saw how social influence can be framed in spatial econometric 
terms and that spatial regression models offer important advantages over linear regression 
models and contextual models for modeling individual-level and group-level effects. In this 
chapter, I apply these ideas by using spatial econometric tools to see whether geographically-
proximate individuals mutually influence each other’s political attitudes. 
Does geographical proximity play a role in social influence? Intuitively, there is 
reason to suspect that it does. As individuals think about political issues, it is reasonable to 
suppose that they account for the views of  their family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors – 
people with whom they have frequent contact in their day-to-day lives not only because of  
their personal relationships, but simply because they reside in the same geographical area.  
This chapter has two aims – one substantive, the other methodological. The first aim 
is to see whether geographically-proximate individuals mutually influence each other’s 
political attitudes. To do this, I first explain how geographical proximity might facilitate 
social influence. Then I identify a spatial weights matrix that best represents the relationships 
among individuals in a geographical space. Next, I use the spatial weights matrix and spatial 
econometric tools to test for spatial dependence and to estimate the neighborhood effect on 
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political attitudes. Based on the results, I assess whether and to what extent geographical 
proximity abets social influence on political attitudes. 
The second aim of  this chapter is to illustrate some of  the statistical results from 
chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 showed that the contextual model can be considered a special 
case of  the spatial lag model, while chapter 3 showed that the dummy variable regression 
model (through the origin) is a special case of  the first-order spatial autoregressive model. 
Using congressional districts as mutually disjoint and exhaustive neighborhoods, I compare 
the results of  estimating these models using the same data. This comparison serves to clarify 
the differences between spatial regression models and more conventional models for 
studying social influence. 
GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
Researchers have found that geography is important for understanding political 
behavior and attitudes. Cho (2003) uncovered evidence of  a diffusion effect in Asian-
American campaign contribution networks within ZIP codes. Lin et al. (2006) found that 
national identity is contagious within Taiwanese townships. Chen and Rodden (2009) found 
that the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to the same political party is 
a function of  the distance between their residential locations. These and other studies show 
that geographical proximity matters. They point to a positive relationship between the 
political attitudes and behaviors of  individuals and the political attitudes and behavior of  
their geographically-proximate peers. But why is there such a relationship? What are the 
theoretical reasons for political attitudes to be susceptible to social influence due to 
geography? 
One major reason is that geography often constrains human activity and interaction. 
As individuals carry out their lives, they encounter and interact with other people who often 
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live in the same geographical space. Geographical spaces constrain the pool of  potential 
individuals with whom one interacts (Putnam, 1966; Huckfeldt, 1983a; Huckfeldt, 1986; 
Huckfeldt, 2009). Given the diversity of  individuals and communities and given that 
individuals sort themselves into communities with similar tastes and values, we would expect 
heterogeneity across geographical areas, but relative homogeneity within geographical areas. 
From an individual’s perspective, this homogeneity means that there is not an unlimited pool 
of  potential friends and associates in his geographical area with whom to discuss politics or 
other topics. Huckfeldt (2009) explains,  
Suppose that the supply of  discussants with particular sets of  preferences is 
unlimited and that people are infinitely patient in their search for political discussion 
partners. Under these circumstances, individuals would always get exactly what they 
want in terms of  discussants and communication networks. If  the Red Sox fan who 
is a Democrat wants to find another Democratic Red Sox fan, she or he will do so. 
And under these circumstances, homophily will be the ever persistent state of  affairs 
within communication networks. The problem is that, first, the supply of  Democrats 
who are also Red Sox fans may be quite limited, at least if  you live in New York City. 
And second, the personal costs of  patience are quite high—it may mean social 
isolation or at least not having anyone with whom to talk politics (or baseball) at 
lunch. 
Because geographical areas constrain associational choices, there is a corresponding 
constraint on the possible impersonal and interpersonal interactions that can take place 
within an area. These impersonal and interpersonal interactions provide opportunities for 
social influence. Thus, geographical areas can give rise to social influence in this indirect way. 
But how might geographically-constrained interactions directly facilitate social influence?  
Geographically-constrained impersonal and interpersonal interactions abet social 
influence by affecting the marginal utility that an individual derives from holding a certain 
political attitude. As a result of  these interactions, an individual’s political attitude can 
change, resulting in an interdependence of  political attitudes in geographical space. These 
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interactions fall into three classes of  social influence mechanisms: coercion, learning, and 
emulation. 
Ccoercion refers to the submission of  the weaker to the stronger. As Franzese and 
Hays (2007a) point out, the types of  coercion that can lead to interdependence “may be 
direct or indirect and hard (force) or soft (suasion).” In geographical contexts, individuals 
might be coerced to conform to certain attitudes or behaviors through social pressure or 
political mobilization. 
Social pressure refers to the intentional or unintentional pressure that other 
individuals may exert on individuals to have certain attitudes or engage in certain behaviors. 
Thus, others’ attitudes are influential not only because of  their credibility or content, but 
because of  the nature of  sociability itself: People are inclined to conform in opinion and 
action to those around them in order to be liked. Consequently, in the face of  disagreement, 
individuals may change their initial attitudes or behaviors in order to get along. Since physical 
proximity often enhances social pressure, we should expect that individuals who are 
geographically close to each other to experience greater social pressure to conform to certain 
political attitudes. 
Political mobilization is an activity designed to make individuals hold certain political 
attitudes or engage in certain political behaviors. According to Cho (2003), because political 
campaigns are strategic with their limited resources, political candidates focus on certain 
media markets but not others: “Because this courting is geographically definable, [campaign] 
donations may appear to be rolling in in geographic clusters rather than emerging as random, 
independent events across the United States.” Similarly, we might expect that political 
candidates would target specific electoral groups (such as a congressional district) for 
persuasive appeals. Because different political candidates specialize in different policies, we 
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would expect them to make different appeals to their specific constituencies. As a result, 
similar individuals in different geographical areas might end up with different political 
attitudes because of  their exposure to different campaigns. 
Learning is a class of  social influence mechanisms that involve information exchange. 
As a mechanism for social influence, learning is based on the presumption that individuals, 
whatever their initial impulses, are open to persuasion (see Elkins and Simmons, 2005). 
Whether they like it or not, individuals are exposed to the attitudes or behaviors of  other 
people in their communities and through this exposure they acquire information about 
political issues. According to Pattie and Johnston (1999, 2000), swing voters who discuss 
politics with others tend to take on the views of  their discussants – a process that they call 
“conversion by conversation.” But information acquisition is not limited to conversations or 
explicitly political activities. Huckfeldt (1986) points out that one can acquire valuable 
information about a community’s political views simply by observing bumper stickers or 
yard signs. But because individuals living in geographical contexts are exposed to a limited 
selection of  individuals and a limited selection of  viewpoints, there is an information bias 
with respect to what can be acquired. As a result, what might be learned in one geographical 
context might be very different from what might be learned in another geographical context. 
Emulation refers to the ritualistic adoption of  others’ attitudes or behaviors. In a 
geographical context, individuals tend to conform to others’ attitudes or behaviors in 
unconscious and conscious ways. According to the idea of  unconscious emulation, individuals 
may gradually form certain attitudes and behaviors because of  mere exposure to those 
attitudes and behaviors. Conscious emulation arises from the tendency of  individuals to feel 
rewarded for conforming to the attitudes or behaviors of  their peers. Psychological studies 
have shown that individuals were more likely to give an incorrect answer to a question when 
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other individuals did so, while individuals tended to give correct answers when there was no 
similar pressure to conform (Asch, 1951). According to threshold models of  behavior 
(Schelling, 1978; Granovetter, 1978), adopting the dominant attitude or engaging in the 
dominant behavior enhances its legitimacy. As the number or proportion of  those who hold 
certain attitudes or engage in certain behaviors increase, the degree of  legitimacy of  those 
attitudes or behaviors increases in the eyes of  the individual. 
Because of  coercion, learning, and emulation, we would expect individuals who are 
geographically-proximate to have more similar political attitudes than individuals who are far 
apart. As Huckfeldt (1986) observed, “[I]ndividual behavior tends to move in the direction 
of  the surrounding population’s social makeup, even when individual characteristics are 
taken into account.”  
Furthermore, because individuals are members of  their community, the social 
influence arising from coercion, learning, and emulation cannot be considered a one-way 
relationship. It would be illogical to suppose that an individual is affected by others in his 
geographical contexts, but that others are not affected by what the individual does – after all, 
communities consist of  individuals. Once an individual adopts an attitude or engages in a 
behavior, the process of  social influence does not stop there; that individual also affects 
others in the same geographical context. Individuals may be softly coerced into adopting a 
certain political attitude, but once they do so, their adoption strengthens the soft coercion 
that other individuals face. After acquiring (biased) political information, individuals may in 
turn pass the information onto others and affect their political attitudes. Individuals who 
consciously or unconsciously conform to a certain political attitude become part of  the 
bandwagon, thereby adding to the utility of  conformity and/or enhancing the exposure to 
that political attitude.  
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At the same time, we cannot suppose that individuals mutually influence each other 
ad infinitum, for that would require the assumption that individuals mindlessly and selflessly 
follow the attitudes of  others. Such an assumption would do great violence to the idea of  
free will and the very possibility of  politics. Political attitudes are meaningful so long as they 
are tied to actual values and ideas, which are ultimately rooted in individual rumination in 
light of, but not based solely on, prevailing attitudes and behaviors. Social influence is 
naturally limited by individual thought; and though this limit might differ from individual to 
individual, this means that the process of  social influence does not alter political attitudes 
forever, but reaches some kind of  equilibrium in which individuals reconcile their personal 
and social inclinations and have no further incentive to change. 
All this suggests that while the social influence among geographically proximity 
individuals must be considered as mutual influence, this influence is naturally limited. As we 
will see, the spatial lag model captures this idea of  mutual influence in equilibrium, while the 
linear regression and contextual models do not. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
I operationalize the idea of  geographical proximity by mapping survey respondents 
from the 2004 ANES onto their respective congressional districts and using this information 
to construct several spatial weights matrices. Using these matrices, I test for spatial 
autocorrelation to see whether there is a relationship between the respondents’ geographical 
locations and their attitudes toward eight political issues. If  there is evidence of  spatial 
autocorrelation for a particular political attitude, I see whether the spatial autocorrelation 
holds after controlling for individual-level explanatory and control variables.  
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Dependent and Independent Variables 
The focus of  this chapter is the analysis of  eight individual-level political attitudes 
from the 2004 ANES. These dependent variables are respondents’ self-placements on the 
following seven-point political issue scales: 
 
1. Whether medical expenses should be covered by government insurance or by 
private insurance 
2. Whether the environment should be protected even if  it eliminates jobs or 
reduces the standard of  living 
3. Whether the federal government should let everybody get ahead on their 
own or ensure that every person has a job and a good standard of  living 
4. Whether the government should provide fewer services to reduce spending 
or more services even if  it means more spending 
5. Whether the federal government should make every effort to improve the 
social and economic position of  blacks 
6. Whether women should have an equal role with men in business, industry, 
and government or remain in the home 
7. Whether defense spending should be increased or decreased 
8. Whether abortions should be more or less restricted 
Detailed descriptions and summary statistics for these eight dependent variables can 
be found in the appendix. 
Independent variables include control variables and explanatory variables that may 
be relevant to political attitude formation. These include the following individual-level socio-
demographic (control) variables: 
 
1. Age (in years) 
2. Number of  children 
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3. Whether the respondent is female 
4. Whether the respondent lives in a rural environment 
5. Whether the respondent is married 
6. Whether the respondent belongs to the military 
7. Social class (self-placed scale, where higher values correspond to higher social 
classes) 
Explanatory variables include the following individual-level variables: 
 
1. Religiosity (whether the respondent attends church) 
2. Intelligence (based on the interviewer’s assessment on a 5-point scale, where 
higher values correspond to greater intelligence) 
3. Household income 
4. Years of  education 
5. Level of  interest in political campaigns (based on a 3-point scale, where 
higher values correspond to greater interest) 
6. Level of  political knowledge (based on the number of  correct responses to 
three knowledge questions) 
7. Party identification (based on a 7-point self-placement scale, where higher 
values correspond to stronger identification with the Republican Party and 
lower values correspond to stronger identification with the Democrat Party) 
8. Political ideology (based on a 7-point self-placement scale, where higher 
values correspond to greater conservatism and lower values correspond to 
greater liberalism) 
9. The importance of  the political issue (on a 5-point scale, where higher values 
correspond with greater importance to the respondent) 
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Operationalizing Geographical Proximity 
The unit of  analysis is the individual, which comes with some challenges for the 
spatial econometric analysis in this chapter. Since I am using the 2004 ANES, there are no 
data on the exact locations of  the survey respondents, such as the latitude and longitude of  
their homes, or even the towns in which they live. However, the 2004 ANES does identify 
the congressional districts to which they belong, which can provide a rough measure of  
where the respondents are positioned geographically.  
The 1212 survey respondents for the 2004 ANES came from 140 congressional 
districts and 29 states. To map the survey respondents, I looked up the coordinates of  each 
congressional district’s centroid and assigned each set of  coordinates to the corresponding 
respondents. Figure 1 is a map of  congressional districts, where the dots mark each district’s 
centroid. 
After mapping all the respondents to their congressional districts, I calculated the 
distance between the geographical centers of  each pair of  congressional districts. These 













 Based on 1212 respondents from the 2004 ANES 
The Spatial Weights Matrix 
In a spatial regression analysis, the specification of  the spatial weights matrix is 
considered known. I will consider five possible definitions of  geographical proximity and 
five corresponding spatial weights matrices and show why a spatial weights matrix based on 
common congressional district is most appropriate for the analysis in this chapter. 
The first plausible definition of  geographical connectivity between individuals in the 
dataset is based on common congressional district. The mutual influence of  political 
attitudes among individuals may be more likely to occur between individuals who reside in 
the same congressional district. Under this definition of  connectivity, the spatial weights 
matrix is a binary connectivity matrix where each element wij is equal to 1 if  individuals i and 
j reside in the same congressional district. An individual’s neighbors are individuals who live 
in the same congressional district, and each congressional district is a disjoint neighborhood. 
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The spatial lag for each individual can be seen as the unweighted average of  fellow 
congressional district denizens. 
A second plausible definition of  connectivity is based on neighboring congressional 
districts. Individuals may be more likely to influence each others’ political attitudes if  they 
reside in the same congressional district or if  they reside in adjacent congressional districts. 
This definition of  connectivity yields two spatial weights matrices: 
− K-nearest neighbor. An individual’s neighbors are those who live in the k 
congressional districts that are closest to the individual’s congressional 
district, where k is a positive integer. “Closeness” is based on the distances 
between the congressional districts’ centroids. 
− Distance band. An individual’s neighbors are those who live either in the same 
congressional district or in congressional districts within a 400-kilometer 
distance band of  the individual’s congressional district’s centroid. 
For both of  these spatial weights matrices, the spatial lag for each individual can be 
seen as the average of  fellow and nearby congressional district denizens. 
The problem with the k-nearest neighbor and distance band matrices is that they are 
not feasible. The 2004 ANES may be based on a random sample of  individuals and 
represent Americans, but it lacks representation from all the congressional districts – the 
dataset includes only 140. Therefore, identifying the k nearest neighbors is fine in theory, but 
given this dataset, the available data points may exist in congressional districts that are too far 
away to be plausibly influential; for example, there is only one respondent from a 
congressional district in Oregon, which means that the closest neighbors must come from 
congressional districts in Washington and California. As for the distance band spatial weights 
matrix, the 400-kilometer distance threshold for influence creates problems because 
respondents in smaller congressional districts would have a lot of  neighbors but respondents 
in large congressional districts would have very few neighbors. Given that congressional 
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district sizes are based on population, using the distance band spatial weights matrix may 
produce misleading results. 
A third plausible definition of  connectivity is based on inverse distance. This is based 
on the idea that individuals are more likely to influence each other’s political attitudes when 
they reside closer together and are less likely to influence each other when they reside farther 
apart. Under this definition of  connectivity, there are two spatial weights matrices for 
consideration: 
− Inverse distance. All individuals are neighbors of  all the other individuals, but 
individuals are more “neighborly” if  their congressional districts are the same 
or if  their congressional districts are closer together. In contrast, individuals 
are less “neighborly” if  their congressional districts are farther apart. 
“Closeness” is based on the distances between the congressional districts’ 
centroids; greater distances indicate less neighborliness. 
− Inverse distance squared. All individuals are neighbors of  all the other 
individuals, but individuals are more “neighborly” if  their congressional 
districts are the same or if  their congressional districts are closer together. In 
contrast, individuals are less “neighborly” if  their congressional districts are 
farther apart. “Closeness” is based on the squared distances between the 
congressional districts’ centroids; greater squared distances indicate less 
neighborliness. 
For both of  these spatial weights matrices, the spatial lag for each individual can be 
seen as the weighted average of  fellow and nearby congressional district denizens. The 
weights are the inverse distance and inverse distance squared. 
Using a spatial weights matrix based on inverse distance or inverse distance squared 
is not feasible when using the 2004 ANES dataset because the distance measures are too 
rough. Since the location of  each respondent is approximated with the geographical center 
of  his congressional district, the inverse distance or inverse distance squared between two 
respondents who live in the same congressional district would be undefined, which means 
that the respondents who should count the most are not counted at all. Even so, this 
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problem is not insurmountable; if  the distances between respondents in the same 
congressional districts were gently massaged so that they are very small numbers rather than 
zero, respondents who live in the same congressional district could still count for a great 
deal. But there still remains the problem of  respondents who live very far away. Though the 
spatial weights matrix and corresponding spatial lag term would show that their influence 
would be very close to zero, in reality, it is very implausible that there would be any sort of  
interaction at all between respondents who live two or three congressional districts over, 
much less in another state. 









DEFINITION OF INDIVIDUAL I’S 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
DEFINITION OF SPATIAL WEIGHT 
W IJ 
 Same district 
Those who live in the same 
congressional district 
w i j = 1 if individuals i and j live 
in the same congressional 
district 




The k nearest individuals, where 
distance is based on the location 
of their congressional district 
w i j = 1 if individual j is one of 
individual i’s k-nearest 
neighbors 
w i j = 0 otherwise or i = j 
 Distance band 
Those who live in congressional 
districts within a 400 km 
distance band 
w i j = 1 if individual i’s and j‘s 
congressional districts are 
within 400 km 
w i j = 0 otherwise or i = j 
 Inverse distance All other individuals  
w i j = d i j where d i j = inverse 
distance (km) between 
individual i’s and j‘s 
congressional districts 




All other individuals 
w i j = (d i j)2 where d i j = inverse 
distance (km) between 
individual i’s and j‘s 
congressional districts 
w i j = 0 if i = j 
    
 
Because of  data limitations and the substantive reasons discussed above, I will use 
the same-district spatial weights matrix. This means that those who live in the same 
congressional district will be considered as “neighbors” and that each congressional district 
will be considered as a disjoint “neighborhood.”  
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Models and Methods 
To test for spatial autocorrelation, I calculate Moran’s I (using the spatial weights 
matrices described above) to see whether there is a relationship between the respondents’ 
geographical locations and their attitudes toward eight political issues. If  there is spatial 
autocorrelation, then one should expect a statistically significant association between values 
in a given location with values in neighboring locations. A statistically significant result for a 
Moran’s I test indicates that there is evidence of  spatial dependence for a political attitude. 
If  there is spatial autocorrelation for a particular political attitude, I then control for 
several individual-level explanatory and control variables in a spatial lag model to see 









where β is a k by 1 vector of  parameters associated with independent variables X, which is 
an n by k matrix of  personal characteristics that may be relevant to an individual’s political 
attitude, such as intelligence, partisanship, marital status, interest in politics, and religiosity. By 
assumption, the error term ε is normally distributed with a constant variance, and I is a n by 
n identity matrix. Wy is the spatial lag of  y and is the average attitude of  respondent i’s 
neighbors. ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter; if  0=ρ , then there is no spatial 
dependence, and the spatial lag model reduces to the classical linear regression model. By 
estimating ρ, we can see whether there is evidence that geographically-proximate individuals 
mutually influence each other’s political attitudes. 
Because the dependent variable appears on both sides of  the equation, the spatial lag 
model cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The OLS estimates will be 
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biased and inconsistent due to simultaneity bias. In contrast, maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation can account for the endogeneity of  the spatial lag Wy and is consistent and 
asymptotically efficient if  the model is correctly specified (Anselin, 1988; Franzese and Hays, 
2007b). Because of  these desirable statistical and substantive properties, I use ML estimation 
for the spatial lag models. 
For comparison, I also estimate (using OLS) baseline linear regression models with 
no geographical variables and contextual models with a contextual variable indicating the 
mean political attitude of  each respondent’s congressional district. I also estimate a linear 
regression model with only the congressional district wide average and a first-order spatial 
autoregressive model. This will illustrate the difference between linear regression models and 
spatial regression models discussed in chapter 3. 
HYPOTHESES 
Using a (global) Moran’s I test, I test the null hypothesis of  spatial randomness 
against the alternative hypothesis of  spatial autocorrelation. If  there is no spatial 
autocorrelation, there would be no association between values and locations. Because I 
believe that geographically-proximate individuals mutually influence each other’s political 
attitudes, I expect to find evidence of  a systematic relationship between values and 
geographic locations, or positive spatial autocorrelation.  
For the spatial lag models, I test whether the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is 
statistically significant after accounting for explanatory and control variables. The null 
hypothesis is that 0=ρ , and the alternative hypothesis is that 0≠ρ . I expect to find 
evidence of  a neighborhood effect, but I remain agnostic as to whether this effect is positive 
or negative. In light of  the theoretical discussion, I expect social influence on political 
attitudes to reach an equilibrium, which means that there is a bound on ρ such that 1<ρ . 
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ASSESSING SPATIAL DEPENDENCE: RESULTS 
The Moran’s I tests showed that there is evidence of  spatial dependence in political 
attitudes toward three out of  eight political issues (see Table 5.2). There is statistically 
significant (at the 0.10 level or better) positive spatial autocorrelation for the issues of  
government versus private medical insurance ( 040.0=I ), the government’s role in securing 
jobs and a good standard of  living ( 090.0=I ), and access to abortion ( 089.0=I ). 
Substantively, these results mean that individuals who live in the same congressional district 
have more similar political attitudes compared with individuals who live in different 
congressional districts. 
 
Table 5.2. Results of Moran’s I Tests: Same District Spatial Weights Matrix 
 POLITICAL ATTITUDE Moran’s i SE P-VALUE 
 
Government versus private medical 
insurance 
0.040* 1.7 0.099 
 Environment versus jobs tradeoff 0.011 0.48 0.63 
 
Government’s role in securing jobs and a 
good standard of living 
0.090*** 3.6 0.000 
 Government spending and services 0.03 1.2 0.21 
 Government assistance to blacks 0.024 1.0 0.31 
 Role of women 0.028 1.2 0.21 
 Defense spending 0.037 1.5 0.12 
 Access to abortion 0.089*** 3.8 0.00 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
COMPARISON OF LINEAR REGRESSION AND SPATIAL REGRESSION 
Chapter 3 showed that the dummy variable regression model (through the origin) is a 
special case of  the first-order spatial autoregressive (FAR) model when the spatial 
autoregressive parameter ρ is constrained so that 1=ρ  and the neighborhoods are mutually 
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exclusive, exhaustive, and discrete. The constraint on the spatial autoregressive parameter 
requires the assumption that individuals in disjoint neighborhoods are completely dominated 
by their neighbors’ attitudes. On the other hand, the FAR model allows for the estimation of  
ρ, which measures the effect of  the neighborhood effect (namely, the size of  the social 
influence) without assuming that individuals who belong to a certain neighborhood 
automatically conform to the mean attitude of  that neighborhood. This section 
demonstrates that the presence or absence of  a constraint on ρ has important consequences 
for statistical inference. 
Using congressional districts as disjoint neighborhoods, I estimated two types of  
naïve models for the attitudes toward the issues of  government versus private medical 
insurance, the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living, and access 
to abortion. The first type of  model is a regression of  the individuals’ attitudes on the mean 
attitudes of  the individuals’ corresponding congressional district, which is an abbreviated 
version of  the dummy variable regression (through the origin), which I will call abbreviated 
dummy model.15 The second model is a FAR model, which is a regression of  the individuals’ 
attitudes on the spatial lags. These models do not contain other explanatory or control 
variables. 
The results are presented in Tables 5.3a-5.3c. For the first type of  model, we can see 
that the estimated effect of  the mean congressional district attitude is exactly 1 for each of  
the three political attitudes. This is what we would expect based on the theoretical results. In 
contrast, the estimated neighborhood effects for the spatial lag models are quite different 
from 1ˆ =ρ . For the issue of  government versus private medical insurance, the 
                                                 
15 Running dummy variable regression models in this application would require 140 dummy variables, which 
take up too much space without providing much more information. 
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neighborhood effect is 0. 053.0ˆ =ρ , which is not statistically significant. For the issue of  
the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living, 098.0ˆ =ρ , which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, the neighborhood effect for the issue of  
access to abortion is 062.0ˆ =ρ , which is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
These results show that even when a neighborhood effect is weak (i.e., ρ is not 
statistically significant), the abbreviated dummy variable model can produce estimates 
showing otherwise. 
 




SPATIAL LAG MODEL 






















 AIC 3226 3394 
 Log likelihood  -1694 











SPATIAL LAG MODEL 






















 AIC 3091 3308 
 Log likelihood  -1651 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
 




SPATIAL LAG MODEL 






















 AIC 2353 2625 
 Log likelihood  -1309 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
In the next section, I investigate whether the spatial dependence detected in the 
Moran’s I tests and naïve models holds after controlling for political knowledge, partisanship, 
and other individual-level independent variables relevant to political attitudes. In light of  
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Galton’s Problem (see chapter 4), it is important to account for factors other than mutual 
influence that might give rise to spatial dependence. The positive relationship between 
geographical location and attitudes toward the issue of  government versus private medical 
insurance may be due to common fate rather than mutual influence. For example, individuals 
in a particular congressional district may favor government medical insurance over private 
medical insurance not because they mutually influence each other’s attitudes, but because 
they all happen to belong to the military. Galton’s problem can be addressed, to some extent, 
by controlling for military membership and other variables that might give rise to the spatial 
clustering of  political attitudes. 
To conserve space, I present results only for the three dependent variables that 
returned statistically significant positive autocorrelation in Moran’s I tests, which are 
government versus private medical insurance, the government’s role in securing jobs and a 
good standard of  living, and access to abortion.16 
ESTIMATING THE SPATIAL LAG MODEL: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
I used maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of  the spatial lag models for 
the issues of  government versus private medical insurance, the government’s role in securing 
jobs and a good standard of  living, and access to abortion. The results are presented in 
Tables 5.4a-5.4c, alongside estimates for a baseline linear regression model (with no 
geographical variables) and a contextual model (with the mean political attitude of  each 
respondent’s congressional district as an independent variable) for comparison.  
The results show that there is little evidence of  a neighborhood effect in political 
attitudes.  
                                                 
16 The estimates for the spatial lag models for the dependent variables without statistically significant spatial 
autocorrelation were not very different from those of the classical linear models. This is unsurprising because in 
the absence of spatial dependence, the spatial lag model reduces to the classical linear model. 
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1. For the issue of  government versus private medical insurance, the 
neighborhood effect is ρ = 0.05, which is almost statistically significant (p-
value = 0.11). 
2. For the issue of  the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard 
of  living, the neighborhood effect is ρ = 0.098, which is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (p-value = 0.00055). 
3. For the issue of  access to abortion, the neighborhood effect is ρ = 0.062, 
which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (p-value = 0.015). 
 
The null hypothesis for each spatial lag model is that there is no neighborhood effect 
(ρ = 0). Based on these results, I reject the null hypothesis for the issue of  access to abortion 
and the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living, and I accept the 
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Table 5.4a. Attitude Models: Government versus Private Medical Insurance 







 AIC 3214 3096 3216 
 Log likelihood -1589 -1529 -1589 
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Table 5.4b. Attitude Models: Government’s Role in Securing Jobs and a Good Standard 
of Living 
 (continued)    
 
Average attitude of 











 AIC 3077 2935 3074 
 Log likelihood -1521 -1449 -1518 
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Table 5.4c. Attitude Models: Access to Abortion 







 AIC 2396 2213 2393 
 Log likelihood -1180 -1088 -1177 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
Compared with the baseline regression model, the spatial lag model fits the data 
better for the issues of  access to abortion and the government’s role in securing jobs and a 
good standard of  living. All things being equal, respondents who live in the same 
congressional district mutually influence each other’s attitudes regarding the issues of  
government versus private medical insurance and access to abortion.  
Of  the three types of  models, the contextual models consistently have statistically 
significant (at the 0.05 level or better) contextual effects and the best goodness-of-fit 
numbers. But this is misleading. Since the contextual variable is the mean political attitude of  
each individual’s congressional district and the mean includes the individual’s attitude, there 
is a simultaneity bias that produces inconsistent and biased estimates. Accordingly, we can 
see that the estimated effects of  the independent variables for the contextual models are 
very different from the corresponding effects of  independent variables in the baseline linear 
regression models and spatial lag models. Furthermore, we can see from the contextual 
model for the issue of  government versus private medical insurance that there is a positive 
contextual effect ( 78.0=b ) that is very statistically significant (at the 0.01 level); in contrast, 
the spatial lag model shows that the neighborhood effect is not important at all. This is an 
example of  how contextual models can overstate the neighborhood effects. 
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Direct Effects, Indirect Effects, and Total Effects 
In the spatial lag model, the presence of  the dependent variable y on either side of  
the equation means that the fitted coefficients must be interpreted in light of  indirect, direct, 
and total effects. This is because the total effects of  the independent variables requires 
accounting for the spatial multiplier ( ) 1−− WI ρ , since the expected value of  y is 
( ) ( ) βρ XWI 1−−=yE  
If  there is no neighborhood effect, then ρ = 0 and the expected value of  y reduces to Xβ. 
Tables 5.5a and 5.5b contrast the effects found by using the linear regression model 
with the total effects found by using the spatial lag model for the issues of  access to abortion 
and the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living. The presence of  a 
statistically significant neighborhood effect means that the total effect of  each independent 
variable is actually greater than the effect given by the linear regression model. Note that 
while the marginal effects (1) from the linear regression model are very similar to the direct 
effects (2) from the spatial lag model, they are quite different from the total effects (4). That 
is because the total effect of  an independent variable for a spatial lag model is the sum of  
the direct and indirect effects. 
The distinction between indirect, direct, and total effects in the spatial lag models 
shows that endogeneity has consequences beyond the political attitudes of  the respondents. 
Not only do respondents’ political attitudes mutually influence each other, their individual 
characteristics have indirect influences as well. For example, a respondent who identifies as a 
conservative is more likely to favor restricting access to abortion; the direct effect of  being a 
conservative is -0.15. But since his political attitude also affects his geographical neighbors, 
there is an indirect effect of  his conservatism on their attitudes and an indirect effect of  
their conservatism toward his attitude as well. In this way, the spatial lag model represents a 
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parsimonious but substantively interesting mechanism of  social influence that brings 
together individual and neighborhood. 
 
Table 5.5a. Comparison of Effects for the Issue of the Government’s Role in Securing 








SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  b 
b 
(Direct Effect) 
Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Age 0.0084 0.0083 0.00034 0.0087 
 Children -0.091 -0.093 -0.0038 -0.097 
 Female -0.080 -0.064 -0.0026 -0.066 
 Rural 0.17 0.17 0.0070 0.18 
 Married -0.19 -0.19721 -0.00804 -0.20525 
 Military 0.059 0.054 0.0022 0.056 
 Attends church -0.23 -0.25 -0.010 -0.26 
 Social class 0.12 0.12 0.0050 0.13 
 Intelligence 0.070 0.085 0.0035 0.088 
 Household income 0.030 0.029 0.0012 0.030 




0.086 0.084 0.0034 0.087 
 Political knowledge 0.052 0.050 0.0020 0.052 
 Party ID 0.23 0.22 0.0092 0.23 
 Political ideology 0.32 0.32 0.013 0.34 














SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  b 
b 
(Direct Effect) 
Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Age -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.00014 -0.0039 
 Children -0.078 -0.081 -0.0029 -0.083 
 Female 0.21 0.218 0.0078 0.23 
 Rural -0.19 -0.17 -0.0062 -0.18 
 Married -0.089 -0.091 -0.0032 -0.094 
 Military -0.060 -0.065 -0.0023 -0.067 
 Attends church -0.44 -0.44 -0.016 -0.46 
 Social class 0.029 0.027 0.00097 0.028 
 Intelligence 0.041 0.049 0.0018 0.051 
 Household income 0.033 0.032 0.0012 0.034 




0.031 0.0011 0.032 
 Political knowledge 0.10 0.10 0.0036 0.10 
 Party ID -0.064 -0.066 -0.0024 -0.068 
 Political ideology -0.16 -0.15 -0.0055 -0.16 
 Issue importance -0.18 -0.18 -0.0065 -0.19 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter illustrates a spatial econometric approach to the study of  social 
influence on political attitudes in a geographical context. This approach depends on the 
specification of  a spatial weights matrix to represent the structure of  mutual influence 
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among geographical neighbors. In this chapter’s analysis, geography (operationalized as 
congressional districts) is the space in which mutual influence might affect the political 
attitudes of  individuals. Each congressional district represents a disjoint neighborhood in 
which mutual influence can take place. The motivating theory is that geographical proximity 
supports opportunities for coercion, learning, and emulation, which leads to a similarity of  
political attitudes within congressional districts. 
To examine whether there is evidence that geographically-proximate individuals 
mutually influence each other’s political attitudes, I first used Moran’s I to test for spatial 
autocorrelation, thereby uncovering evidence of  spatial dependence. Next, I compared the 
estimates of  two naïve models of  social influence and found that the abbrebriated dummy 
variable model tended to overstate the extent of  social influence. Finally, I used spatial lag 
models to estimate neighborhood effects. The results showed that geographically-proximate 
individuals mutually influence each other’s political attitudes regarding two issues: access to 
abortion and the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living. The 
statistically significant estimates of  the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ mean that 
individual attitudes toward these two issues are subject to mutual influence within 
congressional districts. Ignoring this effect means implicitly assuming that individuals take on 
political attitudes without regard to the political attitudes of  other geographically proximate 
individuals. 
At this point, it is uncertain why there is a neighborhood effect for only two out of  
eight political attitudes from the 2004 ANES. These two issues may have been particularly 
salient during the time of  the 2004 ANES data collection, and as a result, individuals were 
more likely to pay attention to others’ attitudes toward them. Or perhaps these two issues 
may be particularly polarizing issues that represent the ideological leanings of  congressional 
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districts, which, we must remember, are political boundaries drawn up to reflect particular 
ideological leanings. At any rate, rather than speculate regarding the reasons, this chapter 
goes only as far as to illustrate the application of  spatial regression models to the question 
of  social influence on political attitudes. Spatial regression models can identify 
neighborhood effects for some political attitudes but not for others; further research is 
needed to determine why some issues are more susceptible to mutual influence and others 
are not. 
The next chapter features another application of  this dissertation’s spatial 




CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL 





While the previous chapter analyzed the role of  geographical proximity in social influence, 
this chapter features a spatial econometric analysis of  political attitudes in one type of  non-
geographical space: Blau space. Like geographical proximity, social similarity – understood in 
terms of  proximity in Blau space – might also provide opportunities for individuals to 
mutually influence each other’s political attitudes. As we saw in chapter 2, the idea of  space 
need not be restricted to geography – individuals can mutually influence each other in non-
geographical contexts as well. 
As individuals make up their minds and feelings about political issues, they often 
account for the views of  their family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors, and these people 
tend to share similar demographic characteristics, such as race, religion, and education. These 
characteristics can be viewed as the dimensions of  a Blau space. In Blau space, each 
individual has a position described by k coordinates, and distances in the coordinate system 
define the relationships among the points. The Blau distances between an individual and his 
family members, friends, colleagues, and neighbors would be very small in this space, relative 
to the Blau distances between that individual and dissimilar individuals. In other words, small 
Blau distances would indicate greater social similarity, while great Blau distances would 
indicate lesser social similarity. This chapter examines whether there is evidence that socially 




If  social similarity does facilitate the mutual influence of  political attitudes, we should expect 
a relationship between Blau distances and political attitudes. 
As in the previous chapter, this chapter has two aims – one substantive, the other 
methodological. The first aim is to see whether socially similar individuals mutually influence 
each other’s political attitudes, all else being equal. To do this, first I elaborate on how social 
similarity might give rise to social influence. Then, I discuss how to operationalize Blau space 
and Blau distance and how to construct a spatial weights matrix that would best represent 
the social connectivities that similar demographic characteristics create among individuals. 
Next, I use spatial econometric tools to test for spatial influence and to estimate 
neighborhood influence, and I compare these results with the estimates from a baseline 
linear regression model and a linear regression model with dummy variables. Based on the 
results, I discuss whether and to what extent social similarity abets the mutual influence of  
political attitudes. 
The second aim of  this chapter is to illustrate the idea of  discretization discussed in 
chapter 3. In chapter 3, we saw that any set of  independent variables can be discretized into 
a set of  mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and discrete dummy variables, or disjoint 
neighborhoods. The discretized linear regression model based on these disjoint 
neighborhoods is essentially a dummy variable regression model (through the origin). In this 
chapter, I discretize a set of  demographic variables to build a discretized linear regression 
model. Next, I estimate both types of  models using the same data and compare the results. 
This illustration will clarify further the differences between the discretized linear regression 




SOCIAL SIMILARITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Like geography, demography can facilitate social influence. According to Huckfeldt’s 
(2009) theory of  density dependence, social contexts constrain individuals’ options for 
interaction and association with other people. While he focused on such constraints within 
geographical contexts, as discussed in the previous chapter, Huckfeldt was open to the idea 
that these constraints can be found in non-geographical contexts17 as well: “Density 
dependence [is] defined with respect to the compositional and distributional properties of  
the social contexts within which actors are imbedded, where the social context is conceived 
relative to either a geographically or non-geographically based population [emphasis added].” As an 
example of  non-geographical context, he explained that individuals who spend their time in 
environments full of  liberals are less likely to interact with conservatives, and hence they are 
less likely to be persuaded to adopt conservative views. Huckfeldt’s example can easily 
extend to demographic similarity as well: Individuals who spend their time in environments 
full of  blue-collar workers are less likely to interact with white-collar professionals, and 
hence they are less likely to be persuaded to adopt views associated with blue collar workers.  
The idea that demographically-based constraints affect individual attitudes and 
behaviors is based on two key assumptions: First, individuals tend to spend more time 
interacting with socially similar others and less time with socially dissimilar others. Second, 
demographically-defined social groups (e.g., working class, racial groups) tend to favor certain 
political policies over others because of  (perceived) collective benefits or because of  similar 
value systems (see Lazer, 2010). Social science research suggests that both assumptions are 
quite reasonable. 
                                                 
17 Previous studies have considered a variety of non-geographical social contexts, such as contexts based on 
language similarity (Dow et al., 1984), trade or group membership (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), occupation and 




First, individuals do spend more time interacting with those who are socially similar 
and less time with those who are socially dissimilar. Marsden and Hurlbert (1987) found that 
discussion partners are more likely to be similar in age, race, and religion. Personal networks 
tend to be homogenous when it comes to race/ethnicity, age, religion, education, 
occupation, and gender (McPherson, et al., 2001). Rodden (2009) found that voters tend to 
be clustered into neighborhoods of  similar demographic, occupational, income, and political 
characteristics. According to Lazer (2010), people tend to have discussions with others who 
tend to be similar in age, race, religion, and political preferences. These findings are 
consistent with the well-documented principle of  homophily, which refers to the 
phenomenon that “like attracts like.” Because of  homophily, there are more social ties 
among similar individuals and fewer social ties among dissimilar individuals. 
Second, the relationship between specific social groups and specific political attitudes 
has been well-documented. In a study of  whether individuals are influenced by the 
characteristics of  the surrounding population, Langton and Rapoport (1975) found that 
working class residents of  Santiago were more likely to support Salvador Allende if  they 
lived in working class areas of  the city then in other areas of  the city. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 
(1989) observed a correlation between race and party support among Mississippi voters in 
the 1984 presidential election. According to Cho (2003), political candidates often appeal to 
specific racial or ethnic groups. This suggests that certain political attitudes and behaviors are 
more closely associated with some racial or ethnic groups than others. 
If  there is greater association among socially similar individuals and if  social groups 
tend to have certain political attitudes and behaviors, then we should not expect that political 
attitudes to be randomly dispersed across individuals – instead, they should cluster among 




Why would associating with those who are socially similar others lead to social 
influence? Impersonal and interpersonal interactions with those who are socially similar can 
affect the marginal utility that an individual derives from holding a certain political attitude. 
As a result of  these interactions, an individual’s political attitude can change. These 
interactions can be classified into two types of  mechanisms of  social influence: coercion and 
learning. 
In demographic contexts, coercion (which can be hard or soft) includes social pressure 
and political mobilization. While individuals might experience social pressure to conform to 
certain attitudes or behaviors or they might be politically mobilized to hold certain attitudes or 
behaviors within geographical contexts, there is reason to believe that social pressure and 
political mobilization can extend beyond mere geography. In an age of  instantaneous 
communication and high mobility norms, individuals may hang onto their social identities as 
least as strongly as their geographical identities. For one thing, there may be a stronger 
psychological attachment to their social identities due to familial and social ties. For example, 
an individual might strongly identify as a Catholic in part because his family and friends are 
also Catholic. Also, social similarity may breed more intimate relationships compared with 
the casual day-to-day interactions that take place in geographical contexts. Ties based on 
social similarity are more likely to be stronger than ties formed by mere geographical 
proximity. As a result, the pressure to conform to certain political attitudes and behaviors 
may be stronger coming from those who are socially similar. 
As for political mobilization, political candidates often explicitly target certain 
electoral groups based on their race or ethnicity. While these candidates may travel to 
geographical areas with strong concentrations of  a certain social group, their appeals are not 




their attempts to show why or how their work has provided collective benefits to these 
groups. Thus, we may expect political attitudes to cluster around some of  these social 
identities. 
Learning is a class of  social influence mechanisms that involve information exchange 
and processing. Learning includes persuasion, socialization, and information processing. First, 
individuals are more open to persuasion when their persuaders are socially similar to them. 
According to Lupia (2002), an important element of  persuasion is the personal attributes of  
those attempting to persuade. Those attempting to persuade need to be (or appear to be) 
trustworthy and knowledgeable to even call attention to an argument. When the argument is 
heard, whether individuals are receptive to the argument depends (to some extent) on the 
personal ethos of  those presenting the argument. One would expect that arguments tend to 
be more persuasive if  they come from those who are socially similar because they tend to 
share the same background, values, and/or history, which tends to breed trust. 
Second, socialization depends on the existence of  social ties to transmit values and 
attitudes. Social science research has shown that this transmission often takes place through 
conversation. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) found evidence that an individual’s voting 
preferences were closely related to the voting preferences of  those with whom he discussed 
politics, even after controlling for a variety of  individual-level variables. This led them to 
conclude that “the political preferences of  citizens have important consequences for the 
vote choices of  other citizens who look to them as political discussants.” In a study of  the 
1992 British General Election, Pattie and Johnston (2000) found that political conversations 
were a key mechanism in transmitting social influence and concluded: 
Conversations with a party’s supporters encouraged respondents to vote for it too, 




took place within their families. … [F]amilies who talked together (more or less) 
voted together. 
Since social ties are often based on social similarity (i.e., the principle of  homophily), 
the values and attitudes transmitted to individuals not are a random sample of  all the 
possible values, attitudes, and information. Accordingly, we should expect individuals to be 
exposed only a subset of  all possible values and attitudes, and that this subset is determined, 
in part, by the demographic characteristics of  the individuals and their social ties. 
Finally, the transmission of  values and attitudes through social ties is not limited to 
the transmission of  political agreement. This is because social ties are also important for 
transmitting political information. According to McClurg (2006), “politically sophisticated” 
social networks can also provide political expertise, increase exposure to norms of  political 
involvement, and communicate political information with more clarity and context. But 
these functions need not be limited to politically sophisticated social networks. Socially 
similar individuals may not necessarily provide political expertise, but they might provide 
information such as the relevance of  elections for different social groups, how the policies 
of  different political candidates and parties may benefit or harm one social group over 
another, and what issues are most salient to which groups. As Huckfeldt (1983b) points out, 
“[T]he consequences of  the interaction need not be explicitly political in order to have 
political implications.” Individuals can use group identification and group norms to process 
political information and as a result, individuals who are socially similar may come to have 
similar political points of  view. 
The mechanisms of  coercion and learning are not contradictory or mutually 
exclusive; indeed, they may work side by and side and reinforce each other. Furthermore, 
because individuals are themselves members of  their demographic contexts, the social 




individual is affected by other socially similar individuals, but those other individuals are also 
affected by what that individual does as well. Once an individual adopts an attitude or 
engages in a behavior, the process of  social influence does not stop there; that individual 
also affects others in the same demographic context. Individuals may be pressured socially 
into adopting a certain political attitude, but once they do so, they themselves become part 
of  that social pressure. Individuals who are politically mobilized to adopt a certain political 
attitude strengthen the association between the political attitude and social group. After 
acquiring political information filtered through their social ties, individuals might pass the 
same filtered information onto others and affect their political attitudes. 
Recognizing the relevance of  demographic characteristics, political scientists usually 
include them as control variables in their regression models. In contrast, this chapter looks at 
demographic characteristics in a more meaningful way. By treating demographic 
characteristics as the dimensions of  a Blau space, one can measure the social proximity 
among individuals and see if  socially-proximate individuals do mutually influence each 
other’s political attitudes. In this way, this chapter puts homophily to task as the organizing 
principle of  social influence. 
At the same time, we cannot suppose that demography is destiny. Political attitudes 
are meaningful so long as they are tied to actual values and ideas, which are ultimately rooted 
in individual rumination in light of  prevailing attitudes and behaviors. As social identity 
brushes up against individual identity, social influence is limited by individual thought. While 
the limits on social influence may be very different from individual to individual, the process 
of  social influence does not continually alter an individual’s political attitude, but reaches 




of  social influence in this chapter incorporate this process of  mutual influence and 
equilibrium. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
To see whether socially similar individuals mutually influence each other’s political 
attitudes, I first operationalize the idea of  social similarity by defining the dimensions of  a 
Blau space. Next, I measure the Blau distances between each pair of  respondent by using 
what is known as Gower’s distance, and use these distances to construct spatial weights 
matrices. Next, I use the spatial weights matrices to test for a relationship between the 
respondents’ Blau locations and their political attitudes. Finally, I test whether that 
relationship holds after controlling for individual-level explanatory and control variables in 
spatial lag models of  influence. To illustrate the discretization process discussed in chapter 3, 
I compare the results of  the spatial lag model with estimates from corresponding discretized 
linear regression models. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
This chapter focuses on only two political attitudes from the 2004 ANES.18 They are 
the respondents’ self-placements on the following two seven-point political issue scales: 
1. Whether the federal government should let everybody get ahead on their 
own or ensure that every person has a job and a good standard of  living 
2. Whether the government should provide fewer services to reduce spending 
or more services even if  it means more spending 
                                                 
18 While I estimated models for all eight political issues, only two featured statistically significant neighborhood 
effects. To emphasize the methodological points in this chapter, I therefore limited the analysis in this chapter 




The independent variables are explanatory variables that may be relevant to political 
attitude formation. The explanatory variables are the following eight individual-level 
variables: 
1. Whether the individual is married19 
2. Religiosity (whether the respondent attends church) 
3. Intelligence (based on the interviewer’s assessment on a 5-point scale, where 
higher values correspond to greater intelligence) 
4. Household income 
5. Level of  education (based on seven possible levels; 0 indicates no high 
school diploma or less, 7 indicates an advanced degree) 
6. Level of  interest in political campaigns (based on a 3-point scale, where 
higher values correspond to greater interest) 
7. Level of  political knowledge (based on the number of  correct responses to 
three knowledge questions) 
8. Party identification (based on a 7-point self-placement scale, where higher 
values correspond to stronger identification with the Republican Party and 
lower values correspond to stronger identification with the Democrat Party) 
9. Political ideology (based on a 7-point self-placement scale, where higher 
values correspond to greater conservatism and lower values correspond to 
greater liberalism) 
10. The importance of  the political issue (on a 5-point scale, where higher values 
correspond with greater importance to the respondent) 
Dimensions of the Blau Space 
Previous research shows that individuals tend to share certain demographic 
characteristics with their friends and family members. Using network data from the 1985 
General Social Survey, Marsden (1988) found that respondents and members of  their 
                                                 




discussion networks tend to share similar demographic attributes, such as age and race. In a 
subsequent study, McPherson et al. (2006) compared network data from the 1985 General 
Social Survey with network data from the 2004 General Social Survey and found that the 
heterogeneity of  confidantes in terms of  age, education, race, and sex has remained 
relatively stable. Based on these studies, I will use age, education, race, and sex as dimensions 
of  the Blau space for this chapter.  
One possible concern about this choice of  Blau dimensions is that the characteristics 
of  age, education, race, and sex are too general. In politics, social similarity matters in 
general, but specific types of  social similarity matters more in specific cases. For example, 
British election studies point to the importance of  social class, while U.S. race relations 
studies point to the importance of  race. In this chapter, however, the dependent variables are 
the political attitudes toward the issue of  the role of  the government in securing jobs and a 
good standard of  living and the issue of  government spending and services, which are quite 
general. Thus, it is appropriate to use a more general definition of  social similarity. 
Discretization of Demographic Variables 
We have seen in chapter 3 that any continuous independent variable can be 
discretized into p mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories so that a multiple regression 
model with k continuous variables can be converted into a discretized linear regression 
model with pk dummy variables. This section applies this technique to the demographic 
variables of  the Blau space. 
The demographic variables that make up the Blau space used in this chapter are age, 
sex, education, and race. For the sake of  simplicity and to keep the number of  dummy 
variables under control, I dichotomize each variable so that 2=p for all 4=k  variables in 




− Age: Under 30 (young adult) or 30 and over (adult) 
− Sex: Female or male (unchanged) 
− Education: College degree or no college degree 
− Race: Black or other race 
Dicotomizing the five demographic variables yields 16 dummy variables, which 
represent 16 disjoint neighborhoods. Each disjoint neighborhood represents a unique 
combination of  demographic traits, and each individual is considered a member of  one 
neighborhood only and no other. Using data from the 2004 ANES, a histogram of  the 16 
disjoint neighborhoods is given in Figure 6.1 below. The number of  individuals in each 
disjoint neighborhood ranges from 1 to 151. The largest neighborhood is neighborhood 4, 
whose 151 members are white females who are aged 30 and over and have no college degree. 
The smallest neighborhood is neighborhood 14, which has 2 individuals who are black 
females who are under 30 years old and have college degrees. Neighborhood 13 is defined by 







Figure 6.1. Histogram of 32 Disjoint Neighborhoods 
 
* Each number on the x-axis denotes a disjoint neighborhood. 
Measuring Social Similarity 
To measure social similarity, I calculated Gower’s dissimilarity coefficient for each 
pair of  respondents. Gower’s dissimilarity coefficient S is a measure of  dissimilarity that is 
widely used in cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling (see Gower, 1971 and Kaufman 
and Rousseeuw, 1990). Like other measures of  dissimilarity, Gower’s dissimilarity coefficient 
expresses the dissimilarity between two individuals in terms of  a distance function based on 
their demographic characteristics. This distance function can be used to group individuals 
together based on their similarities and dissimilarities. The advantage of  using Gower’s 




characteristics (i.e., age, sex, education, and race) that comprise the Blau space in this chapter 
are of  different data types, Gower’s coefficient is an appropriate choice. 
Gower’s Sij for two individuals i and j is the weighted mean of  the contributions of  
their N characteristics. In general, the dissimilarity between two individuals i and j on 
characteristic m ( Nm ,,2,1 K= ) is represented by a score sijm, which is equal to zero when 
they are identical and one (for nominal or binary variables) or a fraction20 otherwise (for 
ordinal variables). The weight δijm is 1 when the comparison is valid and 0 otherwise. Gower’s 














Gower’s Sij is bounded between zero and one; higher values indicate greater dissimilarity (or 
greater social distance), while lower values indicate lesser dissimilarity (or lesser social 
distance). 
Using 2004 ANES data and the cluster package in [R], I computed Gower’s Sij for 
848 respondents. After accounting for missing values, this resulted in 359,128 dissimilarity 
scores, with a mean of  0.44 and standard deviation of  0.19. 
The Spatial Weights Matrix 
Specifying the spatial weight weights matrix is important in spatial econometric 
analysis. While Gower’s distance can provide a measure of  the dissimilarity between pairs of  
respondents, there is no rule to follow, no obvious point at which the similarity between 
them leads to a social tie. The connectivities between individuals are assumed to be known, 
                                                 
20 This fraction is the absolute difference of individual i’s and j’s values for characteristic m, divided by the 





not estimated; the complication is that there are many specification options. Here, I consider 
two general definitions of  social similarity and their corresponding spatial weights matrices. I 
argue that a spatial weights matrix based on a similarity measure based on Gower’s distance 
is most appropriate for the analysis in this chapter. 
One plausible definition of  connectivity is social congruence. Two individuals are 
neighbors if  they have the exact set of  social characteristics, which means that individuals 
mutually influence each other only when their race, sex, religion, social class, and age group 
are exactly identical. Each combination of  these characteristics is a disjoint neighborhood 
and, from the point of  view of  a respondent, a difference in one of  these characteristics 
makes another individual as equally irrelevant as a difference in all of  these characteristics. 
This idea of  neighborhood conflicts with everyday observations: friends tend to be similar, 
but not identical to one another. Therefore, this definition of  social connectivity is 
inappropriate for a spatial weights matrix. 
A more plausible definition of  connectivity is based on a sliding scale of  influence. 
This is based on the idea that individuals are more likely to influence each other’s political 
attitudes when they are more socially similar and are less likely to influence each other when 
they are less socially similar. In other words, all individuals are neighbors of  all the other 
individuals, but individuals are more “neighborly” if  they are closer together in Blau space 
and individuals are less “neighborly” if  they are farther apart in Blau space. Under this 
definition of  connectivity, I constructed a spatial weights matrix based on Gower’s 
dissimilarity coefficient. Ranging from zero to one, Gower’s distance is a measure of  
dissimilarity, where greater values indicate greater social distance. By taking the inverse of  
the dissimilarity between each pair of  individuals, I obtain a measure of  similarity where 




weights matrix (with zeroes on the diagonals), for which the spatial lag for each individual 
can be seen as the weighted average of  the attitudes of  the other individuals in Blau space, 
where the weights are inverse Gower’s distance. Substantively, this means that the attitudes 
of  those who are socially closer matter more and the attitudes of  those who are socially 
farther away matter less to an individual. 
Hereinafter, I refer to this spatial weights matrix as the inverse social distance matrix. 
Models and Methods 
Using the inverse social distance matrix described above, I calculate Moran’s I for 
each dependent variable to test for spatial autocorrelation, or whether there is a relationship 
between the respondents’ Blau locations and their attitudes toward eight political issues. If  
there is spatial autocorrelation, then one should expect a statistically significant association 
between political attitudes and neighboring Blau locations. A statistically significant result for 
a Moran’s I test would indicate that there is evidence of  spatial dependence for the 
corresponding political attitude. 
If  there is spatial autocorrelation for a particular political attitude, I then control for 
several individual-level explanatory and control variables in a spatial lag model to see 









where β is a k by 1 vector of  parameters associated with independent variables X, which is 
an n by k matrix of  personal characteristics that may be relevant to an individual’s political 
attitude, such as intelligence, partisanship, interest in politics, and religiosity. By assumption, 




matrix. Wy is the spatial lag of  y and is the average attitude of  respondent i’s neighbors. ρ is 
the spatial autoregressive parameter; if  0=ρ , then there is no spatial dependence, and the 
spatial lag model reduces to the classical linear regression model. By estimating ρ, we can see 
whether there is evidence that socially similar individuals mutually influence each other’s 
political attitudes. 
To estimate the spatial lag models, I use maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, which 
can handle the endogeneity of  the y term. Using ML estimation is preferable to using OLS 
because the simultaneity bias can result in biased and inconsistent estimates of  the 
parameters. 
For the sake of  comparison, I also estimate several linear regression models using 
generalized least squares. These models include a baseline linear regression model with 
explanatory variables, a linear regression model with explanatory and control variables, and a 
discretized linear regression model. The discretized linear regression consists of  the 
explanatory variables and 16 dummy variables derived from the demographic characteristics 
of  age, race, education, and sex. By comparing these three linear regression models with the 
spatial lag model, we can see more clearly the differences between the linear regression and 
spatial regression frameworks. 
HYPOTHESES 
In a (global) Moran’s I test, the null hypothesis is that political attitudes are randomly 
dispersed in Blau space. If  there is no spatial autocorrelation, there would be no association 
between political attitudes and Blau locations. Because I believe that socially similar 
individuals mutually influence each other’s political attitudes, I expect to find evidence of  a 




For the spatial lag models of  political attitudes, I test whether the spatial 
autoregressive parameter ρ is statistically significant after accounting for explanatory 
variables. The null hypothesis is that 0=ρ , which corresponds with the lack of  mutual 
influence among socially similar individuals. I expect to find evidence of  a neighborhood 
effect such that 1<ρ , but remain agnostic as to whether this effect is positive or negative. 
TESTING FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE: RESULTS 
Based on the results of  the Moran’s I tests (see Table 6.1), there is statistically 
significant spatial autocorrelation for both political attitudes. Substantively, this means that 
there is a relationship between an individual’s attitude toward the issues of  government 
spending and services and the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  
living. 
 
Table 6.1. Results of Moran’s I Tests: Inverse Social Distance Weights Matrix 




 Government spending and services 0.056 4.6 < 0.00 
 
Government’s role in securing jobs and a 
good standard of living 
0.073 6.2 < 0.00 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
In the next section, I investigate whether the spatial dependence detected in the 
Moran’s I tests holds after controlling for political knowledge, partisanship, and other 
individual-level explanatory variables. 
ESTIMATING THE SPATIAL LAG AND LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS: RESULTS 
In social science research, it is common to use demographic variables as control 
variables in models of  political phenomenon, even though they are seldom statistically 




we can see that the age, race, education, and sex variables are not statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level (see Tables 6.2a-6.2b). By comparing the AIC values, we can see that models 










LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 
WITH DEMOGRAPHICS 











































Race: Native American 
and white - 
0.27 
(0.71) 













































Table 6.2a. Linear Regression Models: Government Spending and Services 
 (continued)   















 AIC 2804 2815 
 Log likelihood -1391 -1385 






Table 6.2b. Linear Regression Models: Government’s Role in Securing Jobs and a Good 
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Race: Native American 
and white - 
-1.8** 
(0.81) 









































Table 6.2b. Linear Regression Models: Government’s Role in Securing Jobs and a Good 
Standard of Living 
 (continued)   




















 AIC 3080 3081 
 Log likelihood -1529 -1517 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
While the demographic characteristics of  age, race, education, and sex were not 
statistically or substantively significant as control variables in the linear regression models, 
they do become important as dimensions of  a Blau space. Tables 6.3a-6.3b give the results 
of  spatial lag models using the inverse distance matrices based on such a Blau space. These 
results show that there is a statistically significant neighborhood effect (at the 0.01 level) for 
the attitude toward the issue of  the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard 
of  living ( 25.0ˆ =ρ ), and a statistically significant neighborhood effect (at the 0.10 level) for 
the attitude toward the issue of  government spending and services ( 14.0ˆ =ρ ). Substantively, 
this means that social similarity – conceived and implemented here in terms of  similarity in 
age, race, education, and sex – matters; there is evidence that socially similar individuals 
mutually influence each other’s attitudes toward the issue of  government spending and 





Table 6.3a. Spatial Lag and Discretized Linear Regression Models: Government 
Spending and Services 
  SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 
WITH DEMOGRAPHICS 


































































3) ≥ 30 white, non-





4) ≥ 30 white, non-



























Table 6.3a. Spatial Lag and Discretized Linear Regression Models: Government 
Spending and Services 
 (continued)   
 


























































 AIC 2803 2817 
 Log likelihood -1390 -1383 





Table 6.3b. Linear Regression Models: Government’s Role in Securing Jobs and a Good 
Standard of Living 
  SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
DISCRETIZED LINEAR 
REGRESSION MODEL 









































































3) ≥ 30 white, non-





4) ≥ 30 white, non-




















Table 6.3b. Linear Regression Models: Government’s Role in Securing Jobs and a Good 
Standard of Living 
 (continued)   
 



























































 AIC 3073 3085 
 Log likelihood -1524 -1518 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
Alongside the results for the spatial lag models are the results for the discretized 
linear regression models. Most of  the estimated coefficients for each of  the dummy variables 
are statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better, which means that there is evidence that 
the 15 categories are important for understanding an individual’s baseline political attitude 




college-educated, and male have a mean political attitude of  5.8 toward the issue of  
government spending and services, which means that – all else being equal – they favor the 
idea that the government should provide more services rather than less. Through the dummy 
variables, the discretized linear regression models show that each social category associated 
with a different mean political attitude for each political issue. But estimating the mean 
political attitudes of  each social group is not the same thing as estimating the influence of  
belonging to a social group. Using the discretized linear regression model, we cannot say 
whether an individual who is 30 years old or older, white, college-educated, and male heeds 
the political attitudes of  other individuals who are also 30 years old or older, white, college-
educated, and male; we can only say that – assuming that we know nothing else about him – 
that his political attitude toward the issue of  government spending and services is about a 
5.8 on a 7-point scale.  
Moreover, the discretized linear regression models cannot say whether there is any 
relationship between the social characteristics of  each category and the mean political 
attitudes. Individuals who are 30 years old or older, white, college-educated, and male have a 
mean political attitude of  5.8 toward the issue of  government spending and services, 
whereas individuals who are 30 years old or older, white, college-educated, and female have a 
mean political attitude of  5.9 toward the issue of  government spending and services. This 
suggests that being male or female makes a difference in political attitudes, but as we can see 
from the linear regression model with demographic variables (Table 6.2a), sex is not a 
statistically significant independent variable. By contrasting the discretized linear regression 
model with the linear regression model with demographic variables, we can observe the loss 




Furthermore, by contrasting both linear regression models with the spatial lag model, 
we can see that the spatial lag model allows demographic characteristics to play a more 
meaningful role in explaining social influence. In the linear regression models, demographic 
characteristics are control variables; their associated effects represent little more than 
adjustments in mean political attitudes. On the other hand, in spatial lag models, 
demographic characteristics are used to measure the social similarity between each pair of  
individuals, and these social similarity measurements play a key role in describing how 
individuals mutually influence each other. Since the spatial weights matrix is specified in 
terms of  inverse social distance, the spatial lag term represents the idea that the attitudes of  
those who are more socially similar matter more than the attitudes of  those who are less 
socially similar. Since the y term is found on both sides of  the equation, this social influence 
process is a process of  mutual influence – an individual is more heavily influenced by 
socially similar others, but he also influences them as well. Thus, the spatial lag models 
estimated in Tables 6.3a and 6.3b represent a dynamic endogenous process of  social 
influence within Blau space. 
The importance of  the dynamic endogenous social influence process represented in 
the spatial lag models can be see more clearly by comparing the total effects of  the spatial lag 
models with the marginal effects of  the baseline linear regression models (Tables 6.4a-6.4b). 
A statistically significant neighborhood effect is a magnifier, which means that the total 
effect of  each independent variable is actually greater than the effect given by the linear 
regression model. While the marginal effects (1) from the linear regression model are very 
similar to the direct effects (2) from the spatial lag model, they are quite different from the 




independent variables as well as the indirect effects resulting from the mutual influence 
process. 
 








SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  b (Direct Effect) Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Attends church 0.20 0.20 0.032 0.23 
 Intelligence -0.079 -0.079 -0.013 -0.092 
 Household income -0.013 -0.013 -0.002 -0.015 




-0.13 -0.021 -0.15 
 Political knowledge -0.13 -0.13 -0.020 -0.15 
 Party ID -0.14 -0.14 -0.022 -0.16 
 Political ideology -0.35 -0.35 -0.056 -0.41 






Table 6.4b. Comparison of Effects for the Issue of the Government ‘s Role in Securing 








SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  b 
b 
(Direct Effect) 
Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Attends church -0.22 -0.20 -0.068 -0.27 
 Intelligence 0.15 0.14 0.048 0.19 
 Household income 0.032 0.030 0.010 0.040 




0.11 0.038 0.15 
 Political knowledge 0.099 0.082 0.027 0.11 
 Party ID 0.24 0.23 0.077 0.31 
 Political ideology 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.45 






If  demographic variables are truly important for understanding political attitudes, it 
would not suffice to toss in the usual list of  such variables in a regression model. Doing so 
would not capture the most theoretically interesting aspect of  these characteristics – that 
race/ethnicity, age, education, and sex provide social contexts in which individuals think and 
talk about politics. As McPherson (2004) noted, “The meat grinder of  regression puts all the 
information about social context into the maw of  the independent variable, and crunches 
out values of  the dependent variable with the teeth of  the estimated parameters, shredding 
any sense of  social structure left in the data.” In this chapter, demographic characteristics 
take on a more meaningful role as the dimensions of  a space in which individuals have the 
opportunity to mutually influence each other. 
Using the idea of  Blau space, this chapter is based on the view that demographic 
characteristics define each individual’s social position relative to one another. This allows the 
social similarity between a pair of  individuals to be measured as a distance in the Blau space. 
I used these distances to specify spatial weights matrices to test for spatial autocorrelation in 
political attitudes toward the issues of  government spending and services and the 
government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living. These tests showed that 
there was positive spatial autocorrelation in these two political attitudes. The spatial weights 
matrices were then used in spatial lag models, where the spatial lag was defined as the 
weighted average of  every other individual’s political attitude. Because the weights were 
based on inverse social distance, the model represents the idea that the attitudes of  those 
who are more socially similar matter more than the attitudes of  those who are less socially 




both models are evidence that socially similar individuals do mutually influence each other’s 
political attitudes, all else being equal. 
Using demographic variables in this way is a significant departure from the 
conventional view that demographic characteristics are indicators of  group interests or 
personal attributes that need to be controlled for. In fact, controlling for demographic 
characteristics can be undesirable; we saw in this chapter that including these characteristics 
as control variables in a linear regression model of  political attitudes actually worsened the 
fit of  the models to the data, demonstrating that a linear regression model with demographic 
control variables was little more than a “garage can” model. 
In addition to showing that socially similar individuals mutually influence each other’s 
political attitudes, this chapter demonstrated a methodological point: that using demographic 
variables in a linear regression model is not a sufficient substitute for using a spatial lag 
model of  social influence. Following the process of  discretization described in chapter 3, I 
discretized four demographic variables into 16 dummy variables and used these variables to 
construct two discretized linear regression models. While estimates for these models showed 
that while the coefficients associated with the dummy variables were statistically significant, 
they did not produce information beyond the estimated mean political attitudes of  each 
disjoint neighborhood. In contrast, the spatial lag models contained spatial lags instead of  
the 16 dummy variables, while the other explanatory variables were the same. Constructed 
from the demographic characteristics of  the respondents, the spatial weights matrices 
represented the social relationships between respondents. By comparing the results of  the 
spatial lag models with the results of  several linear regression models, we saw the spatial 
econometric approach was more substantively meaningful for understanding social influence 




because the spatial lag models allowed for the estimate of  the size of  the influence from 
socially similar individuals via the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ. 
The next chapter is the third and last application of  this dissertation’s spatial 
econometric analysis of  social influence. It is an analysis of  whether individuals mutually 











If  you call yourself  a Republican, how would you think about a new political issue? Some 
Republicans might begin by reasoning from first principles: Does this political issue infringe 
upon individual liberty? Does it involve new taxes? Or does it involve the expansion of  
government, and if  so, do the benefits outweigh that cost? Other Republicans might look to 
other Republicans first. What does Jonah Goldberg think about this new issue? What does 
Karl Rove think? What do the writers of  the Wall Street Journal editorial page think? Most 
people, if  they are interested in an issue, probably do a little bit of  both. If  we expect a 
Republican to reason according to more conservative principles and/or heed the opinions 
of  more conservative commentators, then we should also expect most Republicans to reach 
similar conclusions about a political issue.  
While the outcome of  these two thought processes may be the same and while 
individuals may engage in one, both, or neither of  the two, the processes themselves are 
different; the first is an individual-level process, while the second is social influence. To 
understand the role of  social influence in political attitudes, it is important to separate the 
two processes and assess their distinct influences on an individual’s political attitude. In this 
chapter, I examine whether ideologically proximate individuals mutually influence each 




As in the previous two chapters, this chapter has an additional methodological aim. 
One of  the benefits of  using the spatial econometric approach is that it requires researchers 
to make explicit their assumptions regarding the structure of  mutual influence. This is done 
through the specification of  the spatial weights matrix, which represents the connectivities 
among individuals. In this chapter, I compare the results of  using two different yet equally 
plausible spatial weights matrices. Each matrix is based on a different assumption regarding 
the structure of  mutual influence among individuals in an ideological space. By estimating 
spatial lag models with different spatial weights matrices, we can see whether the evidence of  
mutual influence among ideologically similar individuals relies on a narrower or broader set 
of  assumptions regarding the structure of  mutual influence.  
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITY 
Previous studies have found – to no one’s great surprise - that ideologically similar 
individuals find each other more agreeable than do ideologically dissimilar individuals, and 
consequently, individuals are more likely to discuss politics with those who share their 
political orientations. According to the two-step flow explanation (see Lazarsfeld et al, 1968 
and Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1991), individuals are more likely to obtain political information 
from other individuals rather than directly from politicians and reporters. Researchers have 
found that these other individuals do not represent a random sample of  information and 
viewpoints; instead, information seekers tend to seek out individuals who are ideologically 
similar. Unsurprisingly, Democrats prefer discussing politics with other Democrats while 
Republicans prefer discussing politics with other Republicans (Huckfeldt and Mendez, 2008). 
Since ideologically similar individuals are more likely to discuss politics with one 
another, ideologically similar individuals are more likely to influence each other than 




agreement in discussion networks have greater effects on individual attitudes and behaviors. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1991) found that respondents who reported substantial 
disagreement with their discussion partners are unaffected by their politics, while 
respondents who reported a lack of  disagreement with their discussion partners were 
associated with large effects on vote choice. In a study of  changes in party identification, 
Kenny (1994) found evidence of  social influence when respondents correctly perceive the 
political attitude of  their discussants and when respondents and discussants agree about 
politics. In contrast, individuals are less likely to engage in certain political behaviors when 
their social network members are less ideologically similar. Mutz’s (2002) study of  cross-
cutting networks found that individuals with politically-heterogeneous social networks 
tended to retreat from political activity to avoid social conflict. 
How does ideological proximity facilitate social influence? As theorized in the 
previous two chapters, interactions with those who are geographically proximate and/or 
socially similar changes an individual’s marginal utility of  holding a political attitude. How 
can ideological proximity also alter this marginal utility? 
Ideological proximity can abet social influence chiefly through the mechanism of  
learning. Recall from the previous chapter that learning in demographic contexts involves the 
transmission of  values, attitudes, and information through demographically-based social ties 
and that this process may not be strictly political to have political consequences. In contrast, 
learning in ideological contexts is intentionally political and requires a greater degree of  
initiative from individuals. Accordingly, we should expect that learning arises primarily from 
persuasion and information processing. 
 When it comes to politics, individuals are more open to persuasion when their 




at persuasion is successful depends in part on whether the would-be persuader appears or is 
actually trustworthy and knowledgeable. Ideologically similar individuals might find each 
other more trustworthy and knowledge in the narrow sense that they hold common values 
and recognize similar tradeoffs in politics. Because they share the same ideological 
background, arguments in favor of  one policy or another need not be bogged down in 
disagreements over fundamental values; instead, they can address whether a policy supports 
or contradicts a common set of  fundamental values. 
By interacting with those who are ideologically similar, individuals can process 
political information more efficiently. It is well-known in political science that that 
information acquisition is relatively costly (Downs, 1957) and that political sophistication is 
generally low among voters (Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1987). Accordingly, when confronted 
with new political information, an individual may not have all the necessary background 
information with which to assess it. Accordingly, the politically-motivated but cost-conscious 
individual has at least two options: First, the individual can seek out those with political 
expertise; second, the individual can look to see how ideologically similar individuals have 
processed the same information. 
First, individuals may seek out political expertise as a way to cut information costs. 
By referring to political experts in their networks, individuals have a shortcut to an important 
source of  information to circumvent the costs of  information acquisition (McClurg, 2003; 
McClurg 2006b). This behavior is rational because those possessing a high level of  political 
sophistication are more likely to have more and better political information (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter, 1996; Huckfeldt, 2001) than those with lower levels of  political sophistication. 
According to McClurg (2006), political experts in an individual’s network are better able to 




Expert discussants are useful to their peers because they add clarity to information 
exchanges in networks, thereby helping people connect that information to their 
predispositions. Therefore, people who talk politics with political experts are in a 
better position to identify, reject, and understand the relevance of  dissonant political 
information exchanged in their networks. The primary consequence of  this process 
should be to reduce ambivalence about and increase confidence in their political 
views. 
Because individuals find ideological similarity more agreeable, however, it is unlikely that the 
political expertise they look for is ideologically neutral. If  individuals seek out political 
expertise that is ideologically compatible with their views, then the political information they 
acquire will tend to be contextualized and filtered with regard with their common ideology. 
Consequently, compared with ideologically dissimilar experts, ideologically similar experts are 
better able to influence individuals to adopt one political attitude over another. 
Second, the attitudes of  ideologically similar individuals are themselves important 
sources of  information. Assuming that an individual knows the ideological inclinations of  
others, he can infer whether an attitude toward a specific political issue is closer or farther 
away from his ideal point based on whether his ideological peers have adopted that attitude. 
According to Grossback et al. (2004), adoption by ideologically similar peers is an important 
informational signal that a policy is a good “ideological fit.” This is especially important if  a 
policy is not easily identified with ideological labels such as “liberal” or “conservative.” If  an 
individual sees that most of  his ideological peers prefer one policy over another, this 
information can help him gauge whether a policy roughly corresponds with his ideology, 
even if  he does not have a clear or complete idea of  what the policy is supposed to 
accomplish. Thus, the attitudes of  ideologically similar peers provide important ideological 
cues regarding specific political issues, and these ideological cues can help individuals 




Thus, by aiding persuasion and information processing, ideological similarity can 
facilitate the mutual influence of  individual political attitudes. The idea of  mutual influence 
among ideologically similar individuals supports the idea that politics is primarily a social 
activity. While it is certainly possible that a given individual may arrive at a particular political 
attitude unaided by and unexposed to the views of  others, individual limitations suggests 
that it is unlikely for this to be true of  all political attitudes. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The main methodological challenge in this chapter lies in measuring the ideological 
distances between pairs of  individuals. These distances are important for representing the 
connectivities between individuals in spatial weights matrices for spatial econometric analysis. 
In this section, I first review the variables used in this chapter’s analyses. Next, I discuss the 
issue of  measuring ideological similarity and constructing spatial weights matrices. Finally, I 
review the models, methods, and hypotheses. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The focus of  this chapter is the analysis of  eight individual-level political attitudes 
from the 2004 ANES. These dependent variables are respondents’ self-placements on seven-
point political issue scales, which are as follows: 
1. Whether medical expenses should be covered by government insurance or by 
private insurance 
2. Whether the environment should be protected even if  it eliminates jobs or 
reduces the standard of  living 
3. Whether the federal government should let everybody get ahead on their 
own or ensure that every person has a job and a good standard of  living 
4. Whether the government should provide fewer services to reduce spending 




5. Whether the federal government should make every effort to improve the 
social and economic position of  blacks 
6. Whether women should have an equal role with men in business, industry, 
and government or remain in the home 
7. Whether defense spending should be increased or decreased 
8. Whether abortions should be more or less restricted 
Detailed descriptions and summary statistics for these eight dependent variables can 
be found in the appendix. 
Independent variables include control variables and explanatory variables that may 
be relevant to political attitude formation. These include the following individual-level socio-
demographic (control) variables: 
1. Age (in years) 
2. Number of  children 
3. Whether the respondent is female 
4. Whether the respondent lives in a rural environment 
5. Whether the respondent is married 
6. Whether the respondent belongs to the military 
7. Social class (self-placed scale, where higher values correspond to higher social 
classes) 
Explanatory variables include the following individual-level variables: 
1. Religiosity (whether the respondent attends church) 
2. Intelligence (based on the interviewer’s assessment on a 5-point scale, where 
higher values correspond to greater intelligence) 
3. Household income 




5. Level of  interest in political campaigns (based on a 3-point scale, where 
higher values correspond to greater interest) 
6. Level of  political knowledge (based on the number of  correct responses to 
three knowledge questions) 
7. Party identification (based on a 7-point self-placement scale, where higher 
values correspond to stronger identification with the Republican Party and 
lower values correspond to stronger identification with the Democrat Party) 
8. Political ideology (based on a 7-point self-placement scale, where higher 
values correspond to greater conservatism and lower values correspond to 
greater liberalism) 
9. The importance of  the political issue (on a 5-point scale, where higher values 
correspond with greater importance to the respondent) 
Measurement 
Before one can assess whether ideologically similar individuals mutually influence 
each other’s political attitudes, it is necessary to define and measure “ideological similarity.” 
At first glance, the political ideology indicator from the 2004 ANES is the most obvious 
candidate for measuring the ideological similarity between pairs of  individuals; we can simply 
define ideological neighbors as individuals who have similar ideological viewpoints. 
Unfortunately, measuring ideological similarity may not be as straightforward as one would 
like. This is because the 2004 ANES and other mass surveys often measure ideology by 
asking respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale, where extreme conservatism 
and extreme liberalism are the endpoints. The problem is that such a scale is too blunt an 
instrument for measuring the ideological views of  respondents. It is clear among political 
scientists what the left-right spectrum means in politics; it is less clear that laymen know 
what this spectrum means in relation to their particular set of  beliefs (Converse, 1964). 
Ideally, one would place each individual on some common ideological space free from the 




Fortunately, adherents of  the spatial theory of  voting have successfully undertaken 
the task of  identifying a common ideological space – or basic space. According to the spatial 
theory of  voting, voters and candidates can be located in an abstract spatial map, and each 
voter votes for the “closest” candidate on that map. The idea that non-geographical, 
ideological proximity could motivate political behavior grew out of  Hotelling’s observation 
that geographical proximity can motivate economic behavior. Hotelling (1929) showed that 
in a town where all the houses faced a single road, the best location for a single grocery store 
was the middle (or median) of  the town, and if  there were two grocery stores, they would be 
located right next to each other in the middle of  town. Downs (1957) applied this idea of  
spatial competition to politics in his influential work An Economic Theory of  Democracy, in 
which he argued that voters and political parties can be located in common space and that 
voters vote for the party closest to them, causing the parties to converge to the median. 
By leveraging the idea and construction of  an ideological basic space in this chapter, 
I use survey data to map all survey respondents in a common ideological space, calculate 
their relative distances from each other, and identify ideological neighbors based on these 
distances. This will allow for the use of  spatial econometrics to study the effects of  
ideological proximity on political attitudes. 
The ideological “basic space” refers to a space that comprises a set of  latent 
dimensions common to all voters and politicians. Poole (1998) gives the following definition: 
In standard spatial theory, each issue is modeled as an ordered dimension of  
alternatives, and each respondent is assumed to have an ideal point on, and single-
peaked preferences over, each issue dimension. If  the respondents have highly 
structured belief  systems (Converse 1964), then this means that the issues lie on a 




This low-dimensional issue space has been called a “basic space” (Ordeshook, 1976; Poole, 
1998), ideological dimensions (Hinich and Munger, 1994), and “policy space.” In this 
chapter, I will refer to it as basic ideological space. 
 If  we assume that every respondent to the 2004 ANES occupies a position in this 
space, then we can use Poole’s scaling technique to identify those positions based on their 
responses to certain questions in the survey. Poole’s scaling technique for recovering a basic 
space is based on the assumption that respondents report their ideological locations under 
different levels of  bias and different interpretations of  the survey questions. The procedures 
are based on the singular value decomposition of  a numeric matrix with missing data (see 
Poole, 1998 for mathematical details). The procedures will be briefly described here. 
Suppose there are n respondents and m issue scales. The survey data is a matrix X0, 
such that each element xij is individual i’s response to the jth issue (i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, . . 
. , m). Let X denote the version of  X0 with no missing data. Suppose there are s dimensions 
in the basic ideological space. Let ψik represent individual i’s position on the kth basic 
dimension (k = 1, 2, . . . , s). Let W denote an m by s matrix of  weights that map the 
individuals’ positions from the basic ideological space to the observed placements on the m 
issue scales. The model to be estimated is 
[ ] 000 '' EcJWX n ++Ψ=   
Since the dependent variables in this dissertation are political issues, it would be 
tautological to place individuals on a basic space constructed from issue scales. Instead, the 
transposed version of  this model can be used to construct a basic space from respondents’ 
placement of  political candidates and political parties on a seven-point liberal-conservative 
scale. Accordingly, I applied the transposed version of  this model to liberal-conservative 




Democrats, and the Republicans on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale. Using Poole’s 
scaling technique and the basicspace package in [R], I obtained estimates of  the 
locations of  Bush, Kerry, Nader, the Democrats, the Republicans, and, more importantly, the 
respondents on a two-dimensional basic ideological space. Table 7.1 gives the relevant 






Table 7.1. Elements of the Basic Ideological Space 
 STIMULUS N COORDINATE 1 COORDINATE 2 r2 
 Bush 386 0.565 -0.0.15 0.888 
 Kerry 386 -0.375 -0.401 0.833 
 Nader 386 -0.346 0.825 1.000 
 Democrats 386 -0.373 -0.399 0.823 
 Republicans 386 0.530 -0.010 0.854 
 Dimensions estimated: 2 
 5 rows, 386 columns 
 Total number of data entries: 1930 






Using these estimates, I map the respondents onto a two-dimensional basic space 
(Figure 7.1).  
 














Note: There are no labels indicating the ideological points for the Republican Party 
and Democrat Party because they overlap almost completely with the labels for Kerry 





Note that the first ideological dimension (x-axis) is comparable to the conventional 7-point 
liberal-conservatism scale. The interpretation of  the second ideological dimension is less 
obvious; researchers have speculated that it represents economic policy or support for the 
status quo. 
The Spatial Weights Matrix 
In this section, I consider two ways that individuals might be connected to each 
other in basic ideological space and their corresponding spatial weights matrices. I argue that 
both are appropriate for representing the connectivities between respondents. 
Two plausible definitions of  connectivity are inverse ideological distance and k-
nearest neighbor. Inverse ideological distance is based on the idea that mutual influence is 
proportional to ideological similarity. This definition of  connectivity implies that all 
individuals are ideological neighbors with one another but that every one’s neighborliness is 
weighted by their ideological similarity in the basic ideological space. In other words, 
everyone takes account of  everyone else’s political attitudes, only in different degrees. For a 
spatial weights matrix based on inverse ideological distance, the spatial lag for each individual 
can be seen as the weighted average of  everyone else in the basic ideological space. 
K-nearest neighbor connectivity is based on the idea that an individual is subject to 
mutual influence only by some ideological neighbors, not all. Like the inverse distance idea, 
individuals are willing to consider a range of  viewpoints, but unlike the inverse distance 
definition, individuals are willing to consider only a limited range of  viewpoints. This is 
represented by k, which is a constant denoting the number of  neighbors for each individual. 
By convention, the number of  neighbors is k = 5, which means that an each individual takes 




weights matrix, the spatial lag for each individual can be interpreted as the unweighted 
average of  five ideological neighbors’ attitudes. 
Table 7.2 summarizes the two spatial weights matrices. In the following analyses, 
both types of  spatial weights matrices have been normalized so that the row sums equal 1. 
 




DEFINITION OF INDIVIDUAL I’S 
NEIGHBORHOOD 





The k=5 ideologically closest 
individuals 
w i j = 1 if individual j is among 
individual i’s k closest 
ideological individuals 
w i j = 0 otherwise or i = j 
 Inverse distance All other individuals  
w i j = d i j where d i j = the inverse 
Euclidean distance between 
individual i’s and j‘s locations in 
basic ideological space 
w i j = 0 if i = j 
 
Models and Methods 
I used the basicspace and spdep packages in [R] to calculate the distance 
between respondent i'’s and respondent j’s locations in ideological space and to construct the 
three spatial weights matrices discussed previously. Using the spatial weights matrices 
describe in the previous section, I calculated Moran’s I for each dependent variable to test 
for spatial autocorrelation. The results of  the Moran’s I tests will show whether there is 
evidence of  spatial dependence. If  there is no spatial autocorrelation, there would be no 
association between values and locations. If  there is spatial autocorrelation, then one should 




neighboring locations. Based on my hypotheses, there should be evidence of  a systematic 
relationship between values and ideological locations, or positive spatial autocorrelation. 
Next, I control for individual-level explanatory and control variables in spatial lag 
models to see whether there is still evidence of  spatial dependence. These spatial lag models 
are based on the inverse distance spatial weights matrix and on the k-nearest neighbor spatial 








β is a k by 1 vector of  parameters associated with independent variables X, which is an n by 
k matrix of  personal characteristics that may be relevant to an individual’s political attitude. 
The error term ε is assumed to be normally distributed with a constant variance, and I is a n 
by n identity matrix.  
Wy is the spatial lag of  y and is the average attitude of  respondent i’s neighbors. 
Using the inverse distance spatial weights matrix, Wy is the weighted average of  respondent 
i’s ideological neighbors’ attitudes; the attitudes of  individuals who are ideologically closer to 
respondent i are weighted more heavily, while individuals who are ideologically farther away 
are weighted less heavily. Using the k-nearest neighbor matrix, Wy is the unweighted average 
of  respondent i’s 5=k  closest ideological neighbors. 
The spatial autoregressive parameter ρ indicates the extent of  mutual influence 
among ideologically proximate individuals. If  0=ρ , then there is no spatial dependence, 
and the spatial lag model reduces to the classical linear regression model. If  0≠ρ , then 





To estimate the spatial lag models, I use maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, which 
can handle the endogeneity of  the y term in the spatial lag models. Using ML estimation is 
preferable to using OLS because the simultaneity bias can result in biased and inconsistent 
estimates of  the parameters. I also estimate baseline linear regression models (using 
generalized least squares) for comparison. 
HYPOTHESES 
In a (global) Moran’s I test, the null hypothesis is that political attitudes are dispersed 
randomly in basic ideological space, and the alternative hypothesis is that the attitudes are 
not dispersed randomly. Because I believe that individuals mutually influence each other’s 
political attitudes because of  their ideological similarity, I expect to find evidence of  a 
positive relationship between individuals’ attitudes and locations in basic ideological space, or 
positive spatial autocorrelation.  
For the spatial lag models of  political attitudes, I test whether the spatial 
autoregressive parameter ρ is statistically significant after accounting for explanatory 
variables. The null hypothesis is that 0=ρ , and the alternative hypothesis is that 0≠ρ . I 
expect to find evidence of  a neighborhood effect such that 1<ρ , but remain agnostic as to 
whether this effect is positive or negative. 
TESTING FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE: RESULTS 
Based on the results of  the Moran’s I tests (see Table 7.3a-7.3b), both types of  spatial 
weights matrices produced statistically significant (at the 0.10 level or better) spatial 
autocorrelation for all or most of  the political attitudes. The Moran’s I tests using the inverse 
distance spatial weights matrices produced statistically significant spatial autocorrelation for 




role of  women. The Moran’s I tests using the 5-nearest neighbor spatial weights matrices 
produced statistically significant spatial autocorrelation for all eight political attitudes. 
Substantively, the Moran’s I test results mean that there is a positive relationship between an 
individual’s political attitudes and his ideological neighbors’ political attitudes. 
By comparing the results, we can see that Moran’s I associated with the 5-nearest 
neighbor spatial weights matrix is consistently larger than the Moran’s I associated with the 
inverse distance matrix. The p-values for the former are also much smaller than the p-values 
for the latter. Thus, the evidence of  spatial autocorrelation is stronger when using the 5-
nearest neighbor spatial weights matrix. Because the two types of  matrices are based on 
different assumptions, the stronger autocorrelation for the tests conducted with the 5-
nearest neighbor spatial weights matrices suggests that mutual influence may be stronger in 
smaller pools of  ideologically similar individuals. 
In the next section, I investigate whether the spatial dependence detected in the 
Moran’s I tests holds after controlling for political knowledge, partisanship, and other 
individual-level independent variables relevant to political attitudes. Because each type of  
spatial weights matrix produced evidence of  spatial autocorrelation, I estimate spatial lag 







Table 7.3a. Results of Moran’s I Tests: Inverse Distance Spatial Weights Matrix 
 POLITICAL ATTITUDE Moran’s i SE P-VALUE 
 Access to abortion 0.067*** 4.4 < 0.00 
 Environment versus jobs tradeoff 0.075*** 4.9 < 0.00 
 
Government versus private medical 
insurance 0.043*** 2.8 0.0059 
 Government spending and services 0.047** 3.0 0.0030 
 Defense spending 0.071*** 4.3 < 0.00 
 
Government’s role in securing jobs and a 
good standard of living 0.056*** 3.6 0.00037 
 Government assistance to blacks 0.056*** 3.4 0.00057 
 Role of women 0.020 1.4 0.17 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
 
Table 7.3b. Results of Moran’s I Tests: 5-Nearest Neighbor Spatial Weights Matrix 




 Access to abortion 0.15*** 6.3 < 0.00 
 Environment versus jobs tradeoff 0.18*** 7.3 < 0.00 
 
Government versus private medical 
insurance 
0.13*** 5.5 < 0.00 
 Government spending and services 0.10*** 4.3 0.000017 
 Defense spending 0.17*** 6.8 < 0.0 
 
Government’s role in securing jobs and a 
good standard of living 
0.14*** 5.6 < 0.00 
 Government assistance to blacks 0.15*** 6.2 < 0.00 
 Role of women 0.12*** 5.1 < 0.00 




ESTIMATING THE SPATIAL LAG MODEL: RESULTS 
I used maximum likelihood to estimate spatial lag models using the two types of  
similarity-based spatial weights matrix for eight political attitudes issues. While models for all 
the dependent variables were estimated, only the results for the political attitudes with 
statistically significant neighborhood effects are shown (Tables 7.4a-7.4c), alongside 
estimates for linear regression models for comparison. 
The results show that there is statistically significant evidence of  spatial dependence 
for three political attitudes: the attitudes toward the issues of  defense spending, 
environmental protection versus jobs, and access to abortion. The null hypothesis for each 
spatial lag model of  each dependent variable is that there is no neighborhood effect ( 0=ρ ). 
Based on the results, I reject the null hypothesis for the attitudes toward the issues of  
defense spending, environmental protection versus jobs, and access to abortion, and I do not 
reject the null hypothesis for attitudes toward the remaining five issues. 
For five political attitudes, the neighborhood effects detected through Moran’s I tests 
disappeared after controlling for individual-level characteristics, such as ideology and party 
identification. These findings suggest that for five political issues, ideologically-similar 
individuals have similar attitudes because of  their similar individual characteristics, not 
because of  mutual influence. In other words, there is no evidence that there is mutual 
influence in political attitudes within ideologically-defined neighborhoods for these issues. 
Based on the results in Tables 7.4a-7.4c, the three political attitudes that are subject 
to neighborhood effects are the attitudes toward the issues of  environmental protection 
versus jobs, defense spending, and access to abortion. For models of  these three attitudes, a 
comparison of  AIC values shows that it is not obvious which spatial lag model fits better. 




the spatial lag models with inverse distance spatial weights matrix than the corresponding 
estimates for the spatial lag models with the 5-nearest neighbor spatial weights matrix. 
 
































































































































Table 7.4a. Attitude Models: Defense Spending 
 (continued)    






















 AIC 1713 1712 1710 
 Log likelihood -839 -837 -836 


























































































































































Table 7.4b. Attitude Models: Environmental Protection versus Jobs 
 (continued)    
 AIC 1845 1842 1843 
 Log likelihood  -902 -902 




















































































































 (continued)    































Table 7.4c. Attitude Models: Access to Abortion 









 AIC 1512 1508 1510 
 Log likelihood -738 -735 -736 
 *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 2-tailed tests 
 
Direct Effects, Indirect Effects, and Total Effects 
In the spatial lag model, the presence of  the dependent variable y on either side of  
the equation means that the fitted coefficients must be interpreted in light of  direct effects, 
indirect effects, and total effects, such that the expected value of  y is 
( ) ( ) βρ XWI 1−−=yE  
when there is no neighborhood effect. If  there is no neighborhood effect (i.e., 0=ρ ) then 
the expected value of  y reduces to Xβ. 
Tables 7.5a-7.5c contrast the effects found by using the linear regression model with 
the total effects found by using the spatial lag models. The presence of  a statistically 
significant neighborhood effect means that the total effect of  each independent variable is 
tends to be greater than the effect given by the linear regression model. In Tables 7.5a-7.5c, 
note that the marginal effects (1) from the linear regression model are very different from 
the total effects for the spatial lag model with the inverse distance spatial weights matrix (2) 
and from the total effects for the spatial lag model with the 5-nearest neighbor spatial 
weights matrix (3). Because the total effect of  an independent variable for a spatial lag model 
is the sum of  the direct and indirect effects, the effects indicated in (2) and (3) are generally 




An interesting exception can be found in the comparison of  the effects of  
intelligence on attitudes toward defense spending in Table 7.5a, where the total effects from 
the spatial lag models are much smaller than the effects garnered from the baselines linear 
regression model. By referring to the direct effects of  intelligence from the spatial lag 
models in Table 7.4a, we can see that the estimated coefficients (i.e., the direct effects) for 
intelligence in both spatial lag models are much smaller than the estimated coefficient for 
intelligence in the baseline linear regression model so that after adding the indirect effects, 
the total effects from the spatial lag models are still smaller than the effects from the linear 
regression model. Since intelligence is not a statistically significant variable, I then estimated 
all three models excluding intelligence as an explanatory variable. The estimated coefficients 
for all three revised models were essentially the same as the results reported in Table 7.4a; 
however, the standard errors were slightly smaller and the AIC measures for the spatial lag 
models were slightly lower. This finding suggests that including intelligence as an 
independent variable led to a specification error of  including an unnecessary variable, which 
in turn suggests that an inspection of  direct, indirect, and total effects may be also be useful 













 BASELINE LINEAR 
REGRESSION MODEL 
SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
(INVERSE DISTANCE) 
SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
(5-NEAREST 
NEIGHBOR) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Effect Total Effect Total Effect 
 Age 0.0065 0.0077 0.0076 
 Children 0.012 0.016 0.018 
 Female -0.15 -0.19 -0.19 
 Rural 0.14 0.18 0.17 
 Married 0.12 0.14 0.12 
 Military 0.24 0.29 0.27 
 Attends church -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 
 Social class 0.027 0.034 0.036 
 Intelligence 0.023 0.018 0.010 
 Household income 0.015 0.019 0.018 




0.016 0.026 0.032 
 Political knowledge -0.026 -0.035 -0.039 
 Party ID 0.20 0.24 0.23 
 Political ideology 0.16 0.17 0.17 











 BASELINE LINEAR 
REGRESSION MODEL 
SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
(INVERSE DISTANCE) 
SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
(5-NEAREST 
NEIGHBOR) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Effect Total Effect Total Effect 
 Age 0.0062 0.0085 0.0080 
 Children -0.011 -0.0078 -0.0012 
 Female 0.17 0.20 0.17 
 Rural -0.091 -0.14 -0.12 
 Married -0.098 -0.13 -0.11 
 Military 0.18 0.20 0.16 
 Attends church 0.036 0.026 0.027 
 Social class 0.039 0.057 0.045 
 Intelligence 0.050 0.052 0.053 
 Household income 0.0022 0.0021 0.0016 




-0.031 -0.047 -0.045 
 Political knowledge -0.0099 -0.014 -0.010 
 Party ID 0.13 0.17 0.15 
 Political ideology 0.19 0.23 0.20 











 BASELINE LINEAR 
REGRESSION MODEL 
SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
(INVERSE DISTANCE) 
SPATIAL LAG MODEL 
(5-NEAREST 
NEIGHBOR) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Effect Total Effect Total Effect 
 Age -0.0010 -0.00092 -0.00074 
 Children -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 
 Female 0.30 0.38 0.34 
 Rural -0.15 -0.18 -0.17 
 Married -0.081 -0.11 -0.094 
 Military -0.036 -0.025 -0.039 
 Attends church -0.40 -0.50 -0.45 
 Social class 0.013 0.0096 0.012 
 Intelligence 0.11 0.13 0.12 
 Household income 0.030 0.039 0.035 




-0.0040 -0.017 -0.011 
 Political knowledge 0.074 0.093 0.083 
 Party ID -0.093 -0.12 -0.11 
 Political ideology -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 








Is there is evidence that ideologically-similar individuals mutually influence each 
other’s political attitudes? Based on this chapter’s analysis, the answer is yes. Furthermore, 
this answer does not depend on a particular assumption regarding the relationships among 
individuals in ideological space. 
In this chapter, I looked at ideology as a space in which individuals might mutually 
influence each other’s political attitudes. The motivating theory is that ideologically similar 
individuals are important resources for political learning. First, individuals are more receptive 
to political ideas when they come from ideologically similar individuals, and that this 
receptivity is social in nature and separate from the ideological leanings of  the individuals 
themselves. Second, individuals tend to circumvent informational costs by seeking out 
political expertise from ideologically similar experts rather than ideologically neutral ones, 
leading to a biased filtering and contextualization of  political information. Third, the 
adoption of  a particular political attitude by ideologically similar individuals is an important 
cue regarding the ideological compatibility of  a political policy or issue. 
In order to assess whether ideologically similar individuals mutually influence each 
other’s political attitudes, I operationalized the idea of  “ideological similarity” by measuring 
the distance between individuals in a common ideological space. To get this space, I used 
survey respondents’ placements of  political candidates and political parties to estimate a 
basic ideological space in which all the respondents are located. After calculating the 
distances between individuals in the space, I constructed two types of  spatial weights 
matrices based on two definitions of  connectivity. 
To find out whether political attitudes are contagious, I used Moran’s I tests to 




neighborhood effects. The results showed that for three political issues, ideologically similar 
individuals mutually influence each other’s political attitudes. For these three issues, the 
spatial clustering of  political attitudes cannot be explained only by individual characteristics 
such as party identification and political ideology. Furthermore, the fact that the results were 
similar for both specifications of  the spatial weights matrix shows that the evidence of  
mutual influence does not depend on a single assumption regarding the structure of  
influence. 
As in geographical and social contexts, there is evidence that of  mutual influence in 









This dissertation is an attempt to explain how spatial econometrics can be used to study 
social influence in politics. I have explained how social influence is an endogenous process 
of  mutual influence among similar individuals, where “similarity” in terms of  social distance 
can be based on geographic, demographic, or ideological characteristics. I have discussed the 
limitations of  conventional models for studying social influence, such as ANOVA, linear 
regression, and contextual models, showed how these models relate to spatial econometric 
models, and discussed the advantages of  using spatial regression models over these 
conventional models. I have argued that spatial econometrics can be a feasible tool for 
studying social influence by bringing together the concepts of  social influence and 
neighborhood effect and by broadening the concept of  space beyond mere geography to a 
more general set of  opportunities for mutual influence based on characteristics such as 
geographical proximity, demographic similarity, and ideological similarity. Using the 2004 
ANES, I applied these ideas by developing spatial regression models for individual attitudes 
toward political issues to see whether individuals who are geographical, demographic, and 





SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The theoretical feasibility of using spatial econometrics for studying social influence in 
politics 
In chapter 2, I argued that social contexts can be conceived as multi-dimensional 
spaces that provide opportunities for social influence. Social influence should be understood 
as mutual influence among proximate individuals in such a space. This dissertation 
considered three types of  spaces: geographical, demographic (Blau), and ideological space. 
These spaces provide opportunities for social influence in the sense that individuals are more 
likely to associate with those who geographically proximate, demographically similar, and/or 
ideologically similar. 
Understanding social context as space offers two main advantages. First, it 
incorporates previous definitions of  social context (e.g., census tract) while providing a 
flexible framework for more abstract definitions (e.g., socioeconomic status, network 
membership) that need not be limited to geography. Second, understanding social context as 
space is the crucial step for bringing together spatial econometrics and social influence, since 
spatial weights matrices can be used to representing the proximities among individuals in a 
given space. Such spatial weights matrices can then be used in tests for spatial 
autocorrelation and in spatial regression models to assess whether there is evidence of  a 
neighborhood effect, or social influence. 
The relationship between spatial regression models and conventional models 
In chapters 2 and 3, I compared and contrasted spatial regression models with 
analysis of  variance, linear regression, contextual models, and social network models for 
studying social influence. Chapter 2 showed that the contextual model and social network 




spatial-x model and social network model assume that the influence of  social networks is 
exogenous; however, the spatial-x model allows all data points to be considered during 
estimation, while the social network model is based on a truncated sample.  
Chapter 4 addressed the broader issue of  using linear regression or ANOVA (as a 
special case of  linear regression) versus spatial regression models. I demonstrated that while 
ANOVA can be considered a special case of  the first-order autoregressive (FAR) model, 
neither simple linear regression nor multivariate linear regression can be considered spatial 
regression models. These results show that using a host of  geographical, demographic, 
ideological, or other variables as control variables in a linear regression model is no 
substitute for using these same variables in a spatial weights matrix in a spatial regression 
model. Furthermore, I showed that while simple and multivariate linear regression models 
can be forced into special cases of  spatial regression models by discretizing the continuous 
independent variables, the resulting discretized regression model is problematic for a variety 
of  reasons. 
In contrast to “garbage in, garbage out” models, spatial regression models can 
meaningfully account for geographical, demographic, ideological characteristics as part of  an 
individual’s social context. Instead of  looking at the marginal effect of  a single characteristic, 
researchers can define meaningful social contexts (i.e., neighborhoods), use spatial regression 
models to represent the influence process, and estimate the impact on individual political 




Using spatial econometrics to estimate social influence in individual attitudes toward 
political issues 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provided empirical applications of  spatial econometrics to the 
study of  social influence on political attitudes among geographically, demographically, and 
ideologically proximate individuals. 
Chapter 5 showed that there is evidence of  social influence among geographical 
neighbors. Individuals who reside in the same congressional district mutually influence each 
other’s attitudes toward two political issues: access to abortion and the government’s role in 
securing jobs and a good standard of  living. 
Chapter 5 also illustrated the differences between spatial regression and dummy 
variable regression that were discussed in chapter 3. Using congressional districts as disjoint 
neighborhoods, I compared the results of  estimating a spatial regression model and 
contextual model and demonstrated that the latter model constrains the neighborhood effect 
such that 1=ρ , while the former allows for its estimation. 
Chapter 6 examined whether socially similar individuals mutually influence each 
other’s political attitudes. Using Gower’s dissimilarity coefficient as a measure of  social 
proximity, I found that there is evidence of  social influence for attitudes toward the issue of  
the government’s role in securing jobs and a good standard of  living and the issue of  
government spending and services. 
Chapter 6 also illustrated the use of  a discretized linear regression model based on 
demographically-defined disjoint neighborhoods. A comparison of  the estimates of  this 
model and the spatial regression model clarified the differences between the two models for 
studying social influence. 
Chapter 7 is an analysis of  mutual influence among ideologically proximate 




political parties, I constructed a basic ideological space in which all respondents are located 
and used the distances within this space to determine the ideological proximity among the 
individuals. These distances were then used to construct spatial weights matrices 
representing the connectivities among the individuals in a basic ideological space. The results 
show that the ideologically-similar individuals mutually influence each other’s attitudes 
toward the issues of  defense spending, the tradeoff  between environmental protection and 
jobs, and access to abortion. 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation is about whether spatial econometrics can be used to study social 
influence and it showed that it can be done. By equating social influence with neighborhood 
effect, by viewing social contexts as spaces, and by going beyond the limitations of  
geographical space, this dissertation showed that this task is possible. By highlighting the 
explanatory advantages of  spatial regression and by clarifying the relationship between 
spatial regression models and linear regression models and its variants, this dissertation 
showed that using spatial econometrics to study social influence is a desirable one. 
While the evidence of  social influence uncovered in the empirical chapters is hardly 
overwhelming, the primary purpose of  the chapters is to illustrate the use of  spatial 
econometrics using survey data for understanding social influence in politics.  
The spatial econometric approach used in this dissertation is an alternative to 
conventional methods of  studying social influence, such as contextual analysis and ANOVA. 
It offers estimates of  social influence but does not require special social network data, does 
not assume that social influence is a simple average of  network members, and does not 
require respondents to be conscious of  any influence. Furthermore, by leveraging the idea 




space. This study argued for and provided evidence of  spatial dependence in political 
attitudes, thereby showing the viability of  spatial econometrics for studying social influence. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results of  this dissertation point to several possibilities for further research 
First, the empirical applications in this dissertation were limited to cross-sectional 
data from the 2004 ANES. The next step is to extend the spatial regression analysis used in 
this dissertation by applying the spatial lag model to other ANES datasets. By comparing 
neighborhood effects for different years, we can see if  these effects are consistent over time 
and whether changes in these effects are different for different issues. 
Second, this dissertation considered only three types of  spaces: geographical, 
demographic, and ideological. Since social space can be broadly defined and mutual 
influence is certainly not limited to geography, demography, or ideology, it may be 
informative to study mutual influence in spaces defined by other characteristics, such 
language similarity, online activity, or media markets. 
Finally, the empirical applications in this dissertation assumed that there is no spatial 
heterogeneity, which refers to the lack of  structural stability of  political attitudes over space 
by way of  different functional forms or systematically varying parameters (see Anselin, 
1988). In substantive terms, this means assuming that the extent and size of  social influence 
is the same across a space. This study looked only at spatial dependence and assumed that 
the neighborhood effects in geographical, Blau, and ideological spaces are uniform across 
those spaces; it is certainly plausible, however, to suspect that social influence might operate 
differently in different parts of  a space. For example, it may be the case that more highly 




Investigating spatial heterogeneity in political attitudes in different social contexts would 






POLITICAL ATTITUDES  
 
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics and Other Details for 8 Political Issues (7-point scale) 






















3.59 1.58 1019 193 
Protect the 
environment, 
even if it costs 
jobs 
Maintain/increas





in securing jobs 
and a good 
standard of living 
4.21 1.78 1103 109 
The government 





should let each 
person get ahead 























 Role of women 1.92 1.47 1157 55 
Women and men 
should have 
equal roles 
Women’s place is 
in the home 
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